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Abstract 
Inspired by some newly emerged topics from the real world, this thesis comprises of four 
essays that study firms’ strategic incentives, as well as the vertical and horizontal agreements 
between firms.  
The first essay assesses theoretically firms’ incentives to engage in quality proliferation. 
We show that it is possible for vertical proliferation to be completely undesirable in the 
absence of entry threats, therefore proliferation of any level might be anticompetitive. 
Nevertheless, when proliferation is optimally conducted, it always benefits consumers.  
The second and third essays focus on vertical contracts between successive stages of 
production. The second essay places the controversial agency model involved in the e-book 
case in the context of antitrust treatment to vertical restraints, and examines its effects on 
competition and welfare relative to the wholesale model.  
The third essay goes beyond and develops a framework allowing us to clarify the ceteris 
paribus effects of changing each of the two key elements written in a vertical contract: decision 
roles and forms of the transfer payment. Based on this framework, we show that it is 
meaningful to distinguish between classic RRM, by which a manufacturer sets the transfer 
payment as well as the retail price, and agency RPM, by which a retailer is able to set the 
transfer payment before a manufacturer set the retail price. 
The final essay focuses on horizontal cartel agreements and experimentally investigates 
the effects of endogenous enforcement on cartel prices. We highlight the strategic uncertainty 
in cartel coordination as a channel of composition deterrence, as well as the potential trade-off 
between frequency and composition deterrence. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is broadly related to firms’ strategic incentives and inter-firm agreements. The 
progress of information technology has drastically shaped the strategies adopted by firms in 
competition and the ways in which firms interact with each other in the markets. While some 
of the changes are well attended by practitioners and academics, some are largely unaddressed, 
hence the relevant effects on competition and welfare remain unclear. This thesis seeks to 
enhance our understanding of selected topics of such.  
The main body of the thesis presents four independent essays. The first three essays 
theoretically assess the topics of interest, with Chapters 3 and 4 being closely linked. The final 
essay uses experimental methodology, although a theoretical background is provided. All four 
essays offer relevant policy implications. In particular, Chapters 3 and 4 are related to the 
antitrust treatment of vertical restraints, and Chapter 5 is related to the design of antitrust 
enforcement.  
Chapter 2 is motivated by the high-street and luxury collaborations in the fashion apparel 
and sportswear industry.1 While such collaboration may be understood as a type of quality 
                                                          
1 For example, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) alone has collaborated with more than 10 designer brands. See 
http://about.hm.com/en/About/facts-about-hm/fashion-for-all/collections/collaborations.html.  
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proliferation given that high-street and luxury brands are perceived as vertically differentiated, 
the literature on quality proliferation is per se sparse. Specifically, among many strategic 
incentives, proliferation has mainly been examined for two – to increase profit and to deter 
entry. In contrast to the intense investigation regarding both in horizontal differentiation 
settings, the same in vertical differentiation settings receives far less attention. We therefore 
wish to take some initial steps to fill in the gap.  
In a model of vertical maximal differentiation where firms compete in quality and price, 
we analyse the incentive of an established high quality firm to proliferate without and with 
entry threats. We show that the high quality firm would only be able to locate a middle quality 
product if it allows that product to be an independent unit. Such proliferation is not optimal in 
the absence of entry threats but becomes optimal in the presence of entry threats, when the 
proliferation cost is sufficiently small. These results highlight the trade-off between softening 
competition and broadening market segments brought about by proliferation and that even the 
most moderate level of quality proliferation may be anticompetitive. Interestingly, when 
proliferation is optimally carried out, it benefits consumers and could even increase total 
welfare in a way that is more efficient than entry. 
Chapter 3 is motivated by the (in) famous Apple2 case and the prevalence of the agency 
model in some markets in recent years. Complementary to studies on the agency model in a 
particular market, e.g., the e-book market, we take an alternative approach of trying to 
understand the nature of the agency model. Through comparing the wholesale model and the 
agency model characterizing a vertical relation in a bilateral duopoly market, we find that the 
agency model may be regarded as an example of retailer power resale price maintenance (RPM) 
which is usually beneficial to retailers. Results further provide an economic view of why 
restraints of this kind may be evaluated under the rule of reason: while competition is more 
likely to be undercut under the agency model, relative to the wholesale model, the agency 
model benefits consumers by offering lower retail prices and higher demand. 
                                                          
2 U.S. v. Apple Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), the State of Texas, et al. v. Penguin Group Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 3394 
(DLC) (2013). More details about this case can be found in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 notes that, moving from the wholesale model to the agency model, not only the 
decision roles of manufacturers and retailers are reversed, but also the form of the transfer 
payment changes from unit-fee to revenue-sharing. In Chapter 4, we seek to separate out the 
effects of these two changes through comparing across a menu of vertical contracts that differ 
in decision roles and/or forms of the transfer payment. Based on this framework, we formally 
distinguish between classic RRM, by which a manufacturer sets the transfer payment as well 
as the retail price, to agency RPM, by which a retailer is able to set the transfer payment before 
the retail price being set by a manufacturer, e.g., the agency model.  
In a bilateral monopoly market, we find that the two types of RPM differ substantially in 
their respective effects on profit division and consumer surplus: classic RPM benefits the 
manufacturer whereas agency RPM benefits the retailer; classic RPM eliminates double 
marginalisation whereas agency RPM may fail to do. Furthermore, since there is no horizontal 
competition under bilateral monopoly, our analysis highlights the neglected role of vertical 
competition in vertical relations that both the manufacturer and the retailer may have 
incentives to use RPM for vertical rent shifting, which can also affect consumer surplus. 
Regarding the ceteris paribus effects of reversing decision roles and changing forms of the 
transfer payment, we find that, for a given form of the transfer payment, reversing decision 
roles does not affect retail prices and is purely a vertical rent shifting. More interestingly, 
manufacturer profits are higher when the retail price is set by the retailer and retailer profits 
are higher when the retail price is set by the manufacturer. For given decision roles, retail 
prices are always lower under revenue-sharing contracts. Whoever sets the retail price is better 
off under a unit-fee contract, whereas the other is better off under a revenue-sharing contract.  
Chapter 5 focuses on horizontal cartel agreements. A cartel is fundamentally a cooperative 
game, hence not only the expected profitability, but also the stability and sustainability of an 
agreement matter. Nevertheless, practitioners and academics seem to focus more on the former 
(apart from those studying leniency programmes). The literature on cartels and optimal 
antitrust enforcement, including those using experimental methodologies, has contributed to 
our understanding of the effects of exogenous cartel enforcement. In particular, how fines and 
detection probabilities are imposed to alter a cartel’s expected profitability so that frequency 
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deterrence can be achieved. We wish to examine an alternative channel of deterrence, that is, 
how endogenous enforcement, i.e., fines and detection probabilities that vary with the cartel 
harm, can aggravate the cartel coordination problem through worsening the strategic 
uncertainty among cartelists, so that they are deterred from colluding on the risky high cartel 
price and instead collude on a low cartel price. This mitigation of harm following a reduced 
cartel overcharge is known as composition deterrence.  
We conduct a laboratory experiment on infinitely-repeated noncooperative games in 
which subjects engage in homogenous goods price competition in groups of three. Subjects 
can coordinate on prices but face the risk of being detected and fined if they do. The 
experiment has four treatments, of which the baseline is with exogenous enforcement. In the 
other three treatments, the implemented endogenous enforcement regime gives rise to payoff–
equivalent collusive price equilibria that bear different levels of riskiness of collusion. Our 
results suggest evidence of composition deterrence: subjects are found to behave strategically 
and tend to collude on the price with lower riskiness of collusion. Yet, as the low cartel price 
becomes more desirable in the presence of endogenous enforcement, there is an adverse effect 
on frequency deterrence, leaving the overall welfare effect of endogenous enforcement unclear. 
This thesis goes on to present each of the four essays. Chapter 6 delivers the general 
conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Proliferation and Entry Deterrence in 
Vertically Differentiated Markets 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In vertically differentiated markets with products of the same generic type, firms making 
quality-price decisions face a trade-off between softening competition and broadening market 
segments. As a result, proliferation or multi-product strategy (see, e.g., Constantatos and 
Perrakis, 1997), with which firms typically offer a range of products, could have either 
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects. On the one hand, by filling in the gaps on a quality 
spectrum, proliferation increases competition as products available become less differentiated. 
On the other hand, proliferation enables firms to reach different market segments and better 
discriminate against consumers.  
Ever since Schmalensee (1978) suggests empirically that an incumbent can preempt entry 
by introducing new products and restricting the market space available to potential entrants, 
there has been increasing antitrust concerns against excessive proliferation. If one tries to 
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rationalize firms’ engagement in proliferation that is not per se profitable, the argument might 
be that it is optimal if some other considerations are taken into account, e.g., entry deterrence.  
Proliferation to deter entry has been under intense investigation in horizontal 
differentiation settings (Judd, 1985; Choi and Scarpa, 1991; Murooka, 2012), but the same 
analysis in vertical settings is sparse. Given that excessive proliferation is suspicious, one may 
tempt to assume that moderate proliferation is more likely to be justified on profitability 
ground thus seemingly causes no harm. In this paper, we show that it is possible for vertical 
proliferation to be completely undesirable in the absence of entry threats, even in the extreme 
case of introducing only one additional quality. Therefore proliferation of any level might 
involve anticompetitive purpose. More interestingly, when proliferation is optimal given entry 
threats, it always benefits consumers.  
In a vertically differentiated market, suppose that consumers have identical ordinal 
preferences over product quality and differ only in income levels.1 Then at an equal price, 
higher quality is preferable. For example, people would generally agree that a Mason Pearson 
hairbrush is preferable to a hairbrush from Primark.2 In a simple duopoly market, a series of 
papers (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992) 
prove the existence of a unique quality-price equilibrium in which two established firms follow 
the Principle of Maximal Differentiation. That is, they first choose distinct qualities and then 
set distinct prices, so as to dampen competition and increase profits.  
It is also common for a single firm to offer quality-differentiated products to consumers. 
For example, for a given size, Mason Pearson usually offers three types of hairbrush, namely 
pure bristle, bristle/nylon, and nylon, where bristle is finer and more expensive than nylon as 
the component of a hairbrush head. Another form of proliferation, namely brands collaboration, 
is usually conducted jointly by two firms. Similar to a joint venture strategy, brands 
collaboration is defined by Chun and Niehm (2010) as a strategic and cooperative relationship 
                                                          
1 Another interpretation of vertical differentiation is by Mussa and Rosen (1978) where consumers differ only in 
their intensity of preference for quality. The two interpretations are related; if 𝜃 is a parameter of intensity of 
preference for quality, then wealthier consumers have a higher 𝜃 and enjoy quality improvement more that less 
wealthy consumers (See, e.g., Tirole, 1988; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992). 
2 See http://masonpearson.co.uk/ and http://www.primark.com/en/search/categorised search?q=hairbrush.  
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where brands devote their own competitive advantages to present products under joint names 
to consumers.  
A good example of vertical brands collaboration is the high-street brands (e.g. Gap and 
H&M) and luxury brands (e.g. Jimmy Choo and Lanvin) collaborations in the fashion apparel 
and sportswear industry. The premier case was by Puma and Jil Sander in the late 1990s. Chun 
and Niehm (2010) suggest that through this collaboration, “the boundaries between genres 
collapsed.” In 2003, Adidas launched its first collaborations with designer brands Stella 
McCartney and Jeremy Scott. Puma collaborated with Neil Barrett and Alexander McQueen 
in subsequent years. Nike joined the trend in 2012 and has been collaborating with Liberty.   
A more typical case has been the Sweden based clothing retailer Hennes & Mauritz 
(H&M). In 2004, H&M tied up with Karl Lagerfeld and produced a successful collection. 
Since then, it has launched 21 collaborations with 16 different designer brands.3 The average 
prices of items from H&M collaborations were over £100, with the most expensive 
collaboration so far being Maison Martin Margiela for H&M (on average £141.61 per item). 
Despite at much higher prices compared to normal H&M ranges, the collaboration ranges were 
sold out quickly. Some popular pieces were sold on eBay for five times the original prices. 
Meanwhile, the prices were lower than the original luxury collections. As reflected by prices, 
the perceived quality of collaborated ranges seems to be higher than the normal ranges from 
the high-street stores, although would not be as high as the original designer collections. As a 
result, quality configuration expands with such joint proliferation. 
It is of importance to study proliferation in vertically differentiated markets since the 
existing studies relating to it is limited and does not keep up pace with the boom of the real 
world (joint) proliferation cases. Among many strategic incentives, proliferation has mainly 
been examined for two – to increase profit and to deter entry. While there is a literature on the 
optimality of proliferation (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982), the specific conditions and 
                                                          
3 Collaborations in the last decade included those with Stella McCartney, Viktor & Rolf, Roberto Cavalli, Comme 
des Garcons, Marimekko, Matthew Williamson, Jimmy Choo, Sonia Rykiel, Lanvin, Versace, Marni, Anna Dello 
Russo, Maison Martin Margiela, Isabel Marant and Alexander Wang. See http://about.hm.com/en/About/facts-
about-hm/people-and-history/history.html. 
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endogenous proliferation qualities have been largely unaddressed, leaving it difficult to 
evaluate proliferation even in a simple framework. Since the entry deterrence effect of 
proliferation in vertical differentiation settings is rarely examined, the relevant welfare effects 
remain unclear.4 
Although fully replicating the real world high-street and luxury collaborations is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we wish to examine how proliferation works in a context that captures 
this sort of competition. In the absence of entry threats, common expectation of firms on 
proliferation is to broaden market segments. Whether such expectation can be fulfilled is 
unclear without knowing how firms wish to locate the additional qualities.  
Furthermore, when a firm makes decisions regarding proliferation, it faces a menu of 
options of how much control it wishes to take. For example, it may wish to take full control 
over the quality-price decision of any additional product introduced; or any additional product 
acts as an independent unit that decides its own quality and price, while the parent-firm acts 
as a shareholder collecting profit from it (i.e., divisionalisation in Baye, Crocker and Ju, 1996).  
Immediately the message is that an entrant would make the same quality-price decision as an 
independent unit, as the independent unit seeks to maximise its own profit instead of the total 
profits of its parent-firm.  
In a model of maximal differentiation where one firm specializes at the high end of the 
quality spectrum and Bertrand competitive firms operate at the low end, we show that the high 
quality firm would only be able to locate a middle quality product if it allows that product to 
be an independent unit. The quality level of the middle quality product is endogenously 
determined and is a convex combination of the existing high and low qualities. To be specific, 
it is 4/7 of that of the high quality product plus 3/7 of that of the low quality product. The price 
of the middle quality product is 2/7 of the price of the high quality product.5 Such proliferation 
                                                          
4 There is a much richer strand of literature on “limit quality” to deter entry (e.g., Lane, 1980; Donnenfeld and 
Weber, 1995; Noh and Moschini, 2006) than proliferation to deter entry in vertical differentiation model. 
5 This is superficially similar to Choi and Shin (1992)’s results in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation with 
uncovered market. They find that the quality level of the low quality product is 4/7 of that of the high quality 
product, and the price of the low quality product is 2/7 of the price of the high quality product. However, in this 
paper, we have an additional middle quality product. 
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is not optimal in the absence of entry threats but becomes optimal in the presence of entry 
threats, when the proliferation cost is sufficiently small.  
Moving from the two-quality to the three-quality market, if the fixed cost of introducing 
the third quality is small enough, then the rise in consumer surplus would outweigh the fall in 
industry profits, hence total welfare increases. Such increase in welfare could be achieved by 
the high quality firm through proliferation, or by the entrant if proliferation does not take place. 
From the welfare point of view, whether the outcome is achieved more efficiently by the 
established firm or by the entrant depends on their relative cost of introducing the third product. 
If the high quality firm benefits from the fact that it is already established hence incur lower 
cost, then not only proliferation can increase welfare, it also does in a way that is more efficient 
than entry. 
The setting considered in this paper is along the similar lines to Tirole (1988), who 
provides an intuitive yet simple way to solve the model of vertical differentiation. We allow 
competitive firms in the low quality segment, which is different from the standard duopoly 
model. This modification, however, is consistent with the distribution of differentiated brands 
in the real world. For example, in the fashion apparel industry, there are countless high-street 
brands and far fewer designer luxury brands. Although it is a simplified model, it delivers a 
comprehensive evaluation of the proliferation strategy. 
This paper is close in spirit to Baye et al. (1996), who study firms’ incentives to add 
divisions before engaging in Cournot competition. They suggest that the profit generated by a 
new division may be offset by the fall in the profit of the parent-firm’s existing units. Therefore 
proliferation, however moderate, might fail to fulfil the expectation. 
The idea on proliferation location is close to Donnenfeld and Weber (1992), who show in 
a model of maximal differentiation that a later entrant always selects an intermediate level of 
quality. But the intermediate quality is not endogenously determined and they do not consider 
the situation where the intermediate quality is offered by an incumbent. Our result on the 
quality level of the middle quality product is consistent with the prediction of Choi and Shin 
(1992), who suggest it to be “just over half that of the established firm”.  
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While Constantatos and Perrakis (1997) also find that proliferation may help an 
established firm to block entry, their focus is on market coverage. In our model, market 
coverage is endogenously full with or without proliferation. Proliferation intensifies price 
competition and reallocates demand: in the presence of the middle quality product, price of 
the high quality product decreases and demand increases, whereas demand for the low quality 
product drops significantly.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model for our analysis. Section 
2.2.1 provides a two-quality market environment in which one high quality firm and 
competitive low quality firms compete in price. We characterize the equilibrium as a 
benchmark for assessing proliferation incentives later. Section 2.2.2 evaluates the profitability 
of proliferation in the existing two-quality market without threat of entry. We determine 
endogenously the quality choice of proliferation. Section 2.2.3 examines proliferation as a 
deterrent when there is threat of entry. Section 2.3 presents welfare analysis. Section 2.4 
concludes.   
 
2.2 Model 
2.2.1 Two-quality environment 
In a market of quality-differentiated products of the same generic type. Product 𝑖  is of 
quality 𝑠𝑖  and is sold at price 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}, where 𝑠ℎ > 𝑠𝑙  and 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝𝑙 . Products with high 
quality 𝑠ℎ are provided by a single firm, 𝐻, and products with low quality 𝑠𝑙 are provided by 
at least two firms, 𝐿1 and 𝐿2. 𝐻 and the low quality segment engage in maximal differentiation: 
𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 are fixed at the two ends of the quality spectrum. The difference between 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 
is denoted as 𝑑 and is therefore the total length of the spectrum. The unit cost of production 𝑐 
is assumed to be the same for both qualities and is normalized to zero. We assume for now 
that there is no threat of entry. 
There is a continuum of consumers who have identical ordinal preferences over product 
quality but differ in the willingness to pay. They are uniformly distributed over the interval 
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[0, 𝜃] where 𝜃 represents their willingness to pay. Each consumer consumes at most one unit 
of the products and maximises the following utility function 
𝑈 = {
𝜃𝑠𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,
0,                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
                                                                                             (2.1) 
The last consumer with the willingness to pay for the high quality product and the low 
quality product, is represented by 𝜃ℎ = (𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙)/𝑑  and 𝜃𝑙 = 𝑝𝑙/𝑠𝑙 , respectively. That is, 
consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃ℎ , ?̅?] buy the high quality products, consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ) buy 
the low quality products and consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [0, 𝜃𝑙) buy neither of them.   
As 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 offer products with the identical quality 𝑠𝑙 , the Bertrand (1883) paradox 
leads to Lemma 2.1. 
Lemma 2.1 Price competition drives 𝑝𝑙 down to zero. All consumers purchase at least one of 
the products and the market is covered. 
For 𝐻, we can write the optimisation problem as 
max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋𝐻 =max
𝑝ℎ
 𝑝ℎ(𝜃 − 𝜃ℎ),                                                                                                 
where 𝜃 − 𝜃ℎ is the demand for high quality product. To solve this optimisation problem, we 
derive the first-order condition with respect to 𝑝ℎ and obtain 
𝑝ℎ = 𝜃𝑑/2 + 𝑝𝑙/2, 
𝐷ℎ = 𝜃𝑑 + 𝑝𝑙/2𝑑. 
Together with Lemma 2.1, we have the following  
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Lemma 2.2 In equilibrium, high and low quality products equally share the market; 𝐷ℎ =
𝐷𝑙 = 𝜃/2. H sets 𝑝ℎ =  𝜃𝑑/2 and obtains 𝜋𝐻 = ?̅?
2𝑑/4, whereas 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 obtain zero profit. 
Lemma 2.2 explains firms’ price decisions in the vertically differentiated market. Given 
that 𝑑 is constant, the price of the high quality product is higher when the distribution of 
willingness to pay 𝜃 is more dispersed. The market is equally and fully covered by the two 
existing qualities. Unlike the standard non-cooperative duopoly vertical differentiation model 
where both high and low quality firms enjoy positive surplus, price competition among 
products of quality 𝑠𝑙 in our model leaves no surplus for the low quality segment.  
 
2.2.2 Proliferation environment  
This section examines 𝐻’s incentive to proliferate in the existing two-quality market. Since 
moderate proliferation is more likely to be justified on profitability ground, we allow 𝐻 to 
introduce exactly one additional quality, 𝑠𝑚, and assume that  
𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽𝑠𝑙 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑠ℎ, 𝛽 ∈ (0,1). 
The above assumption ensures that 𝑠𝑚 is of an intermediate level, where 𝛽 is the location 
parameter. Given that 𝑠ℎ  and 𝑠𝑙  are exogenous, 𝛽 decides 𝑠𝑚 . When 𝛽 > 0.5, 𝑠𝑚 is closer 
to 𝑠𝑙 than to 𝑠ℎ. We exclude the possibility of equality among qualities which is not profitable 
for 𝐻. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how proliferation may change the market. We know from Lemmata 
2.1 and 2.2 that in the market with two qualities 𝑠𝑙  and 𝑠ℎ , all consumers will purchase. 
Consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ) buy products of 𝑠𝑙 and consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃ℎ, ?̅?] buy products 
of 𝑠ℎ. When products of 𝑠𝑚 are introduced to the market, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 
2.1, consumers face three choices instead of two. Ceteris paribus, consumers with  𝜃 ∈
[𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃𝑚) buy products of 𝑠𝑙, consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑚, 𝜃ℎ
′) buy products of 𝑠𝑚, and consumers 
with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃ℎ
′, ?̅?] buy products of 𝑠ℎ. 
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Figure 2.1 Proliferation in the two-quality market 
Johnson and Myatt (2003) suggest that when established firms strategically expand on the 
quality spectrum, they usually do so by introducing a lower quality product.6 As 𝑠ℎ > 𝑠𝑚 >
𝑠𝑙, we have 𝐻, rather than one of the low quality firms, to offer 𝑠𝑚. Linking it to the real world, 
reputation of the designer brands seems to be the key factor contributing to the success of 
H&M’s collaborated ranges. Since in the scope of this paper, proliferation is to be conducted 
by a single firm, not jointly, it can only be credibly conducted by 𝐻. 𝐻 will proliferate by 
introducing a middle quality to avoid fierce local competition with the existing qualities, as 
also suggested by Donnenfeld and Weber (1992). 
Upon proliferation, 𝐻 has to incur some fixed cost 𝑓, which may be seen as a product-
specific-capital, but the unit cost of production is again normalized to zero. Proliferation works 
like this: first 𝛽 is chosen and then all three quality products engage in price competition. As 
                                                          
6 They provide an example from the Indian watch market in which a launch of a high-end brand by a low-end firm 
was unsuccessful and eventually exited the market. 
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there are two decisions to be made regarding the middle quality product, quality location and 
price,  𝐻 faces options of how much control it wishes to take upon proliferation.  
 a. Full Control b. Semi-full Control c. Independent Control 
𝜷 is decided by 𝐻 𝐻 Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
𝒑𝒎 is decided by 𝐻 Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
Table 2.1 Control options of proliferation 
As shown in Table 2.1, 𝐻 can choose from three control options. We specify below the 
optimisation problem of  𝐻 with each option respectively. 
a. Full Control 
max
 𝛽,𝑝ℎ,𝑝𝑚
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max
𝛽,𝑝ℎ,𝑝𝑚
[𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚 − 𝑓].                                                                                            (2.2) 
With this option, 𝐻 takes full control over proliferation. It sets the quality location and 
price of the middle quality product, as well as the price of the original high quality product, so 
as to jointly maximise its total proliferation profits, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
.  
b. Semi-full Control  
max
𝛽
 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max 
𝛽
[(max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋ℎ +max
𝑝𝑚
 𝜋𝑚) − 𝑓],                                                                 (2.3) 
where 
max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋ℎ = max
𝑝ℎ
 𝑝ℎ𝐷ℎ   
max
𝑝𝑚
 𝜋𝑚 = max
𝑝𝑚
 𝑝𝑚𝐷𝑚
}.                                                                                                       (2.4) 
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With this option, 𝐻 sets the location of the middle quality product to maximise total 
proliferation profits, but does not interfere into price competition. 𝑝ℎ and 𝑝𝑚 are chosen to 
maximise respective unit profits. 
c. Independent Control 
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max𝜋ℎ
𝑝ℎ
+max𝜋𝑚 − 𝑓
𝛽,𝑝𝑚
.                                                                                               (2.5) 
With this option, the middle quality product acts purely as an independent unit and has 
freedom to decide its quality location as well as price, whereas 𝐻 acts as the parent-firm of the 
middle quality product and collects the profit that it generates.  
To determine whether 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate and which control option it will 
choose, we need to compare 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 under options a, b and c to its profit without proliferation, 
𝜋𝐻, as solved in Section 2.2.1. Specifically, 𝐻 will proliferate if  𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻 .                                                                                                           
Lemma 2.3 Under Full Control, 𝐷𝑚 = 0 and 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 . 𝐻 has no incentive to proliferate. 
Any positive 𝑓, however small, prevents proliferation from being profitable. 
Proof. Appendix A1. 
Lemma 2.3 says that the market is unaffected by proliferation under Full Control: demand 
and profit allocations remain the same as in the two-quality environment. When making 
quality-price decision jointly, 𝐻 has no incentive to introduce a quality level that is different 
from the existing qualities.  
Lemma 2.4 Under Semi-full Control,  𝑝𝑚 → 0  and 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 .𝐻  has no incentive to 
proliferate.  
Proof. Appendix A2. 
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Under Semi-full Control, the profit maximizing level of 𝛽 is approaching 1. This means 
that the difference between 𝑠𝑚 and 𝑠𝑙 is infinitesimally small and the middle quality product 
in fact joins the Bertrand competition with the low quality segment. As a result, despite 
positive 𝐷𝑚, 𝜋𝑚 is zero. Again, any positive 𝑓 would lead to a decrease in 𝜋𝐻 if proliferation 
happens. 
Lemma 2.5 Under Independent Control,  𝛽 = 3/7 and  𝑠𝑚 = 3𝑠𝑙/7 + 4𝑠ℎ/7 . The middle 
quality product makes a positive profit.  
Proof. Appendix A2. 
The middle quality product is closer to but different from the high quality product, which 
would never be the case under the first two controls. It is intuitive that given 𝑝𝑙 = 0, 𝑠𝑚 needs 
to be sufficiently differentiated from 𝑠𝑙 in order for the middle quality product to be attractive. 
Among the three control options, Independent Control is the only option with which 
proliferation actually expands the quality configuration and the proliferated product generates 
a positive profit. However, it remains to be checked whether proliferation can increase total 
profits.   
Lemma 2.6 Under Independent Control, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = ?̅?2𝑑/6 − 𝑓 <𝜋𝐻 . 𝐻 has no incentive to 
proliferate. 
Proof. Appendix A2. 
While 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 for all three control options, Independent Control is the least profitable 
for 𝐻, despite that it is the only option with which 𝜋𝑚 > 0. Table 2.2 puts together equilibrium 
outcomes from the two-quality environment and the Independent Control in the proliferation 
environment. Total demand in the proliferation environment is  𝜃 , so the market is fully 
covered with and without proliferation. Through the introduction of the middle quality product, 
𝐻  has successfully broadened its market segment by taking away 3𝜃/8 out of the total 
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4𝜃/8  demand that the low quality product would have otherwise captured. Proliferation does 
not reduce the demand for the high quality product, but 𝑝ℎ is halved as a result, which leads 
to the fall in 𝐻’s total profits. Specifically, proliferation creates 𝜋𝑚 = ?̅?
2𝑑/48 but decreases 
𝜋ℎ from 12?̅?
2𝑑/48 to 7?̅?2𝑑/48, therefore is not desirable for 𝐻. 
Environment Price Demand Profit 
 𝒑𝒍 𝒑𝒎 𝒑𝒉 𝑫𝒍 𝑫𝒎 𝑫𝒉 𝝅𝒍 𝝅𝒎 𝝅𝒉 
Two-quality 0 - 𝜃𝑑/2 𝜃/2 - 𝜃/2 0 - 𝜃
2
𝑑/4 
Proliferation 
(IC) 
0 𝜃𝑑/14 𝜃𝑑/4 𝜃/8 7𝜃/24 7𝜃/12 0 𝜃
2
𝑑/48 7?̅?
2𝑑/48 
Table 2.2 Two-quality environment vs. proliferation environment with independent control  
Lemmata 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6 lead to Proposition 2.1. 
Proposition 2.1 In the absence of threat of entry, proliferation is not profitable for 𝐻 under 
any level of control. Ceteris paribus, 𝐻 will not initiate proliferation.  
Given that the most moderate level of proliferation of offering only one additional quality 
cannot be justified on profitability ground, Proposition 2.1 also implies the undesirability of 
excessive proliferation. The result suggests the stability of the principle of maximal 
differentiation in the market configuration featured in this paper. This is however, conditional 
on no entry threats. Since proliferation is also a candidate for deterrence, it may be optimal for 
𝐻 to do so when the condition is relaxed.  
 
2.2.3 Entry environment 
This section examines 𝐻’s incentive to proliferate in the existing two-quality market, so as to 
deter a potential entrant 𝐸. Upon entry, 𝐸 makes quality-price decision to ensure positive post-
entry surplus.  
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Lemma 2.7 𝐸 will enter the market with products of quality 𝑠𝐸 = 3𝑠𝑙/7 + 4𝑠ℎ/7. 𝐸 sets 𝑝𝐸 =
𝜃𝑑/14 and obtains 𝜋𝐸 = ?̅?
2𝑑/48 – 𝑘, where 𝑘 ∈ [0, ?̅?2𝑑/48] is the fixed entry cost. 
Since 𝜋𝐸 > 0, 𝐸 always has an incentive to enter. The quality-price decision made by 𝐸 
is the same as that under Independent Control in the proliferation environment. This is because 
when making decisions, the independent unit maximises its own profit (and not the total profits 
of its parent-firm) just as what an entrant would do. The only difference is that 𝜋𝑚 generated 
under Independent Control contributes to the total profits of the parent-firm, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜, whereas 
𝐸 gets to keep 𝜋𝐸 for itself.  
Suppose that given the distribution of 𝜃, it is never profitable for 𝐸 to enter with a fourth 
quality, then anticipating the quality-price decision of 𝐸, 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate to 
deter entry if doing so is more profitable than accommodating entry, i.e., if 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻
𝐸.                                                                                                          
Proposition 2.2 In the presence of threat of entry, 𝐻’s incentive towards proliferation with 
Independent Control depends on the value of proliferation cost, f, such that  
 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻
𝐸 for 𝑓 ∈ (?̅?2𝑑/48,∞), proliferation is not profitable for 𝐻; 
 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻
𝐸 for 𝑓 ∈ [0, ?̅?2𝑑/48), 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate and achieve a 
second best profit.   
Proof: When considering proliferation to deter entry, 𝐻  will choose Independent Control 
because with this control option, the proliferated product is of quality  𝑠𝑚 = 𝑠𝐸 , thus can 
restrict the market space available and make it impossible for 𝐸 to enter,7 whereas with the 
other two control options, proliferation does not change the quality configuration in the market. 
Table 2.3 represents firms’ profits in different environments.   
 
                                                          
7 In this paper, we focus on whether the high quality incumbent has the incentive to proliferate to deter entry. See, 
e.g., Dixit (1980) and Judd (1985) for the issue of credibility in entry deterrence. 
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Environment Profit of firms 
 𝑯 𝑬 𝑳𝟏, 𝑳𝟐 
Two-Quality 12?̅?2𝑑/48 - 0 
Proliferation (IC)  8?̅?2𝑑/48 − 𝑓 0 0 
Entry 7?̅?2𝑑/48 ?̅?2𝑑/48 − 𝑘 0 
Table 2.3 Firms’ profits in two-quality, proliferation (IC) and entry environments 
Proposition 2.2 is obtained by comparing 𝐻’s profit in proliferation environment and 
entry environment. As shown in Table 2.3,  𝐻 ’s incentive to proliferate anticipating the 
decision of 𝐸 depends on the magnitude of proliferation cost.  
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 together suggest that, when 𝑓 > ?̅?2𝑑/48, proliferation is not 
profitable for 𝐻, regardless of whether there is threat of entry. However, when 𝑓 ≤ ?̅?2𝑑/48, 
proliferation becomes optimal only if it is used as an abusive exclusionary conduct. That is, 
even the most moderate level of proliferation of introducing one additional quality may be 
anticompetitive. 
 
2.3 Welfare analysis 
This section examines how consumer surplus and total welfare change when the market has 
three instead of two qualities. Consumer surplus is generated from the consumption of each 
quality. In the two-quality market, consumer surplus consists of 𝐶𝑆ℎ from consumers with 𝜃 ∈
[𝜃ℎ,?̅?]  and 𝐶𝑆𝑙 from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ), where  
𝐶𝑆ℎ = ∫ (𝜃𝑠ℎ − 𝑝ℎ) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝐶𝑆𝑙 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑙 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑑𝜃   
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
}.                                                                                                  (2.6) 
20 
 
In the three-quality market, consumer surplus consists of 𝐶𝑆ℎ  from consumers with 𝜃 ∈
[𝜃ℎ,?̅?], 𝐶𝑆𝑚 from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑚, 𝜃ℎ) and 𝐶𝑆𝑙  from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃𝑚), 
where       
𝐶𝑆ℎ = ∫ (𝜃𝑠ℎ − 𝑝ℎ) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃
𝜃ℎ
   
𝐶𝑆𝑚 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑚 − 𝑝𝑚) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑚
𝐶𝑆𝑙 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑙 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑑𝜃     
𝜃𝑚
𝜃𝑙
 
}
 
 
 
 
.                                                                                               (2.7) 
Calculation. See Appendix A3. 
Summing up consumer surplus and firms’ profits, we are able to compare total welfare in 
different environments, as shown in Table 2.4. Since the third quality could be offered by 
proliferation or by the entrant, we include both of them for comparison. Proliferation and entry 
achieve the same consumer surplus, which is greater than the consumer surplus in the two-
quality market, whereas they both decrease industry profits. 
Environment Welfare Comparison 
 Consumer surplus Industry profits Total welfare 
Two-quality 𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/8 + 3𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/8 𝜃
2
𝑑/4 3𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/8 + 𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/8 
Three-quality 
(Proliferation) 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝜃
2
𝑑/6 
 
𝜃
2
𝑑/6 − 𝑓 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝑓 
 
Three-quality 
(Entry) 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝜃
2
𝑑/6 
 
𝜃
2
𝑑/6 − 𝑘 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝑘 
                                              Table 2.4 Welfare comparison 
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Lemma 2.7 Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, consumer surplus strictly 
increases and industry profits strictly decrease, regardless of values of f and k. 
Proof. Appendix A4. 
Following Lemma 2.7, whether the rise in consumer surplus outweighs the fall in producer 
surplus depends on the fixed cost upon having the middle quality product. 
Proposition 2.3 Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, the change in total welfare 
is such that  
 When the third quality is introduced through 𝐻’s proliferation, total welfare increases 
if and only if 𝑓 ∈ [0, (44𝑠ℎ + 91𝑠𝑚 − 135𝑠𝑙)𝜃
2
/1152); 
 When the third quality is introduced by 𝐸, total welfare increases if and only if 𝑘 ∈ [0,
(44𝑠ℎ + 91𝑠𝑚 − 135𝑠𝑙)𝜃
2
/1152). 
Proof. Appendix A4. 
When the fixed cost is smaller than the critical threshold, having the middle quality 
product is welfare-enhancing; otherwise total welfare decreases as a result of a large fall in 
industry profits. Proliferation and entry affect total welfare in the identical way if 𝑓 = 𝑘. From 
a welfare point of view, whether the third quality should be offered by 𝐻 or 𝐸 depends on their 
relative cost of introducing it. If 𝐻 benefits from the fact that it is already established therefore 
incurs lower cost, then not only proliferation can increase welfare, it also does in a way that is 
more efficient than entry. This leads to an interesting result that, despite being an exclusionary 
conduct carried out deliberately by a dominant firm facing threat of entry, proliferation always 
benefits consumers and can even increase total welfare. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Proliferation in horizontal differentiation markets is well understood. As proliferation is 
becoming increasingly popular in vertical differentiation markets, and many vertically 
differentiated brands, especially those in the sportswear and fashion apparel industry, have 
been repeatedly engaging in joint-proliferations, e.g., H&M collaborations, it seems important 
to investigate proliferation in vertical differentiation markets. This paper provides some initial 
steps towards this goal.  
We offer an evaluation of proliferation by assessing its effects on profitability, entry 
deterrence and welfare in a simple yet intuitive framework. We highlight the trade-off between 
softening competition and broadening market segments brought about by proliferation and 
show that even the most moderate level of proliferation may be anticompetitive. Nonetheless 
when proliferation is carried out as a division that competes independently with the parent-
firm, it always benefits consumers and could even increase total welfare in a way that is more 
efficient than entry. In addition, we have extended the literature on entrant choice in duopoly 
markets following the principle of maximal differentiation by endogenously determining the 
quality level of the additional middle quality product.  
In this paper we focus on proliferation incentives of the high quality firm. The current 
framework, while useful for addressing our research interests, does not allow the low quality 
segment to play a positive role. To move closer to the real world and replicate joint-
proliferation, future research should introduce competition to the high quality segment and 
horizontal differentiation among high quality firms and low quality firms, and assess the 
respective incentives of vertically related firms to collaborate. For example, a low quality firm 
may find it desirable to collaborate with a high quality firm so as to differentiate itself from 
other low quality firms.  
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2.5 Appendices A 
A1. Proof of Lemma 2.3  
Expand 𝐻’s optimisation problem (2.2), 
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = 𝑝ℎ (𝜃 −
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
) + 𝑝𝑚 [
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
−
𝑝𝑚
(1−𝛽)𝑑
] − 𝑓.  
Derive the first order conditions with respect to 𝑝ℎ and 𝑝𝑚 
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
𝜕𝑝ℎ
= 𝜃 −
2𝑝ℎ
𝛽𝑑
+
2𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
= 0,  
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 
2𝑝ℎ
𝛽𝑑
−
2𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
−
2𝑝𝑚
(1−𝛽)𝑑
= 0.   
The second-order conditions are fulfilled. Prices and demands  are  𝑝ℎ = ?̅?𝑑/2 and 𝑝𝑚 =
?̅?𝑑(1 − 𝛽)/2; 𝐷ℎ = ?̅?/2,  𝐷𝑚 = 0 and  𝐷𝑙 = ?̅?/2. Under Full Control, demand allocation 
stays the same as in the two-quality environment.                                                                           □                                                                                      
 
A2. Proofs of Lemmata 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6  
We first look at independent price competition as in (2.4). Derive the first-order conditions 
respectively and solve for prices, demands and profits as functions of 𝛽 and ?̅? 
𝑝ℎ = 
2?̅?𝛽𝑑
3+𝛽
, 
𝑝𝑚 =
?̅?𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷ℎ =
2?̅?
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷𝑚 =
?̅?
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷𝑙 =
?̅?𝛽
3+𝛽
, 
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𝜋ℎ =
4?̅?2𝛽𝑑
(3+𝛽)2
, 
𝜋𝑚 =
?̅?2𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)
(3+𝛽)2
, 
𝜋𝑙 = 0. 
Under Semi-full Control, 𝛽 is set by 𝐻 to maximise 𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚. We can find that, for 𝛽 ∈
(0, 1),  𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚  is increasing in  𝛽 ;  𝜕(𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚)/𝜕𝛽 = ?̅?
2𝑑(15 − 11𝛽)/(3 + 𝛽)2 > 0 . 
Hence 𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚  is maximised at 𝛽 → 1. When 𝛽 → 1, 𝑠𝑚 → 𝑠𝑙 , 𝑝ℎ → ?̅?𝑑/2, which is the 
same in the two-quality environment, and 𝑝𝑚 → 0.  
Under Independent Control, 𝛽 is set to maximise the unit profit of the middle quality 
product, not total profits 
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝛽
=
(3+𝛽)2(?̅?2𝑑−2?̅?2𝛽𝑑)−2?̅?2𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)(3+𝛽)
(3+𝛽)4
= 0. 
Solve for the above equation and 𝛽 = 3/7. The second-order conditions are fulfilled. The 
equilibrium outcomes are presented in Table 2.2 in Section 2.2.2.                                           □                                                        
 
A3. Calculation of equations 2.6 and 2.7  
Expand and solve for (2.6), in the two-quality market 
𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
2
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ − 𝜃𝑝ℎ −
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠ℎ + 𝜃ℎ𝑠ℎ =
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ −
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
𝐶𝑆𝑙 =
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠𝑙 =
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙, 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑙 + 𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
Expand and solve for (2.7), in the three-quality market 
𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
2
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ − 𝜃𝑝ℎ −
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠ℎ + 𝜃ℎ𝑠ℎ =
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ −
7
48
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
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𝐶𝑆𝑚 =
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠𝑚 − 𝜃ℎ𝑝𝑚 −
1
2
𝜃𝑚
2𝑠𝑚 + 𝜃𝑚𝑠𝑚 =
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
1
48
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
𝐶𝑆𝑙 =
1
2
𝜃𝑚
2𝑠𝑙 =
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙, 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑙 + 𝐶𝑆𝑚 + 𝐶𝑆ℎ =
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 −
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑.  
                                                                                                                                                   □ 
    
A4. Proofs of Lemma 2.7 and Proposition 2.3  
Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, consumer surplus strictly increases if 
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 −
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
That is, if 
140
1152
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
231
1152
𝑠𝑙, 
which always holds since 
140
1152
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
140
1152
𝑠𝑚 +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚, 
and  
231
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
231
1152
𝑠𝑙. 
It is straightforward to verify that, moving from two-quality to three-quality market, 
industry profits decrease. Because 1/4 > 1/6, 
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 − 𝑓, 
and 
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 − 𝑘. 
Proliferation increases total welfare if 
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119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 − 𝑓 >
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
That is, if 
𝑓 <
44
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
135
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
It is straightforward to verify that the right hand side of the above inequation is strictly 
positive. 
Likewise, entry increases total welfare if  
𝑘 <
44
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
135
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
It follows that, total welfare is higher with proliferation than with entry if and only if 𝑓 <
𝑘.                                                                                                                                                 □ 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Comparison of the Wholesale Model and 
the Agency Model in Differentiated Markets 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Today individuals shop at high street stores, supermarkets, as well as a variety of online 
retailers: goods are passing through more elaborate supply and distribution chains. The 
manufacturer-retailer contracts linking the vertical relations, not surprisingly, are not always 
identical. Among the various vertical contracts observed in practice, this paper deals with two, 
the wholesale model and the agency model. Under the wholesale model, a manufacturer sets 
the wholesale price and sells to a retailer, and the retailer sets the retail price and deals with 
final consumers. Under the agency model, a retailer specifies the revenue-sharing rate, before 
selling to final consumers at the retail price set by a manufacturer. The agency model involves 
resale price maintenance (RPM) because the retail price is set the by the manufacturer, not the 
retailer.   
While the wholesale model remains common in a bricks-and-mortar environment, the 
agency model becomes predominant in online markets. Some natural questions to ask then 
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would be why a certain vertical contract is chosen against the others, and which contract is 
beneficial to consumers. These questions appear more relevant given the (in) famous Apple1 
case that involved the switch of vertical contracts from the wholesale to the agency model. 
Plausibly also due to the fact that the agency model has been adopted by several giant online 
retailers, e.g., Amazon marketplace, Apple, eBay, Google and various booking websites, 
concerns might arise regarding the nature of such contract, the powerful position of those 
retailers and whether consumers and market performance are harmed as a consequence. At 
least the Department of Justice’s decision on forcing publishers to move away from the agency 
model of selling e-books seems to send such a signal.  
In fact, Apple was not the first antitrust case in which distinctions between the wholesale 
and agency models were highlighted. In the 1967 Schwinn2 case which involved the adoption 
of territorial restraints, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the per se illegality of vertical 
restraints applied to the transactions in which Schwinn sold bicycles to distributors for resale 
to dealers, i.e., a wholesale model under which the ownership of bicycles was transferred; but 
those in which Schwinn sold and shipped directly to dealers and paid distributors a commission 
for taking the order, i.e., an agency model under which Schwinn retained the ownership of 
bicycles, were legal. That is, the same vertical restraints were treated differently under 
wholesale and agency models, and the judicial reasoning was the legal ownership of property.  
Linking Apple and Schwinn, the antitrust view towards the agency model seems to be 
somewhat inconsistent. One may argue that it is due to the different contexts in which the 
vertical restraints are adopted. Apple involved multiple vertical restraints as well as horizontal 
                                                          
1 U.S. v. Apple Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), the State of Texas, et al. v. Penguin Group Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 3394 
(DLC) (2013). In April 2010, five large book publishers in the US switched from the wholesale model, which they 
used to have with Amazon, of selling e-books to the agency model put forward by Apple. Following the price rise 
of e-books after the switch of vertical contracts, the Department of Justice has lodged a complaint against Apple 
and publishers for their contractual agreements. The agreement between Apple and publishers also included a price 
parity provision, the Most Favoured Nation Clause. For details see Competition Law Journal Concurrences No.3-
2012 on “e-Books and the Boundaries of Antitrust”. 
2 U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 388 U.S. 365 (1966). From the 1950s, Schwinn adopted a selective distribution 
system and imposed territorial and customer restraints to its distributors and dealers. Its distributors were only 
authorized to sell to franchised dealers in their assigned territories, and dealers were only allowed to sell from 
authorized locations. Meanwhile, its distribution method, the Schwinn Plan, allowed Schwinn to sell and ship 
bicycles using various ways and not necessarily through its distributors.  
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conspiracy among the publishers, and the agency model was a complementary device to the 
price fixing clause used. Yet, the Court’s reasoning in Schwinn that “…it is unreasonable 
without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an 
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it” 3  was heavily 
criticized as “it may indicate that such confinement is unlawful absent an acceptable business 
justification” (ABA Antitrust Section, 1977). In this view, instead of the ownership of property, 
what should be evaluated is the actual impact of restraints on market performance and how 
such impact differ under wholesale and agency models. 
While the linear price wholesale model is well understood as the basic form of vertical 
relations in economic theory (Tirole, 1988), recent papers studying the agency model tend to 
focus more on specific issues related to the e-book market, such as device, e.g. Kindle (Gaudin 
and White, 2014), the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause (Boik and Corts, 2013) and 
consumer lock-in (Johnson, 2013), rather than the systematic analysis of the agency model per 
se. 
In this paper, we seek to examine the agency model and compare it to the wholesale model, 
which constitutes the basis of understanding some transformations in vertical relations. We do 
so in a bilateral duopoly framework developed by Dobson and Waterson (1996, 2007) which 
incorporates both interbrand competition, i.e., competition between manufacturers, and 
intrabrand competition, i.e., competition between retailers. When making comparisons, we 
focus on welfare conditions and the relative profitability of the alternative schemes for 
manufacturers and retailers. We then interpret how results obtained from the comparison are 
relevant and useful for the understanding of the nature of the agency model, as well as the 
antitrust treatment of restraints of this kind. 
Regarding welfare conditions, we find that in symmetric equilibrium, retail prices are 
always lower under the agency model relative to the wholesale model. The driving force is 
double marginalisation: it exists under the wholesale model and disappears under the agency 
model. Consumer surplus is always higher under the agency model, whereas industry profits 
                                                          
3 388 U.S. at 379.  
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are higher under the wholesale model for a wider range of degrees of product differentiation 
in the market. Social surplus is higher under the agency model provided that manufacturers’ 
goods are sufficiently differentiated. Given these results, if courts were to distinguish between 
restraints involved in sale and nonsale transactions, as they did in Schwinn, the verdict might 
be more reasonably based on how welfare impacts of restraints differ in these two scenarios – 
the agency model is more beneficial to consumers – instead of the legal ownership of property.  
Regarding the relative profitability of the alternative schemes for manufacturers and 
retailers, we find that manufacturer profits are always higher under the wholesale model, 
whereas retailer profits are higher under the agency model unless manufacturers’ goods are 
close substitutes. This result offers two insights. First, although manufacturers, ceteris paribus, 
have no profit-driven incentive to switch away from the wholesale model, the switch is 
considerably likely in favour of retailers. The popularity of the agency model in some markets 
in turn implies the powerful position of retailers in those markets. Second, retailers can benefit 
from the differentiation at the manufacturer level under the agency model, which contrasts 
with the inverse association suggested by Steiner (1993) that stronger brands tend to lead to 
lower retail margins and higher manufacturing margins. Hence manufacturers and retailers’ 
incentives are better aligned under the agency model. 
The economic theory on vertical restraints has been traditionally concerned with 
manufacturer power restraints imposed by manufacturers to neutralize potential externalities 
and induce retail service, assuming that retailers have no market power (e.g., Telser, 1960), or 
some market power (e.g., Mathewson and Winter, 1984). Relating the above result to this 
strand of the literature, an interesting question arises as why manufacturers would adopt the 
agency model. In his re-evaluation of Schwinn, Grimes (2007) tells the story behind the case 
as “an insecure brand seller imposes downstream power restraints.”4 Downstream or retailer 
power restraints, he further defines, “may be imposed by the upstream seller, but the seller acts 
                                                          
4 He writes, “In 1952, Schwinn had 22.5% of the market…Schwinn’s share fell to 12.8% by 1961. It was precisely 
during this period that Schwinn was actively implementing a selective distribution system designed to insulate 
retailers from competition and allow them to charge a higher margin. Schwinn was, at this point, an insecure brand 
seller.” 
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in response to conditions of downstream power.” In this view, the agency model may be an 
example of retailer power RPM, adopted by manufacturers who are in need of brand promotion. 
While such retail power restraints also serve to induce retail service provision, the underlying 
assumption of the power relation between manufacturers and retailers is different from the 
traditional view. This might plausibly also have been part of the story in Apple.5  
Relative to the wholesale model, the higher consumer surplus and better alignment of 
incentives under the agency model constitute a conflict, which is critical in determining the 
antitrust status of restraints of this kind: they benefit consumers but undercut competition. The 
evolution of the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints from per se rules to the rule of reason 
suggests the scope of applying the rule of reason in treating restraints of this kind.6 While some 
retailer power restraints do not meaningfully harm consumers or competition, such as those in 
Schwinn, some others do. With the alignment of incentives, the agency model is prone to 
additional and potentially more harmful restraints, such as the MFN clause involved in Apple.7 
Based on our results, we consider the economic analysis of the actual impact of restraints, 
instead of the ownership of property, to be a better support for applying the rule of reason in 
treating the agency model.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. Section 3.3 
presents the framework for our analysis, in which we characterize the vertical relation first by 
the wholesale model and then by the agency model. Section 3.4 compares the symmetric 
equilibrium outcomes under the two models. Section 3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
                                                          
5 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC) (2013). The publishers were upset by Amazon’s $9.99 prevailing price policy which they 
feared that would erode the value and price of books, including hardcover books. They agreed to switch from the 
wholesale to the agency model upon Apple’s proposal. Apple was found to have “played a central role in facilitating 
and executing that conspiracy. Without Apple’s orchestration of this conspiracy, it would not have succeeded as it 
did in the Spring of 2010.” 
6 In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the rule of reason in Sylvania (433 U.S. 36) in deciding the legality of 
nonprice restraints, which reversed the 10-year-old decision of the per se illegality of such restraints in Schwinn. 
In 2007, the Court overruled its decision that RPM was illegal per se in Dr. Miles (220 U.S. 373) by applying the 
rule of reason in Leegin (551 U.S. 877). 
7 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC) at 47. “The MFN guaranteed that the e-books in Apple’s e-bookstore would be sold for the 
lowest retailer price available in the marketplace.” See Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2015) for an analysis of how the 
MFN clause can induce the adoption of the agency model.  
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3.2 Related literature  
This paper is related to the law and economics literature on vertical restraints. Vertical 
restraints are imposed by manufacturers to cope with vertical externalities such as double 
marginalisation, and horizontal externalities such as pre-sale service underprovision due to 
intrabrand competition (Tirole, 1988). Restraints, especially those to neutralize horizontal 
externalities, often allow retailers to capture some of the industry rents. These rents have been    
used to provide a procompetitive theory of restraints: manufacturers may use these rents to 
entice retailers to provide promotional efforts which are often costly. For example, Marvel and 
McCafferty (1996) compare the efficiency of using RPM and exclusive territories to combat 
free-riding. On the other hand, these rents may be used in anticompetitive ways by facilitating 
collusion and blocking new entrants. For example, Shaffer (1991) compares RPM and slotting 
allowances and find that both restraints increase prices and retail profits, and may be seen as 
practices to facilitate coordination. Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014) suggest that the rents created 
by restraints for retailers can induce them not to accommodate an entrant to the manufacturer 
level since entry would reduce those rents.  
The above literature suggests that the anticompetitive effects of restraints are mostly likely 
to arise when they are introduced to dampen intrabrand competition and are not meant to 
enhance the efficiency of the vertical relation. This may explain why retailer-sponsored 
“competition-reducing” restraints are almost always considered to increase prices and harm 
consumers, and thus are presumptively unlawful (Tirole, 1988). For example, Dobson and 
Waterson (2007) examine the effects of RPM in the presence of countervailing power and find 
that the social effects of RPM are likely to be negative when retailer power is strong.  
In this paper, we show that although the agency model is likely to relax competition and 
increase retailer profits, it is beneficial to consumers and can be socially desirable. We suggest 
the agency model to be better understood as an example of retailer power restraints that we 
mentioned in Section 3.1. A major difference between retailer-sponsored “competition-
reducing” restraints and retailer power restraints, as suggested by Grimes (2007), is that 
retailer power restraints are imposed with genuine business purposes, although intrabrand 
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competition may be reduced as a result. Specifically, strong brands have little incentive to 
impose restraints that benefit retailers, because retailers who do not promote these brands to 
increase sales would be worse off. However, weak or insecure manufacturers would have to 
provide extra incentives to induce retailers to promote their brands, even if it is costly for them 
to do so. This corresponds to the empirically verified inverse association between the strength 
of brands and retail margins (Steiner, 1993; Lynch, 2004).  
From both law and economics perspectives, contemporary vertical restraint theory 
recognises retailing as a distinct stage of vertical relations and that it is wrong to neglect the 
role of intrabrand competition in affecting consumers’ choices, as well as the exercise of 
countervailing power (e.g., Steiner, 1991; Dobson and Waterson, 1999). The understanding of 
the agency model as retailer power RPM is meaningful as it helps to distinguish the agency 
model from being perceived as a form of vertical integration which ignores the changing power 
relation between manufacturers and retailers.8  
Among the recent studies that compare different vertical contracts, our characterization 
of the agency model follows Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2013), but the counterparts used for 
comparison differ in their paper and ours. Their paper compares the agency model to an 
alternative model in which the revenue sharing rate and the retail price are both set by retailers, 
whereas our benchmark is the wholesale model. In addition, they focus on the equilibrium 
contract selection problem of firms and allow different contracts to be used in the same market, 
whereas we assume common contracts and focus on the different effects of restraint on 
competition and welfare. 
The comparison between the wholesale and the agency models is also made in Johnson 
(2014), who studies the effects of MFN clauses based on the comparison. Results regarding 
retailer profits and industry profits in his paper are different from ours and the differences arise 
because of different demand functions used and different assumptions on market coverage. 
While he assumes market coverage to be full, changes in demand are important in our paper. 
                                                          
8 For example, Liu and Shuai (2015) view the agency model as vertical integration and neglect the division of 
industry profits between manufacturers and retailers. 
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A further related strand of literature is on markets with intermediaries. Comparisons have 
been made between the two forms of intermediation: the intermediary buys and resells a 
product, or simply refers buyers for a fee (Bellaflamme and Peitz, 2010). Condorelli et al. 
(2013) suggest that, when information is asymmetric – the intermediary has privileged 
information about consumers, efficiency increases when the latter form is used. 
 
3.3 Model 
We consider a market with two manufacturers, 𝑗 = 1, 2, and two retailers, 𝑖 = 1, 2. Each 
manufacturer 𝑗 produces a single good 𝑗 and each retailer 𝑖 presents final consumers with 
goods from both manufacturers, i.e., 𝑞𝑖
𝑗 > 0, such that vertical contracts are nonexclusive. 
Correspondingly, consumers are able to choose from four “final goods” and thus make two 
decisions: which retailer store to shop and which manufacturer good to buy. This is intuitive 
as firms in vertically related markets compete not only horizontally with firms at the same 
level over consumer demand, but also vertically with firms at the other level over their 
respective shares of retail prices. We assume manufacturer goods and retailer services to be 
symmetrically differentiated and all production costs to be zero. 
Following Dobson and Waterson (1996, 2007) and Gabrielsen and Johansen (2015), we 
assume the consumers making decisions to maximise  
𝑈(𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑖
𝑗 −
1
2
𝑖𝑗
(𝑞𝑖
𝑗)2 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖
𝑗𝑞−𝑖
𝑗 + 𝑞𝑖
−𝑗𝑞−𝑖
−𝑗
) − 𝛾(𝑞𝑖
𝑗𝑞𝑖
−𝑗 + 𝑞−𝑖
𝑗 𝑞−𝑖
−𝑗
)             
− 𝛽𝛾(𝑞𝑖
𝑗𝑞−𝑖
−𝑗 + 𝑞−𝑖
𝑗 𝑞𝑖
−𝑗
).      
This utility function gives rise to the downward sloping inverse demand function  
𝑝𝑖
𝑗 = 1 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑗 − 𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝑗 − 𝛾𝑞𝑖
−𝑗 − 𝛽𝛾𝑞−𝑖
−𝑗
.                                                                                    (3.1)                     
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The parameter 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of intrabrand competition between retailers’ 
services and the parameter 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of interbrand competition between 
goods.9 Retailers’ services are perceived to be perfectly differentiated when 𝛽 = 0  and 
become closer substitutes as 𝛽 → 1. Likewise, when 𝛾 = 0, the two goods are viewed as 
perfectly differentiated and demand-unrelated, as 𝛾 → 1, they become closer substitutes. We 
assume that firms behave non-cooperatively. The direct demand function is given by 
𝑞𝑖
𝑗 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)−𝑝𝑖
𝑗
+𝛾𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
+𝛽(𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
−𝛾𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
)
(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
.                                                                                     (3.2) 
The quantity demanded for good 𝑗 at retailer 𝑖 is a function of own price, 𝑝𝑖
𝑗
, prices of two 
relatively closer substitutes, 𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
 and 𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
, and the price of another substitute that is further 
away in the product space, 𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
. Given the ranges of parameters, it can be easily verified that 
own-price effect dominates each cross-price effect.  
The above direct demand system has two features worth highlighting. First, the cross-
price effect between different goods presented by different retailers is negative; 𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑗/𝜕𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗 =
−𝛽𝛾/(1 − 𝛽2)(1 − 𝛾2) < 0, which contrasts to our knowledge that as the price of one good 
increases, the demand of its substitute increases. Gabrielsen and Johansen (2015) suggest that 
the negative cross-price effect can be explained as a “second-order effect”. More specifically, 
as 𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
 increases, consumers would optimally switch away from good (−𝑖, −𝑗) and demand 
more (𝑖, −𝑗) and (−𝑖, 𝑗), as these two are relatively closer substitutes to (−𝑖, −𝑗). However, as 
more (𝑖, −𝑗) and (−𝑖, 𝑗) are consumed, being relatively closer substitutes to them, (𝑖, 𝑗) would 
consequently be demanded less. This negative “second-order effect” dominates the direct 
substitution effect, leading to a negative cross-price effect. 
Second, demand is decided by two countervailing effects: a price effect and a market size 
effect. For a common price, demand becomes (1 − 𝑝)/ (1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾), which is increasing 
                                                          
9 Dobson and Waterson (1996) assume 𝛾 ∈ (−1, 1) where a negative 𝛾 indicates that the goods are complements. 
We do not consider this case in this paper. 
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in degrees of differentiation in the market. This means that high demand may be driven by low 
prices or highly differentiated products. Some studies consider vertical restraints that increase 
demand to be presumptively procompetitive (e.g., Bork, 1978), some others argue that 
consumers may “end up with the wrong product at the wrong price” (Grimes, 2007). Overall 
this demand system allows for differentiation at both levels of the vertically related market to 
be parameterised in a convenient form, offering clear and tractable solutions.  
Suppose that manufacturers cannot directly reach final consumers, we characterise the 
vertical relation first under the wholesale model and then under the agency model. We focus 
on symmetric equilibrium throughout the analysis. 
 
3.3.1 The wholesale model 
The timing under the wholesale model is as follows 
1. Manufacturers set wholesale prices simultaneously. The wholesale price set by 
manufacturer 𝑗 to retailer 𝑖 is 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
, 
2. Retailers set retail prices simultaneously. The price set by retailer 𝑖 for good 𝑗 is 𝑝𝑖
𝑗 . 
Retailer 𝑖, denoted as 𝑅𝑖, faces the following optimisation problem 
max
𝑝𝑖
1,   𝑝𝑖
2
𝜋𝑅𝑖 = max𝑝𝑖
1,   𝑝𝑖
2
[(𝑝𝑖
1 −𝑤𝑖
1)𝑞𝑖
1 + (𝑝𝑖
2 −𝑤𝑖
2)𝑞𝑖
2].                                                             (3.3) 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1 = 𝑞𝑖
1 + (𝑝𝑖
1 −𝑤𝑖
1)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1 + (𝑝𝑖
2 −𝑤𝑖
2)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
2
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1 = 0.                                                             (3.4) 
From (3.4), we get 
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𝑝1
1 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛽(𝑝2
1−𝛾𝑝2
2)+2𝛾𝑝1
2+𝑤1
1−𝛾𝑤1
2
2
,  
𝑝2
1 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛽(𝑝1
1−𝛾𝑝1
2)+2𝛾𝑝2
2+𝑤2
1−𝛾𝑤2
2
2
, 
𝑝1
2 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛽(𝑝2
2−𝛾𝑝2
1)+2𝛾𝑝1
1+𝑤1
2−𝛾𝑤1
1
2
,  
𝑝2
2 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛽(𝑝1
2−𝛾𝑝1
1)+2𝛾𝑝2
1+𝑤2
2−𝛾𝑤2
1
2
.  
Solve for the above  
𝑝1
1 =
(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)+2𝑤1
1+𝛽𝑤2
1
4−𝛽2
,  
𝑝2
1 =
(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)+2𝑤2
1+𝛽𝑤1
,1
4−𝛽2
,  
𝑝1
2 =
(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)+2𝑤1
2+𝛽𝑤2
2
4−𝛽2
,  
𝑝2
2 =
(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)+2𝑤2
2+𝛽𝑤1
2
4−𝛽2
.  
Substitute the equilibrium second-stage prices into the direct demand function (3.2), 
we get the second-stage quantities demand 
𝑞1
1 =
𝛽(𝑤2
1−𝛾𝑤2
2)−(2−𝛽2)(𝑤1
1−𝛾𝑤1
2)
(4−𝛽2)(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
+
1
(2−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
,  
𝑞2
1 =
𝛽(𝑤1
1−𝛾𝑤1
2)−(2−𝛽2)(𝑤2
1−𝛾𝑤2
2)
(4−𝛽2)(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
+
1
(2−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
,  
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𝑞1
2 =
𝛽(𝑤2
2−𝛾𝑤2
1)−(2−𝛽2)(𝑤1
2−𝛾𝑤1
1)
(4−𝛽2)(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
+
1
(2−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
,  
𝑞2
2 =
𝛽(𝑤1
2−𝛾𝑤1
1)−(2−𝛽2)(𝑤2
2−𝛾𝑤2
1)
(4−𝛽2)(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
+
1
(2−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
. 
Manufacturer 𝑗, denoted as 𝑆𝑗, faces  
max
𝑤1
𝑗
, 𝑤2
𝑗
𝜋𝑗 = max
𝑤1
𝑗
, 𝑤2
𝑗
𝑤1
𝑗𝑞1
𝑗 +𝑤2
𝑗𝑞2
𝑗
.                                                                                             (3.5) 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑤1
𝑗 = 𝑞1
𝑗 +𝑤1
𝑗 𝜕𝑞1
𝑗
𝜕𝑤1
𝑗 +𝑤2
𝑗 𝜕𝑞2
𝑗
𝜕𝑤1
𝑗 = 0.                                                                                              (3.6) 
From (3.6), we get 
𝑤1
1 =
(2−𝛽2)𝛾𝑤1
2+2𝛽𝑤2
1−𝛽𝛾𝑤2
2+(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2(2−𝛽2)
,   
𝑤2
1 =
(2−𝛽2)𝛾𝑤2
2+2𝛽𝑤1
1−𝛽𝛾𝑤1
2+(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2(2−𝛽2)
, 
𝑤1
2 =
(2−𝛽2)𝛾𝑤1
1+2𝛽𝑤2
2−𝛽𝛾𝑤2
1+(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2(2−𝛽2)
,  
𝑤2
2 =
(2−𝛽2)𝛾𝑤2
1+2𝛽𝑤1
2−𝛽𝛾𝑤1
1+(2+𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2(2−𝛽2)
. 
Imposing symmetry, the equilibrium wholesale prices, denoted as 𝑤∗, are therefore 
𝑤∗ =
1−𝛾
2−𝛾
 .                                                                                                                              (3.7) 
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The symmetric equilibrium retail prices and demand, denoted as  𝑝∗ 
and 𝑞∗respectively, are given by 
𝑝∗ =
(1−𝛽)(2−𝛾)+1−𝛾
(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)
,                                                             
𝑞∗ =
1
(1+𝛽)(2−𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛾)
.                                                                    
𝑝∗ decreases in 𝛽 and 𝛾: higher values of 𝛽 and 𝛾 mean lower degrees of differentiation 
between goods and services, thus lower prices. 𝑞∗ initially decreases and then increases in 𝛽 
and 𝛾. This is because, as we mentioned earlier, demand is decided by two countervailing 
effects. As 𝛽 and 𝛾 increase, on the one hand, goods and services become less differentiated 
and demand falls; on the other hand, price decreases and demand increases. Whether demand 
increases or decreases in 𝛽 and 𝛾 thus depends on which effect is stronger.  
We present the complete set of symmetric equilibrium results under the wholesale model, 
including firms’ profits in the following lemma.  
Lemma 3.1 Under the wholesale model, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which 
 𝑤∗ = (1 − 𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾); 
 𝑝∗ = [(1 − 𝛽)(2 − 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛾]/(2 − 𝛽)(2 − 𝛾); 
 𝑞∗ = 1/(1 + 𝛽)(2 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛾); 
 𝜋𝑗 = 2(1 − 𝛾)/(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛽)(2 − 𝛾)2; 
 𝜋𝑖 = 2(1 − 𝛽)/(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛽)
2(2 − 𝛾)2.  
 
3.3.2 The agency model  
The timing under the agency model is as follows 
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1. Retailers declare revenue sharing rates simultaneously. The revenue sharing rate set 
by retailer 𝑖 is 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [0,1), with manufacturers retaining (1 − 𝛼𝑖 ) of the revenue.
10 
2. Manufacturers set retail prices simultaneously. The price set by manufacturer 𝑗 to 
retailer 𝑖 is 𝑝𝑖
𝑗 .  
Under this model,  𝑆𝑗  controls the retail price and faces the following optimisation 
problem 
max
𝑝1
𝑗
, 𝑝2
𝑗
𝜋𝑆
𝑗
= max
𝑝1
𝑗
, 𝑝2
𝑗
 [(1 −  𝛼1)𝑝1
𝑗𝑞1
𝑗 + (1 −  𝛼2)𝑝2
𝑗𝑞2
𝑗].                                                          (3.8) 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑆
𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗 = (1 −  𝛼1)(𝑞1
𝑗 + 𝑝1
𝑗 𝜕𝑞1
𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗) + (1 −  𝛼2)𝑝2
𝑗 𝜕𝑞2
𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗 = 0.                                                       (3.9) 
Given symmetry, we get 
𝑝𝑖 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)[(2−𝛾)+𝛽(1−𝛾)+
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝑖)
1−𝛼𝑖
]
(2−𝛾)2−𝛽2[1+(1−𝛾)2+
(1−𝛾)[(1−𝛼𝑖)
2
+(1−𝛼−𝑖)
2
]
(1−𝛼𝑖)(1−𝛼−𝑖)
]
 ,                                                               
𝑞𝑖 =  
(2−𝛾)2−𝛽2[1+(1−𝛾)2+
(1−𝛾)[(1−𝛼𝑖)
2
+(1−𝛼−𝑖)
2
]
(1−𝛼𝑖)(1−𝛼−𝑖)
]−(1−𝛾)[(1−𝛽)+(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾)+𝛽(
1−𝛼−𝑖
1−𝛼𝑖
−
𝛽(1−𝛼𝑖)
1−𝛼−𝑖
)]
(2−𝛾)2(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)−𝛽2[1+(1−𝛾)2+
(1−𝛾)[(1−𝛼𝑖)
2
+(1−𝛼−𝑖)
2
]
(1−𝛼𝑖)(1−𝛼−𝑖)
](1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
.           
     
𝑅𝑖 faces the following optimisation problem  
                                                          
10 We allow retailers to specify one sharing rate that applies to both manufacturers, and this does not conflict with 
what we observe in real life. For example, Apple claimed the same rate to all book publishers and Google claims 
the same rate to all apps developers. 
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max
𝛼𝑖
𝜋𝑅𝑖 = max𝛼𝑖
 𝛼𝑖(𝑝𝑖
1𝑞𝑖
1 + 𝑝𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
2),                                                                                      (3.10) 
which is solved in Foros et al. (2013)11. Given their results, the symmetric equilibrium revenue 
sharing rates are, denoted as 𝛼∗ 
𝛼∗ =
(2−𝛾)(1−𝛽2)
2−𝛾(1+𝛽)
.                                                                                                                     (3.11) 
The symmetric equilibrium retail prices and demand under the agency model, denoted as 
𝑝𝐴
∗  and 𝑞𝐴
∗  respectively, are given by 
𝑝𝐴
∗ =
1−𝛾
2−𝛾
,                                                                                       
𝑞𝐴
∗ =
1
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛾)
.                                                                       
𝑝𝐴
∗  decreases in 𝛾. 𝑞𝐴
∗  and 𝛾 exhibit a U-shape relationship for the same reason as under 
the wholesale model: demand is decided by two countervailing effects. However, under the 
agency model, 𝛽 does not affect 𝑝𝐴
∗ , hence it affects demand only through the negative market 
size effect.  
The following lemma summarises the complete set of symmetric equilibrium results under 
the agency model.  
Lemma 3.2 Under the agency model, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which 
 𝛼∗ = (2 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛽2)/[2 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽)]; 
 𝑝𝐴
∗ = (1 − 𝛾) (2 − 𝛾)⁄ ; 
 𝑞𝐴
∗ = 1/(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛾); 
                                                          
11 Our analysis of retailers’ optimisation problems under the agency model is analogous to Foros et al. (2013). 
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 𝜋𝐴
𝑗 = 2𝛽(1 − 𝛾)[2𝛽 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽)]/(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛾)2[2 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽)] ; 
 𝜋𝑖𝐴 = 2(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)/(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛾)[2 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽)]. 
 
3.4 Comparison  
In this section we compare the symmetric equilibrium outcomes under the two models. We 
start with the following proposition.  
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium, retail prices are lower, quantities demanded are higher and 
consumer surplus is higher under the agency model than under the wholesale model.  
Proof. Appendix B1. 
Proposition 3.1 is driven by the elimination of double marginalisation under the agency 
model. To show this, we write 𝑝∗ as the sum of two mark-ups12  
 𝑤∗⏟
1𝑠𝑡 
+  𝑝∗ −  𝑤∗⏟   
2𝑛𝑑 
=
1−𝛾
2−𝛾⏟
1𝑠𝑡 
+
1−𝛽
(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)⏟    
2𝑛𝑑 
.                                                                                      (3.12) 
As 𝑝𝐴
∗ = (1 − 𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾) = 𝑤∗, the total mark-up under the agency model is equivalent 
to the first mark-up under the wholesale model.  
Double marginalisation as the driving force indicates that when the second mark-up under 
the wholesale model becomes zero, there should not be any difference between the equilibrium 
outcomes under the two models. This is indeed the case as 𝛽 → 1 and (1 − 𝛽)/ (2 − 𝛽)(2 −
𝛾)  → 0. The intuition is, when retailers’ services are close substitutes, retailers are neither 
able to price above costs (i.e., 𝑤∗) under the wholesale model, nor to demand positive shares 
from the manufacturers under the agency model. Hence, some degrees of differentiation 
between retailers are essential for us to distinguish between the equilibrium outcomes under 
                                                          
12 The first mark-up is  𝑤∗ as we assume that firms incur zero marginal costs. 
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the two models. As long as 𝛽  is smaller than one, we are able to rank the two sets of 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Proposition 3.2 In equilibrium, there exists a 𝛾′ ∈ [0,1) such that social surplus is higher 
under the agency model than under the wholesale model if  𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′). 
Proof. Appendix B2. 
 
          Figure 3.1 Social surplus                                Figure 3.2 Industry profits    
Proposition 3.2 says that the agency model is socially desirable given that manufacturers’ 
goods are sufficiently differentiated. We illustrate the comparison of social surplus between 
the two models in Figure 3.1 to complement Proposition 3.2. As we observe, when the 
condition 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′) is not satisfied, it is still possible for social surplus to be higher under the 
agency model, but would place additional conditions on 𝛽, e.g., as 𝛾 is close to one, 𝛽 needs 
to be close to zero for social surplus to be higher under the agency model. It follows that the 
difference in social surplus between the two models is more responsive to changes in 
differentiation at the manufacturer level.  
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The results on consumer surplus and social surplus from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 imply 
that the rank of equilibrium industry profits under the two models depends on values of 𝛽 and 
𝛾. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 together offers two more observations worth highlighting. First, 
suppose that both 𝛽 and 𝛾 are independently and equally likely to take up any value over the 
interval [0,1). Then there are more pairs of 𝛽 and 𝛾 such that industry profits are lower and 
social surplus is higher under the agency model than under the wholesale model.  
Second, when goods and services are approximately homogenous, i.e., 𝛽 →  1 and 𝛾 →
 1, industry profits and social surplus are both relatively higher under the wholesale model. 
However, when social surplus becomes higher under the agency model but industry profits 
remain higher under the wholesale model, policy concerns might arise if the wholesale model 
is adopted. The higher industry profits obtained are at the expense of using the “wrong” 
vertical contract, especially given Propositions 3.1 that consumer surplus is always higher 
under the agency model. 
We now compare how industry profits are divided between manufacturers and retailers 
under the two models. This not only helps to explain the observed comparison of industry 
profits, but also offers insights on how the power relations between manufacturers and retailers 
differ under the two models. As vertical restraints theory distinguishes between restraints 
imposed under manufacturer and retailer power, understanding the division of profits is 
therefore useful in determining the nature of a particular restraint. 
Proposition 3.3 In equilibrium, manufacturer profits are lower under the agency model than 
under the wholesale model, whereas there exists a 𝛾′′ ∈ (𝛾′, 1) such that retailer profits are 
higher under the agency model than under the wholesale model if 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′′).  
Proof. Appendix B3. 
Under the wholesale model, manufacturers’ per-unit profits are precisely  𝑤∗ = (1 −
𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾), whereas under the agency model, their per-unit profits are their shares of  𝑝𝐴
∗ , 
(1 − α)(1 − 𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾), which are strictly lower than  𝑤∗. Overall for manufacturers, the 
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effect of relatively higher per-unit profits under the wholesale model always outweighs the 
effect of relatively higher demand under the agency model. In contrast, retailer profits, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3, are relatively higher under the agency model as along as 
manufacturers’ goods are sufficiently differentiated, i.e.,  𝛾  is not too high, regardless of 
degrees of differentiation at their own level.  
 
       Figure 3.3 Retailer profits 
Proposition 3.3 has two implications. First, moving from the wholesale to the agency 
model, manufacturers are clearly worse off, therefore the agency model is never preferred by 
manufacturers. Instead, the agency model, per se a form of RPM, is likely to be in favour of 
retailers. Second, retailers can benefit from high degrees of differentiation at the manufacturer 
level, implying that the two parties’ incentives are better aligned.  
We explain the second implication further. As we assume that firms behave non-
cooperatively, they would usually benefit from high degrees of differentiation at their own 
level and low degrees of differentiation at the other level of the vertically related market, such 
that they can exercise countervailing power and appropriate a higher portion of the industry 
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rent. It follows that a highly differentiated brand would leave thin margins to retailers and high 
margins to manufacturers (see, Steiner, 1993).  
It is straightforward to verify that this is the case under the wholesale model. The second 
mark-up in (3.14), (1 − 𝛽)/(2 − 𝛽)(2 − 𝛾) , increases in  𝛾 , meaning that retail margin 
increases as manufacturers’ goods become less differentiated under the wholesale model. 
Under the agency model, however, retail margin α(1 − 𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾) is positively correlated 
with degrees of differentiation between goods for any given revenue sharing rate. When the 
revenue sharing rate is endogenous, the relationship is determined by a trade-off: a higher 
degree of differentiation between manufacturers can reduce retail margin as it reduces the 
revenue sharing rate and can increase retail margin as it increases the retail price (which are 
set by manufacturers). The combined effect may not be the same as under the wholesale model. 
In fact, for 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′′), as stated in Proposition 3.3, retailers under the agency model actually 
prefer it when the differentiation between manufacturers’ goods is high. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
In this section we explain how results obtained from the comparison between the wholesale 
and the agency models are useful for understanding the agency model and the antitrust 
treatment of restrains of this kind.  
First, our results suggest that the agency model may be understood as a retailer power 
restraint. Retailer power restraints, as introduced in Section 3.1, are usually imposed by 
insecure manufacturers (Grimes, 2007). Ceteris paribus, the agency model is not an option for 
manufacturers as they earn more under the wholesale model. By choosing the agency model 
over the wholesale model, manufacturers deliberately create incentives for retailers, at the 
expense of their own. Although strong manufacturers have no incentive to do so, insecure 
manufactures may use restraints of this kind to induce retail service and brand promotion. 
Moving from the wholesale to the agency model, two things change: retail prices are set by 
manufacturers instead of retailers and transfer payments are revenue shares instead of unit fees. 
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As a result, retailers do not have to compete over prices and the vertical competition between 
manufacturers and retailers is relaxed, leaving retailers with higher rents. 
Second, with regard to welfare, consumers are better off under the agency model. It 
follows that if courts were to treat restraints involved in sale and nonsale transactions 
differently, e.g., in Schwinn the former was illegal whereas the latter was legal, then having 
the verdict based on the actual impact of restraints on consumer surplus (and on how such 
impact differs in sale and nonsale transactions) seems to be more consistent with the definition 
of the rule of reason,13 instead of the legal ownership of property. 
The better position of consumers under the agency model further explains, from the end 
welfare point of view, why Grimes (2007) might consider that some loose forms of 
“inducement” offered by insecure manufacturers to retailers are “probably presumptively 
lawful.” Nevertheless, he retains two concerns over vertical restraints for brand promotion. 
One is whether such promotion involves deception about product quality that would eventually 
harm consumers14 and the other is whether intrabrand competition is undercut too much to 
“maintain the competitive distribution of strong brands.” While the first concern is an 
additional dimension of the problem that the current paper does not deal with, the second 
concern arises naturally given two possible conflicts: one is between the motive and the impact 
of a restraint and the other is between the restraint’s impact on welfare and on competition. 
Our final interpretation of results therefore addresses the above conflicts and relates them 
to antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. Antitrust authorities and courts may frequently face 
the first conflict. For example, in Schwinn, the Court accepted that the distribution program 
was for business purpose which enabled Schwinn to “compete more effectively in the 
marketplace,”15 but the question remained was whether “the effect upon competition in the 
                                                          
13 “The rule of reason is (127 S. Ct. 2712) ‘the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in 
violation of § 1,’ and in application amounts to ‘an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to 
assess [a restraint’s] actual effect’” (Martin, 2009). 
14 Grimes (2007) writes “…the consumer is unaware that a vertical restraint has given the retailer an incentive to 
promote a particular seller’s product” and that products with “superior characteristics” may “no longer require the 
promotion incentives of a vertical restraint.” 
15 388 U.S. at 374. 
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marketplace is substantially adverse.”16 This appears to signal that courts attach more weight 
to the impact.  
Within the analysis of the impact of vertical restraints, the second conflict has been 
controversial alongside the evolution of antitrust treatment. Such conflict is appealing under 
the agency model given the proceeding discussion: while consumers clearly benefit from it, 
the agency model is evidently more likely to undercut competition with the alignment of 
incentives. While this does not mean that the agency model would necessarily harm 
competition substantially, the lack of incentives for firms to compete may itself constitute a 
major concern of antitrust authorities and courts. The series of vertical restraint cases suggest 
that, as highlighted by Martin (2009), if a restraint generates conflicting impacts on 
competition and consumer surplus, precedence goes to consumer surplus. This implies that, in 
treating vertical restraints of this kind, the rule of reason may be more appropriate as impacts 
of such restraints may differ, depending on the context in which they are used and the 
additional restraints used in conjunction, among others.  
Moving from the per se rule to the rule of reason further urges the recognition of the 
importance of intrabrand competition and the powerful position of retailers in some industries. 
This is because many vertical restraints, including RPM, may not be a means through which 
manufacturers exercise power, but manufacturers act in response of retailer power. The role 
of retailers therefore is crucial in determining the status of retailer power restraints, and in 
particular, identifying cases in which a genuine business purpose is lacking and the restraint is 
mostly likely to be dictated by retailers.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The agency model is popular in some markets in recent years. However, it is not new and 
involved debatable court decisions. Complementary to studies on the agency model in a 
particular market, we take an alternative approach to understand the nature of the agency 
                                                          
16 388 U.S. at 375. 
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model through comparing it to the wholesale model, as well as through placing it in the context 
of antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. 
In a bilateral duopoly model with product differentiation at both the manufacturer level 
and the retailer level of the market, we first find that, relative to the wholesale model, the 
agency model benefits consumers with lower retail prices as it eliminates double 
marginalisation. Hence an economic view would suggest that the legality of restraints involved 
in the agency distribution in Schwinn may be better supported by the impact of restraints on 
consumer surplus rather than the legal ownership of property.   
Second, as manufacturers are strictly better off under the wholesale model whereas 
retailers are more likely to be better off under the agency model, the agency model may be an 
example of retailer power RPM, imposed by insecure manufacturers to incentivise retailers to 
promote their brands. Furthermore, stronger brands do not tend to squeeze retail margin under 
the agency model, hence the incentives of manufacturers and retailers are better aligned under 
this model. Overall the agency model increases consumer surplus but tends to relax 
competition, which constitutes a conflict faced by antitrust authorities and courts in treating 
restraints of this kind. We suggest that they may be evaluated under the rule of reason. 
Unlike the traditional views on vertical relations where retailers are often considered to 
be perfectly competitive and possess little market power, the rise of the agency model implies 
that, ceteris paribus, retailers are in strong position. Understanding the agency model as 
retailer power RPM is meaningful for recognising the changing power relations in some supply 
and distribution chains. 
The potential better position of retailers under the agency model comes not only from 
reduced intrabrand competition, but also from relaxed vertical competition given the alignment 
of incentives. In contrast to the extensive literature on how restraints affect horizontal 
competition in vertically related markets, i.e., interbrand and intrabrand competiton, the same 
regarding vertical competition is scarce. While the current paper does not separate effects 
coming from the two dimensions, it may be a relevant topic for future research.  
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3.7 Appendices B 
B1. Proof of Proposition 3.1 
Given Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, it is straightforward that 𝑝∗ > 𝑝𝐴
∗  and 𝑞∗ < 𝑞𝐴
∗  for 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1).  
Denoting the equilibrium consumer surplus under the wholesale model as 𝐶𝑆 and that under 
the agency model as 𝐶𝑆𝐴, we find that 
𝐶𝑆 =
4
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)
−
1
2(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛽
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛾
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛽𝛾
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
, 
𝐶𝑆𝐴 =
4
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛾)
−
1
2(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛽
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛾
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛾)2
−
2𝛽𝛾
(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛾)2
. 
Consumer surplus is relatively higher under the agency model if  
𝐶𝑆𝐴 − 𝐶𝑆 =
(1−𝛽)(8𝛽2𝛾2−4𝛽2𝛾−8𝛽𝛾2−12𝛽2−16𝛾2+5𝛽+4𝛾+29)
2(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
> 0. 
Since (1 − 𝛽)/2(1 + 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛾)2(2 − 𝛽)2(2 − 𝛾)2 is positive, it follows that 𝐶𝑆𝐴 − 𝐶𝑆 >
0 if  
8𝛽2𝛾2 − 4𝛽2𝛾 − 8𝛽𝛾2 − 12𝛽2 − 16𝛾2 + 5𝛽 + 4𝛾 + 29 > 0. 
The above is equivalent to 
(1 − 𝛽)[4𝛾(1 − 𝛽𝛾) + 4𝛽𝛾(1 − 𝛾)] + 12(1 − 𝛽2) + 16(1 − 𝛾2) + 5𝛽 + 1 > 0, 
which can be easily verified to hold for 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1).                                                                    □                                                                                                                                                                  
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B2. Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Denoting the equilibrium social surplus under the wholesale model as 𝑆 and that under the 
agency model as 𝑆𝐴 , we can write 𝑆 = 2𝜋
𝑆𝑗 + 2 𝜋𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑆 and 𝑆𝐴 = 2𝜋𝐴
𝑆𝑗 + 2 𝜋𝑅𝑖𝐴 + 𝐶𝑆𝐴 , 
more specifically,  
𝑆 =
16𝛽2𝛾2−16𝛽2𝛾−16𝛽𝛾2−32𝛽2+4𝛽𝛾−32𝛾2+20𝛽+20𝛾+55
2(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
, 
𝑆𝐴 =
−16𝛽𝛾2+4𝛽𝛾−16𝛾2+20𝛽+4𝛾+23
2(1+𝛽)2(1+𝛾)2(2−𝛾)2
. 
Given any 𝛽 , the relationship between  𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆 and 𝛾 is illustrated in Figure 3.4.  𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆 is 
positive for sure for 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′) whereas it may or may not be positive for 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾′, 1).  𝑆𝐴 = 𝑆 
at 𝛾 = 𝛾′.                                                                                                                                    □                                                    
 
Figure 3.4 The relationship between 𝛾 and (𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆) 
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B3. Proof of Proposition 3.3 
We first compare manufacturer profits under the two models. Given Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, 
𝜋𝑆
𝑗
> 𝜋𝐴
𝑆𝑗 if the following holds, 
2(1−𝛾)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)2(2−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)
[2 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽) − 𝛽(2 − 𝛽)(2𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾)] > 0. 
Since 2(1 − 𝛾)/(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾)(2 − 𝛽)(2 − 𝛾)2(2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾) is positive, it follows that 
𝜋𝑆
𝑗
− 𝜋𝐴
𝑆𝑗 > 0 if  
2 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛽) − 𝛽(2 − 𝛽)(2𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾) > 0, 
that is, if 𝛾 < 2(1 − 𝛽2 + 𝛽)/(1 − 𝛽2), which always holds given 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ [0,1).          
 
      Figure 3.5 The relationship between 𝛾 and (𝜋𝑅𝑖𝐴 −  𝜋𝑅𝑖) 
Next, we compare retailer profits, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, given any 𝛽,  𝜋𝑅𝑖𝐴 −  𝜋𝑅𝑖 is 
positive for 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾′′), whereas it is more likely to be negative for 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾′′, 1). To find 𝛾′′, 
we evaluate  𝜋𝑅𝑖𝐴 =  𝜋𝑅𝑖 at 𝛽 = 0, and obtain 𝛾
′′ = 3/4.                                                             □                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
53 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Two Types of Resale Price Maintenance 
and Vertical Rent Shifting 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Resale price maintenance (RPM) is the practice by which an upstream manufacturer specifies 
the retail price of a product sold to consumers which, as evaluated by the economic literature, 
has both pro and anticompetitive effects.1 RPM has traditionally been viewed as being imposed 
by upstream manufacturers. Under classic RPM, manufacturers set the retail price in addition 
to their decisions on the transfer payment, e.g., the wholesale price. Retailers typically make 
no decision. Yet, we often observe in the real world another form of RPM, agency RPM, by 
which retailers set the transfer payment, before manufacturers set the retail price. A recent 
example of agency RPM was the agency model used by Apple and the book publishers for 
                                                          
1 RPM can be used to improve the efficiency in vertical relations, while it can also be anticompetitive by dampening 
competition, facilitating collusion and blocking new entrants. See, Rey and Caballero-Sanz (1996) for a 
comprehensive survey.  
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selling e-books under which Apple first specified the revenue-sharing rate and the book 
publishers set the e-book price.2  
While there are a number of studies examining the agency model as a type of RPM (e.g., 
Foros, Kind and Shaffer, 2013) and comparing it to the wholesale model (e.g., Lu, 2016), two 
concerns arises. First, little is known about how different agency RPM is from classic RPM. 
Hence it remains unclear whether the two share the common pro and anticompetitive effects. 
Second, moving from the wholesale model to the agency model, not only the decision roles of 
manufacturers and retailers are reversed but also the form of the transfer payment changes, i.e., 
from unit-fee to revenue-sharing. It remains unclear which effect drives the comparison. For 
example, it can be shown that double marginalisation is eliminated under the agency model. 
However, since the two features of the agency model, RPM and revenue-sharing, are both 
potential instruments to neutralize vertical externalities (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988; Dana and Spier, 
2001), it is not clear whether double marginalisation is eliminated as a result of RPM, or a 
result of revenue-sharing, or joint effects of both. 
In this paper, we develop a framework to distinguish between the two types of RPM, as 
well as separate out the effects of reversing decision roles and changing forms of the transfer 
payment. We compare eight simple vertical contracts including four unit-fee contracts and 
four revenue-sharing contracts characterising a vertical relation of a monopolist manufacturer 
and a monopolist retailer.3  For a given form of the transfer payment, the four contracts differ 
in who sets the retail price and who sets the amount of the transfer payment: a) the 
manufacturer sets the transfer payment and the retailer sets the retail price, b) the retailer sets 
the transfer payment and the manufacturer sets the retail price, c) the manufacturer sets both, 
and d) the retailer sets both. Among the eight contracts, two involve classic RPM and two 
involve agency RPM. Many of the featured contracts are, either alone or in combination, 
                                                          
2 U.S. v. Apple Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), the State of Texas, et al. v. Penguin Group Inc., et al. 12 Civ. 3394 
(DLC) (2013). 
3 Under a unit-fee contract, the transfer payment between the manufacturer and the retailer is proportional to the 
quantity demanded, e.g., a uniform wholesale price, whereas a revenue-sharing contract is a form of royalties under 
which the transfer payment is a proportion of the total revenue. The contracts featured in this paper are either unit-
fee or revenue-sharing contracts, not any form of combination of the two. See Figure 4.1 in Section 4.3.1 for details. 
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observed in the real world. For example, Amazon and e-Bay use a combination of unit-fee and 
revenue-sharing agency RPM to deal with their business sellers4; a revenue-sharing contract 
without RPM is used in the movie industry.5 
By comparing the contracts, we find that classic RPM and agency RPM can be 
distinguished in the following aspects. First, while both the manufacturer and the retailer may 
have incentives to adopt RPM in facing vertical competition, their preferences over RPM differ: 
classic RPM benefits the manufacturer whereas agency RPM benefits the retailer. Second, the 
efficiency benefit of the elimination of double marginalisation applies to classic RPM, but not 
necessarily to agency RPM. Third, agency RPM is better in resembling the freedom of trade 
appreciated by courts.6 
Regarding the ceteris paribus effects of reversing decision roles and changing forms of 
the transfer payment, we find that, for a given form of the transfer payment, reversing decision 
roles, i.e., whether there is agency RPM or not, does not affect retail prices and is purely a 
vertical rent shifting. More interestingly, manufacturer profits are higher when the retail price 
is set by the retailer and retailer profits are higher when the retail price is set by the 
manufacturer. This can be explained by our earlier result that agency RPM empowers the 
retailer. For given decision roles, retail prices are always lower under revenue-sharing 
contracts. Whoever sets the retail price is better off under a unit-fee contract, whereas the other 
is better off under a revenue-sharing contract. We further extend this part of the analysis to the 
bilateral duopoly market in which we compare symmetric equilibrium outcomes of the four 
contracts.  
Our approach and findings are useful in the following ways. First, we compare across a 
menu of vertical contracts, which enables us to separate out the effects of the two key elements 
                                                          
4 See https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=3517791 for “Selling on Amazon Fee 
Schedule” and http://sellercentre.ebay.co.uk/fees-business-sellers-0?cat=763 for eBay’s “Fees for business seller”. 
5 See, e.g., Dana and Spier (2001).   
6 Justice White highlighted the antitrust view of competition as a process of favouring independent decisions by 
independent firms (433 U.S. 36 at 66-67): “…the reason was rather… the notion in many of our cases involving 
vertical restraints that independent businessmen should have the freedom to dispose of the goods they own as they 
see fit.” 
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written in a vertical contract, decision roles and forms of the transfer payment, on retail prices 
and profit division. Through comparing a given contract with different counterparts, we offer 
an overview of the baseline preferences of different parties towards vertical contracts, which 
is helpful for understanding the role of RPM in a particular industry. 
Second, we highlight the neglected distinctions between classic RPM and agency RPM, 
which is important for the assessment of RPM in a specific context, so as to minimise the 
potential Type I and Type II errors in the antitrust treatment of RPM. One needs to be cautious 
of the commonly assumed association between RPM and the elimination of double 
marginalisation, even in the absence of any additional contract terms. Also, RPM that does 
provide consumers with lower prices might come at the expenses of limited competition. 
Third, and in relation to the first two, we clarify that, ceteris paribus, reversing decision 
roles primarily shifts the vertical rents between different levels of the market, whereas 
changing forms of the transfer payment primarily affects consumer surplus. That is, although 
the agency model eliminates double marginalisation, this effect is not driven by RPM but by 
the nature of revenue-sharing contracts. 
Furthermore, we show that recognising the role of vertical competition is meaningful. In 
the model of bilateral monopoly where there is no horizontal competition, the manufacturer 
and the retailer still have incentives to use RPM for vertical competition. Here RPM increases 
rents of the firm at one level of the market through vertically suppressing the firm at the other 
level of the market, and more importantly, it can affect consumer surplus and thus should not 
be neglected. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related literature. Section 4.3 
presents the framework for our analysis, in which we first characterize the vertical relation by 
a menu of contracts in bilateral monopoly, and then extend the analysis to bilateral duopoly. 
Section 4.4 ranks the contracts using different criteria and analyses the results. Section 4.5 
concludes. 
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4.2 Related literature  
Unlike the Chicago approach to vertical relations (see, e.g., Bork, 1966), which views firms at 
successive levels of a supply chain as partners with complementary functions and tends to 
omit the conflict between them, contemporary vertical restraint theory (e.g., Steiner, 1993) and 
contract theory (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1987) recognise that competition occurs not only 
horizontally at the same level of the market, but also vertically between different levels. 
Contracts characterising vertical relations thus can affect the total rents as well as the division 
rules of those rents. 
Despite that the contract is a vertical one, antitrust law seems to only treat firms at the 
same level as competitors, reflected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement of “all competitive 
effects, are by definition, horizontal effects.”7 In analyzing the anticompetitive effects of RPM, 
the economic literature almost always relies on the horizontal effect of RPM (Giovannett and 
Stallibrass, 2009). For example, RPM may be adopted to dampen competition (Shaffer, 1991; 
Dobson and Waterson, 2007), to block entry (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014) and to facilitate 
collusion (Jullien and Rey, 2007), at a particular level of the market. In this context, RPM that 
empowers firms at a particular level usually does so through relaxing the horizontal 
competition that the firms are facing. In contract theory, the economics of rent shifting is also 
horizontal in nature, which is from one seller to another, and the buyer may or may not play a 
positive role (Marx and Shaffer, 2004).  
Contrary to the abundance literature on horizontal competition in vertical relations, 
vertical competition has received far less attention. One primary reason, as suggested by 
Steiner (2008), is the doubt on whether vertical competition can affect consumer surplus in the 
same way as horizontal competition. He highlights this omission and argues that even with 
“no further horizontal market shares to capture”, firms at a particular level can increase their 
profits through vertically squeezing the margin of firms at other levels of the market. In this 
paper, we show that RPM could be such a device and that vertical competition can affect 
                                                          
7 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.4 (1988). 
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consumer surplus. This is similar to the story of RPM as a commitment device to protect 
upstream monopoly rents (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; Rey and Vergé, 2004), which is 
possibly so far the only theory of harm that relies on RPM having a vertical effect (Giovannett 
and Stallibrass, 2009). However, we find that not only upstream manufacturers, but also 
downstream retailers may have the incentive to use RPM for vertical rent shifting.  
 Related to the above, as retailers are traditionally viewed as lacking in market power in a 
vertical relation, despite the rich literature on RPM and the awareness later on that RPM may 
also be “retailer-sponsored” (Dobson and Waterson, 1999), little attention has been paid to the 
actual decision role of the retailer. Until recently, and plausibly motivated by Apple’s e-book 
case, some studies start to compare alternative vertical contracts. Foros, et al. (2013) focus on 
the decision role of the retail price in revenue-sharing contracts. Johnson (2014) and Lu (2016) 
compare the wholesale model to the agency model. Closest in framework to us, Liu and Shuai 
(2015) include two unit-fee contracts and two revenue-sharing contracts in their comparison 
and allow the decisions of manufacturers and retailers to reverse, yet they do not clarify the 
ceteris paribus effects of changing one thing at a time.  
This paper is further related to the literature on countervailing power, which primarily 
examines the effects of buyer power on market configuration and welfare. In addition to 
studies on whether buyer power would lead to exclusion (e.g., Marx and Shaffer, 2007; 
Gabrielsen and Johansen, 2015), reduction of wholesale prices (Chen, 2003), and promotion 
of retailers’ own-label brands instead of manufacturers’ brands (Dobson and Waterson, 1999), 
our results offer an additional device of exercising buyer power: to use RPM to extract rents 
from the manufacturer.  
 
4.3 Model 
We consider a market with two manufacturers, 𝑗 = 𝐴, 𝐵  and two retailers,  𝑖 = 1, 2. Each 
manufacturer 𝑗 produces a single good 𝑗 and distributes to both retailers, i.e., 𝑞𝑖
𝑗 > 0, such that 
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vertical contracts are nonexclusive. That is, there are four “final goods” competing in the 
downstream market, {𝐴1, 𝐵1, 𝐴2, 𝐵2}. We assume production costs of all firms to be zero. 
We use the linear demand following Dobson and Waterson (1996, 2007) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑗 = 1 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑗 − 𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝑗 − 𝛾𝑞𝑖
−𝑗 − 𝛽𝛾𝑞−𝑖
−𝑗
,                                                                                     (4.1)                         
which gives rise to the following direct demand function 
𝑞𝑖
𝑗 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)−𝑝𝑖
𝑗
+𝛾𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
+𝛽(𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
−𝛾𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
)
(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
.                                                                                            (4.2) 
The quantity demanded for good 𝑗 at retailer 𝑖 depends on its own price, prices of the 
competing goods and two parameters. The parameter 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of 
competition between retailers and the parameter 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1)  measures the degree of 
competition between manufacturers. As values of the parameters increase, competition in the 
associated market level becomes more intense.  
 
4.3.1 Bilateral monopoly 
The direct demand function in (4.2) is valid when all four “final goods” are presented in the 
market, but it can be modified to model other market configurations. To model bilateral 
monopoly, we simply set 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 0  in (4.1) and obtain  𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞 . This is as if the 
manufacturers’ goods and the retailers’ services are perceived to be perfectly differentiated 
and thus not in competition.  
In this sub-section, we consider a monopolist manufacturer, 𝑀, who produces a single 
good and distributes to the monopolist retailer, 𝑅 , who then serves consumers. In this 
framework, we compare eight vertical contracts as shown in Figure 4.1. Contracts 1-4 are unit-
fee based (in squares) and contracts 5-8 are revenue-sharing based (in circles). Each contract 
involves decisions on the retail price, 𝑝, and the amount of the transfer payment between 𝑀 
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and 𝑅, 𝑤 or 𝛼, where 𝑤 is the linear tariff in unit-fee contracts and 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1] is the revenue-
sharing rate in revenue-sharing contacts.𝑤  can be straightforwardly interpreted as the 
wholesale price when decided by 𝑀 and can be interpreted as a service fee when charged by 
𝑅. Under revenue-sharing contracts, the firm setting 𝛼 obtains 𝛼 of the total revenue and the 
other firm obtains (1 − 𝛼) of the total revenue.  
Our baseline is contract 2, the standard wholesale model, which involves unit-fee transfer 
payments and no RPM. Given the baseline, we distinguish between two types of RPM: classic 
RPM under which 𝑀 has sole control over both decisions (contracts 1 and 5), and agency RPM 
under which whereas 𝑅 first sets 𝑤 (contract 3) or 𝛼 (contract 7, commonly known as the 
agency model) and then 𝑀 sets 𝑝. That is, although both types allow 𝑀 to set the retail price, 
the decision role of 𝑅 differs. The remaining contracts 4, 6 and 8 do not involve RPM. 𝑅 has 
sole control over both decisions in 4 and 8, and under 6, 𝑀 decides the proportions of total 
revenue to retain, before 𝑅 sets 𝑝. 
 
Figure 4.1 A menu of vertical contracts – bilateral monopoly 
We assume that under each contract, all terms are final and are not subject to renegotiation, 
and 𝑀 and 𝑅 make the allocated decisions to maximise their profits. Table 4.1 presents the 
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equilibrium outcomes of different contracts8, including transfer payments (𝑤  or 𝛼), retail 
prices (𝑝), quantity demanded (𝑞), manufacturer profits (𝜋𝑀), retailer profits (𝜋𝑅) and total 
profits (𝜋). Contract 0 represents the monopoly outcomes when 𝑀 and 𝑅 integrate, which are 
useful for our analysis later. More specifically, we compare across contracts 1-8 to examine 
whether 𝑀 and 𝑅 would each have an incentive to adopt RPM in facing vertical competition 
and how the two types of RPM differ, and then restrict the comparison to contracts 2, 3, 6 and 
7 to identify the ceteris paribus effects of reversing decision roles and changing forms of the 
transfer payment. Note that, in the restricted comparison, contracts 2, 3, 6 and 7 are typically 
referred as models of wholesale, reversed wholesale, reversed agency and agency to facilitate 
understanding. 
Table 4.1 Equilibrium outcomes – bilateral monopoly 
 
4.3.2 Bilateral duopoly 
In this sub-section we relax the imposition of 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 0 and are back to the direct demand 
function (4.2) of modelling two competing manufacturers and two competing retailers. Now 
the vertically related market features both horizontal and vertical competition.  
Unlike in bilateral monopoly where eight vertical contracts are considered, in this 
framework, we compare four contracts: wholesale (2), reversed wholesale (3), reversed agency 
                                                          
8 Proof see Appendix C1. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RPM - Classic No Agency 
 
No Classic No Agency No 
𝒘 - 1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  0 - - - - 
𝜶 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 
𝒑 1 2⁄  1 2⁄  3 4⁄  3 4⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  
𝒒 1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 4⁄  1 4⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  1 2⁄  
𝝅𝑴 - 1 4⁄  1 8⁄  1 16⁄  0 1/4 1 4⁄  0 0 
𝝅𝑹 - 0 1 16⁄  1 8⁄  1 4⁄  0 0 1 4⁄  1 4⁄  
𝝅 1 4⁄  1 4⁄  3 16⁄  3 16⁄  1 4⁄  1 4⁄  1 4⁄  1 4⁄  1 4⁄  
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(6) and agency (7). The reason for not including the contracts in which both decisions are made 
by firms at the same level of the market, i.e., contracts 1, 4, 5 and 8, is that there exists no pure 
strategy equilibrium in those contracts in the presence of horizontal competition. For example, 
if we allow the two manufacturers, 𝐴 and 𝐵, to make both decisions, then 𝐴 may have an 
incentive to offer retailers positive payments in order to induce the exclusion of 𝐵 from the 
market.  
We focus on symmetric equilibrium in this sub-section. Table 4.2 presents the equilibrium 
outcomes of the four contracts in bilateral duopoly9, including transfer payments (𝑤 or 𝛼), 
retail prices (𝑝), quantity demanded per final good (𝑞), manufacturer profits per firm (𝜋𝑗), 
retailer profits per firm (𝜋𝑖) and total profits (𝜋). Since the four contracts included feature only 
agency RPM, we cannot comment on the differences between the two types of RPM in this 
framework. However, extending the analysis to bilateral duopoly provides useful robustness 
check on the other results from bilateral monopoly, i.e., whether they hold in the presence of 
horizontal competition. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
Given the equilibrium outcomes of the different vertical contracts, in this section we rank the 
contracts using a number of criteria, namely, maximising manufacturer profits, maximising 
retailer profits, maximising consumer surplus, as well as best resembling the notion of 
independent decisions by independent firms appreciated by courts. By comparing and ranking 
the contracts accordingly, we seek to address the research questions set up in the preceding 
sections. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Proof see Appendix C2. 
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Table 4.2 Symmetric equilibrium outcomes – bilateral duopoly 
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4.4.1 Bilateral monopoly 
We first compare the equilibrium outcomes in the bilateral monopoly market. Table 4.3 
presents the rankings of contracts using our variables of interest, 𝜋𝑀 , 𝜋𝑅  and 𝑝. Contracts 
denoted in squares are unit-fee based and those in circles are revenue-sharing based. Our 
baseline wholesale model (contract 2) is denoted in bold.  
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Rankings of contracts – bilateral monopoly 
We start with 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅. As table 4.3 shows, among all contracts, 𝜋
𝑀 is maximised in 1, 
5, and 6 and minimised in 4, 7 and 8. It is not surprising that 𝑀 prefers to take sole control of 
the decisions (in 1 and 5), and is exploited when 𝑅  makes both decisions (in 4 and 8), 
regardless of the contract form. The additional insight comes from that he likes contract 6 as 
much as contract 5. That is, being able to decide the revenue-sharing rate is as if being able to 
make both decisions. The intuition is, although 𝑅 sets the retail price in contract 6, she has no 
incentive to set a price that does not maximise the total revenue. No matter how little revenue 
share 𝑀  offers her, 𝑅  would set a price to maximise that share, which is equivalent to 
maximise the total revenue. The preferences of 𝑅 is the opposite of those of 𝑀 due to the 
vertical conflict between them on the division of total revenue.  
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that a revenue-sharing contract is written between 𝑀 and 𝑅. Ceteris 
paribus, whoever decides the revenue-sharing rate earns more, whereas the decision role of 
the retail price is irrelevant.  
 Ranking 
𝝅𝑴 
1  ○5 ○6 > 𝟐 > 3 > 4  ○7 ○8   
𝝅𝑹 4  ○7 ○8 > 3 > 𝟐  > 1  ○5 ○6  
𝒑 
1  4  ○5 ○6 ○7 ○8 < 𝟐  3  
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Foros et al. (2013) find that when retailers set the revenue-sharing rate, they would like 
manufacturers to set the retail price if 𝛽 > 𝛾 to avoid fierce horizontal competition. Lemma 
4.1 complements this finding by adding the baseline scenario of 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 0. Regardless of 
who sets the revenue-sharing rate, 𝑀 or 𝑅 are indifferent between whether or not setting the 
retail price. More importantly, Lemma 4.1 emphasizes the revenue-sharing rate as the key 
element affecting the respective profits of 𝑀 or 𝑅. Although we use a simple model, the results 
indicate that, among a number of possible reasons explaining why many giant retailers would 
like to use the agency model, the key reason seems to be, it allows them to set the revenue-
sharing rate, and they are content to delegate price decisions to sellers.  
To examine 𝑀 and 𝑅’s incentives of adopting RPM, we need to find out whether RPM 
can increase 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅, respectively. Results suggest that, compared to the baseline contract 
(2), there are three alternative contracts (1, 5 and 6) that can make 𝑀 better off, among which 
two involve RPM (1 and 5); there are four contracts (4, 7, 8 and 3) that can make 𝑅 better off, 
among which two involve RPM. That is, while RPM is not the only way to increase 𝜋𝑀 or 𝜋𝑅, 
it can be such a device.   
More interestingly, it is clear from Table 4.3 that when 𝑀 or 𝑅 was to use RPM for higher 
rents, the types of RPM that he or she would choose are different. Typically, classic RPM 
benefits 𝑀 and agency RPM benefits 𝑅. Furthermore, while both unit-fee and revenue-sharing 
classic RPM (1 and 5) enable 𝑀  to extract the monopoly rents and thus 𝑀  is indifferent 
between the two, revenue-sharing agency RPM (7) provides 𝑅 with monopoly rents and unit-
fee agency RPM (3) benefits 𝑅 to a smaller extent.  
Note that such incentive of adopting RPM is purely driven by the vertical competition 
between 𝑀 and 𝑅 that each of them is strictly better off obtaining more of the total rents. The 
results suggest that RPM can be a device of vertical rent shifting, and the type of RPM adopted 
is, ceteris paribus, useful in telling whether the rent is shifted from 𝑀 to 𝑅, or vice versa. 
Lemma 4.2 Compared to the baseline wholesale model (2), ceteris paribus, classic RPM 
benefits 𝑀 and agency RPM benefits 𝑅. 
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We then examine how such vertical effects of RPM affect consumer surplus. First, as 
shown in Table 4.3, retail prices are identical among contracts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and are 
identical between contracts 2 and 3. Consumers are worse off under contracts 2 and 3 that 
involve double marginalisation and thus higher retail prices. The message here is, despite that 
RPM may reduce prices and benefit consumers, similar effects can be achieved without RPM. 
Second, not all contracts involving RPM affect consumer surplus in the identical way. The 
two classic RPM and revenue-sharing agency RPM indeed benefit consumers by eliminating 
double marginalisation and providing lower retail prices, such efficiency benefit does not 
realise under unit-fee agency RPM.  
Lemma 4.3 Compared to the baseline wholesale model (2), classic RPM offers lower retail 
prices by eliminating double marginalisation, whereas agency RRM achieves such efficiency 
benefit if the form of contract is revenue-sharing. 
Lemma 4.3 offers two implications. First, one needs to be cautious of the commonly 
assumed association between RPM and the elimination of double marginalisation. While such 
association is ceteris paribus true for classic RPM, it is not necessarily true for agency RPM. 
Second, vertical competition should not be neglected as it can benefit consumers. Relative to 
the baseline, three out of the total four contracts involving RPM change consumer surplus, 
which demonstrates the relevance of vertical competition. 
Antitrust authorities and courts also consider whether vertical restraints limit competition 
by restricting firms’ freedom of trade. For example, in deciding the illegality of RPM in Dr 
Miles10, the Supreme Court stated that it restricted the freedom of firms in trading what they 
own. We therefore further distinguish between the two types of RPM from this perspective. 
Table 4.4 includes the baseline contract and the contracts with RPM, and lists whether the 
ownership of goods is transferred from 𝑀 to 𝑅, and whether 𝑀 and 𝑅 have the freedom to 
make independent decisions under these contracts. The different combinations of answers to 
                                                          
10 Dr. Miles Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
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these two questions, i.e., Yes/No under unit-fee classic RPM (1), No/No under revenue-
sharing classic RPM (5) and No/Yes under the two agency RPM (3 and 7) suggest that 
different RPM may restrict the freedom of trade to different extents. 
Table 4.4 Freedom of trade – bilateral monopoly 
Among the five contracts, unit-fee classic RPM (1) seems to least resemble the “antitrust 
view of competition as a process of favoring independent decisions by independent firms” 
(Martin, 2009), as it involves the transfer of ownership of goods from 𝑀 to 𝑅 and yet 𝑅 has 
no freedom in setting the retail price. On the other hand, agency RPM (3 and 7) is by definition 
better in respecting the freedom of the retailer. 
Overall, we can conclude that it is necessary and meaningful to distinguish between the 
two types of RPM, as stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1 In a bilateral monopoly market, classic RPM and agency RPM differ in their 
respective effects on profit division, consumer surplus and freedom of trade 
 Classic RPM benefits the manufacturer whereas agency RPM benefits the retailer; 
 Classic RPM eliminates double marginalisation whereas agency RPM may fail to; 
 Classic RPM restricts the freedom of trade whereas agency RPM allows the retailer 
to make independent decisions.    
Note that there are potential conflicts when different criteria are used. For example, 
consumers would prefer unit-fee classic RPM to unit-fee agency RPM, but the former strictly 
 1 2 3 5 7 
RPM Classic No Agency 
 
Classic Agency      
Transfer of 
ownership 
Yes Yes No No No 
Freedom of   
trade 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
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restricts the retailer’s freedom of trade and thus overall competition. Since Leegin11 in which 
the per se illegality of RPM was overruled in the U.S., comprehensive evaluations of RPM, 
including its impacts on competition as well as on consumer surplus, have become more 
relevant for the antitrust treatment of RPM. Proposition 4.1 suggests that even in a simple 
framework, RPM of different types can have substantially different impacts. Hence there may 
be cases in which it is necessary to view RPM in a specific context before deciding the form 
of antitrust intervention to avoid Type I and Type II errors. 
We next move on to examine the ceteris paribus effects of reversing decision roles of 𝑀 
and 𝑅, and changing forms of the transfer payment between them. For this purpose we restrict 
the comparison to four contracts that allow both 𝑀 and 𝑅 to make independent decisions: 
wholesale (2), reversed wholesale (3), reversed agency (6) and agency (7). Among the four 
contracts, contracts of reversed wholesale and agency involve agency RPM. 
In a bilateral monopoly market, the comparison has been made between the wholesale and 
the agency models, based on which welfare implications are drawn (Gaudin and White, 2014). 
However, since moving from wholesale to agency, not only decision roles of 𝑀 and 𝑅 are 
reversed, but also the form of the transfer payment changes, it would be difficult to identify 
the driving force of the comparison without capturing the effects of changing one thing at a 
time. 
As presented in Table 4.5, we examine the effect of reversing decision roles by holding 
the form of the transfer payment constant, and then examine the effect of changing the form 
of the transfer payment by holding the decision roles constant. For a given form of transfer 
payments, we first find that reversing decision roles does not change retail prices: 𝑝 is identical 
between contracts 2 and 3, and between 6 and 7. Second, while reversing decision roles does 
not change the total profits either, it redistributes the total profits between 𝑀  and  𝑅 . 
Interestingly 𝜋𝑀 is higher under contracts 2 and 6, both with the retailer setting the retail price, 
                                                          
11 Leegin v. PSKS. Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
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and 𝜋𝑅 is higher under contracts 3 and 7, which we know from earlier results that involve 
agency RPM.  
For given decision roles, changing the form of the transfer payment changes 𝑝. Retail 
prices are lower and total profits are higher under revenue-sharing contracts (6 and 7), 
irrespective of the decision roles. Furthermore, and in line with Lemma 4.1, whoever sets the 
retail price is better off under a unit-fee contract, whereas the other is better off under a 
revenue-sharing contract. We summaries these findings as follows. 
Table 4.5 Reversing decision roles and changing forms of transfer payments – bilateral monopoly 
Proposition 4.2 In a bilateral monopoly market, the ceteris paribus effects of reversing 
decision roles of the manufacturer and the retailer, and changing forms of the transfer 
payment between them are such that 
a. For a given form of the transfer payment, retail prices are the same, irrespective of 
the decision roles;  
b. For a given form of the transfer payment, the manufacturer and the retailer each 
would like the other to set the retail price;  
c. For given decision roles, retail prices are lower under revenue-sharing contracts; 
d. For given decision roles, the one who sets the retail price would like a unit-fee contract, 
whereas the one who sets the amount of the transfer payment would like a revenue-
sharing contract. 
 For a given form of transfer payment For given decision roles 
 Unit-fee 
 
Revenue-sharing 
 
𝑀 sets 𝑤/𝛼 
𝑅 sets 𝑝 
𝑅 sets 𝑤/𝛼 
𝑀 sets 𝑝 
 
𝝅𝑴 2 > 3  ○6 >○7  2 <○6  3 >○7  
𝝅𝑹 2 <  3  ○6 <○7  2 >○6  3 <○7  
𝒑 2 =  3  ○6 =○7  2 >○6  3 >○7  
𝝅 2 =  3  
 
○6 =○7  2 <○6  3 <○7  
70 
 
Proposition 4.2 is useful as it clarifies the driving forces of the differences in the retail 
price and profit division across featured vertical contracts: ceteris paribus, reversing decision 
roles changes profit division between 𝑀 and 𝑅, whereas changing the form of the transfer 
payment changes the retail price. We discuss the implications further below. 
First, while the agency model eliminates double marginalisation, it does so through a 
channel different from classic RPM. The theoretical rationale of using RPM to solve the 
double marginalisation problem is that RPM leads to the same allocation as vertical integration. 
However, under agency RPM where the retailer is free to set the amount of the transfer 
payment, as stated in Proposition 4.1, such rationale may not hold. Under the agency model, 
the elimination of double marginalisation is not driven by the retail price being set by the 
manufacturer, i.e., RPM, but by the nature of revenue-sharing contracts. It follows that, the 
efficiency effect of the agency model involving RPM can be equally achieved by alternative 
vertical contracts without RPM. 
Second, it seems counterintuitive that, regardless of the contract form, neither the 
manufacturer nor the retailer would wish to maintain control over the retail price. In fact, this 
is due to different reasons under different forms of contracts. Lemma 4.1 has explained the 
reason under a revenue-sharing contract: the one setting the revenue-sharing rate is as if 
making both decisions and is able to extract full rents. Under a unit-fee contract, whoever 
moves first, i.e., setting the wholesale price, has an advantage because the second mover has 
to take into account the first mover’s decision. When demand is elastic and cost pass-though 
is incomplete, the increase in the wholesale price by the first mover will have to be partly 
absorbed by the second mover who sets the retail price and is thus worse off. Hence, when 
decision roles are fixed, the one setting the retail price prefer a unit-fee contract to guarantee 
positive earnings, as he/she would only obtain 𝜀 under a revenue-sharing contract. 
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4.4.2 Bilateral duopoly 
We extend the comparison of contracts wholesale (2), reversed wholesale (3), reversed agency 
(6) and agency (7) to a vertical market of two competing manufacturers and two competing 
retailers.12 This extension is directly relevant to the analysis of the effects of reversing decision 
roles and changing forms of the transfer payment. It provides robustness check on whether 
Proposition 4.2 obtained in a bilateral monopoly market can be carried over. This market 
configuration with both horizontal and vertical competition is also closer to the real world. 
Furthermore, since it includes two contracts with no RPM and two contracts with agency RPM, 
we are able to examine whether agency RPM remains beneficial to retailers in this setting. 
By comparing the symmetric equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 4.2, we obtain the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4.3 In a bilateral duopoly market, the ceteris paribus effects of reversing decision 
roles of manufacturers and retailers, and changing forms of the transfer payment between 
them are such that  
 c. from Proposition 4.2 holds; 
 Under unit-fee contracts, a. b. and d. from Proposition 4.2 hold; 
 Under revenue-sharing contracts, whether a. b. and d. from Proposition 4.2 hold 
depends on values of 𝛽 and 𝛾.  
Although some results obtained under revenue-sharing contracts in the bilateral monopoly 
market do not hold straightforwardly in the bilateral duopoly market, the essence holds: ceteris 
paribus, reversing decision roles changes profit division, whereas changing the form of the 
                                                          
12 Comparisons of these four vertical contracts in a bilateral duopoly market have been made in Liu and Shuai 
(2015), who primarily focus on welfare comparisons between alternative contracts and do not discuss profit division 
nor issues of RPM. For this reason, although the four contracts are considered, the ceteris paribus effects of 
changing one element at a time remain unclear. Furthermore, while their results from comparing reversed agency 
and agency contracts are similar to ours, we obtain different results regarding the comparison between wholesale 
and reversed wholesale contracts.  
 
72 
 
transfer payment changes the retail price. This is because, in the bilateral duopoly market, 
retail prices remain lower under revenue-sharing contracts, regardless of decision roles, and 
agency RPM remains beneficial to retailers among the four contracts.  
In the bilateral duopoly market, reversing decision roles under revenue-sharing contracts, 
in addition to the change in profit division, can change retail prices. Compared to reversed 
agency model (6) which does not involve RPM, the agency model (7) would increase retail 
prices if the degree of competition intensity is relatively higher between retailers than between 
manufacturers, i.e.,  𝛽 > 𝛾.  As a result, under revenue-sharing contracts, the comparison of 
𝜋𝑗(𝜋𝑖) given different decision roles is not as straightforward as under the bilateral monopoly 
case and is dependent on 𝛽 and 𝛾. However, as we mentioned above, when we compare across 
all four contracts, 𝜋𝑗 is higher under either wholesale model (2) or reversed agency model (6), 
both with retailers setting the retail price; 𝜋𝑖 is higher under either reversed wholesale model 
(3) or agency model (7), both involve agency RPM.  
Note that, under unit-fee contracts, reversing decision roles typically shifts some rents 
from one level of the market to the other without changing the total profits, whereas under 
revenue-sharing contracts, there can be additional rents from an increased total profits 
following changes in the retail price.  
In the absence of horizontal competition, vertical competition in bilateral monopoly can 
help to restore the vertical integration outcome (contract 0); whereas moving to the bilateral 
duopoly market, horizontal competition in addition can help to decrease the retail price below 
the monopoly level. For example, the equilibrium retail prices under either one of the featured 
revenue-sharing contracts are strictly lower than the integrated monopoly retail prices; (1 −
𝛽)/(2 − 𝛽) < 1/2 and (1 − 𝛾)/(2 − 𝛾) < 1/2, for 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1). 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Vertical relations in economics are often modelled on the basis that upstream manufacturers 
set the wholesale price and downstream retailers set the retail price. However, this is over-
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simplistic. A number of other complexities have been included in models over time, e.g., 
allowing for the manufacturers charging, or being charged, a fixed fee, as well as allowing for 
various royalty schemes. These complexities may further affect the adoption of vertical 
restraints such as RPM. 
In this paper, we consider the implications of relaxing two key elements written in a 
vertical contract, decision roles of manufacturers and retailers, i.e., who sets the retail price 
and who sets the amount of the transfer payment, as well as forms of the transfer payment 
between them, i.e., unit-fee or revenue-sharing. We do so by comparing eight vertical contracts 
covering the possible combinations of the variants of the two key elements. This framework 
of analysis enables us to distinguish between two types of RPM: classic RPM by which a 
manufacturer sets both the transfer payment and the retail price, and agency RPM by which a 
retailer sets the transfer payment before the retail price being set by a manufacturer.  
In a bilateral monopoly market, we find that the two types of RPM differ substantially in 
their respective effects on profit division, consumer surplus and freedom of trade. Ceteris 
paribus, classic RPM benefits the manufacturer whereas agency RPM benefits the retailer; 
classic RPM eliminates double marginalisation whereas agency RPM may fail to do. 
Furthermore, since there is no horizontal competition under bilateral monopoly, our analysis 
highlights the neglected role of vertical competition in vertical relations that both the 
manufacturer and the retailer may have incentives to use RPM for vertical rent shifting, which 
may affect consumer surplus. 
Moreover, we separate out the effects of reversing decision roles and changing forms of 
the transfer payment. The former changes profit division whereas the latter changes retail 
prices. For a given form of the transfer payment, retail prices are the same irrespective of 
decision roles, and both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer not to set the retail price. For 
given decision roles, retail prices are lower under revenue-sharing contracts, and the one 
setting the retail price would like a unit-fee contract whereas the other would like a revenue-
sharing contract.  
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Our approach and findings suggest that it is important to evaluate RPM in a particular 
context, as the motives, the driving forces and the associated welfare effects of RPM can differ 
substantially. Understanding each simple two-level vertical contract is also crucial for the 
assessment of combined contracts and/or multi-level supply and distribution chains. 
The current framework may be extended to include costs and to model more complex 
vertical arrangements in a particular industry. Furthermore, given the different preferences of 
different parties towards these vertical contracts, it is important for future research to study the 
equilibrium contract selection problem. 
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4.6 Appendices C                                                                                                                   
C1. Equilibrium outcomes under bilateral monopoly  
Recall that the direct demand function under bilateral monopoly is 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝. 
Under contract 0, 𝑀 and 𝑅 integrate and the monopolist’s payoff is 𝑝(1 − 𝑝).  Solving 
the first-order condition, we can find that the equilibrium retail price is given by 
𝑝0 =
1
2
. 
The equilibrium demand and profits are therefore 
𝑞0 = 1 −
1
2
=
1
2
, 
𝜋0 =
1
2
(1 −
1
2
 ) =
1
4
. 
 
We next move on to our baseline wholesale model (contract 2). Under this contract, the 
optimisation problems of 𝑀 and 𝑅 are, assuming zero marginal costs, respectively 
max
𝑤
𝜋𝑀 = max
𝑤
𝑤𝑞, 
max
𝑝
𝜋𝑅 = max
𝑝
(𝑝 − 𝑤)𝑞. 
In stage 2, from the corresponding first-order condition, we can find  𝑅 ’s payoff-
maximising retail prices as a function of 𝑤, and it is given by 
𝑝 =
1
2
+
𝑤
2
. 
In stage 1, 𝑀 maximises 𝑤(1 − 1/2 − 𝑤/2) and the equilibrium wholesale price is 
𝑤2 =
1
2
. 
The equilibrium retail price and demand are therefore 
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𝑝2 =
3
4
, 
𝑞2 =
1
4
. 
𝑝2 > 𝑝0, which is due to double marginalisation. The equilibrium profits are 
𝜋2
𝑀 =
1
2
×
1
4
=
1
8
, 
𝜋𝑅2 =
(
3
4
−
1
2
)
4
=
1
16
, 
𝜋2 = 𝜋2
𝑀 + 𝜋𝑅2 =
3
16
. 
 
Under contract 1, unit-fee contract with classic RPM, 𝑀  sets both 𝑝  and  𝑤 . He will 
optimally set 𝑝  to achieve the vertical integration outcome and then take away the full 
monopoly rent by charging 𝑤 = 𝑝. That is  
𝑤1 = 𝑝1 = 𝑝0 =
1
2
, 
𝑞1 = 𝑞0 =
1
2
. 
Unit-fee classic RPM eliminates double mark-ups. However, unlike a vertically-
integrated monopolist, 𝑅 has to pay 𝑤 to 𝑀 under bilateral monopoly, their respective profits 
are hence 
𝜋1
𝑀 =
1
2
×
1
2
=
1
4
, 
𝜋𝑅1 =
(
1
2
−
1
2
)
2
= 0. 
 
Under reversed wholesale model (contract 3), relative to contract 2, the decision roles of 
𝑀 and 𝑅 are reversed, therefore their optimisation problems are 
max
𝑤
𝜋𝑅 = max
𝑤
𝑤𝑞, 
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max
𝑝
𝜋𝑀 = max
𝑝
(𝑝 − 𝑤)𝑞. 
The equilibrium 𝑤 and 𝑝 stay the same as under contract 2, but 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅 change 
𝑤3 = 𝑤2 =
1
2
, 
𝑝3 = 𝑝2 =
3
4
, 
𝜋3
𝑀 =
(
3
4
−
1
2
)
4
=
1
16
, 
𝜋𝑅3 =
1
2
×
1
4
=
1
8
, 
𝜋3 = 𝜋2 =
3
16
. 
As we can see, although 𝑀 sets the retail price, i.e., RPM, double marginalisation persists 
under contract 3. While total profits stay the same as under contract 2, 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑅 are reversed 
as a result of reversing decision roles.  
 
The last unit-fee contract included in our analysis is contract 4, under which 𝑅 sets both 𝑝 
and 𝑤. Symmetric to the idea of proving the equilibrium outcomes under contract 1, under 
contract 4, 𝑅 will optimally set 𝑝 to achieve the monopoly outcome and then take away the 
full rent by charging 𝑤 = 0. That is  
𝑤4 = 0, 
𝑝4 = 𝑝0 =
1
2
, 
𝑞4 = 𝑞0 =
1
2
. 
𝑀 and 𝑅’s respective profits are 
𝜋4
𝑀 = 0 ×
1
2
= 0, 
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𝜋𝑅4 =
(
1
2
−0)
2
=
1
4
. 
 
We now examine the four revenue-sharing contracts. We start with the most popular 
contract among the four, the agency model (contract 7). Under this contract, the optimisation 
problems of 𝑀 and 𝑅 are, assuming zero marginal costs, respectively 
max
𝛼
𝜋𝑅 = max
𝛼
𝛼𝑝𝑞, 
max
𝑝
𝜋𝑀 = max
𝑝
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑞. 
In stage 2, from the corresponding first-order condition, we can obtain that 𝑀’s payoff-
maximising retail price is given by 
𝑝 =
1
2
. 
Note that unlike the stage 2 equilibrium price under the wholesale model (contract 2) 
which is a function of the wholesale price 𝑤, here the revenue-sharing rate 𝛼 does not appear 
in the equation of stage 2 equilibrium price. The reason is that, as discussed also in the first 
part of Section 4.4.1, for 𝑀, maximising the payoff (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑞 is equivalent to maximising 𝑝𝑞, 
hence he would set 𝑝 to maximise the total rent, regardless of the value of 𝛼. For the same 
reason, 𝑅 has no incentive to set 𝛼 below 1: ceteris paribus, 𝑀 would set 𝑝 = 1/2, no matter 
how little (1 − 𝛼) is. In the absence of any other contract terms, the party setting 𝛼 under 
revenue-sharing contracts can obtain the full monopoly rent. That is 
𝜋7
𝑀 = (1 − 1) ×
1
2
×
1
2
= 0, 
𝜋𝑅7 = 1 ×
1
2
×
1
2
=
1
4
. 
 
Likewise, it is straightforward to obtain outcomes under contract 6. Since 𝛼 is set by 𝑀 
under this contract, we have 
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𝜋6
𝑀 = 1 ×
1
2
×
1
2
=
1
4
, 
𝜋𝑅6 = (1 − 1) ×
1
2
×
1
2
= 0. 
 
The idea of proof for contract 5 is analogous to that for contract 1, except that when 𝑀 
takes the full monopoly rent under contract 5, he does so by setting the revenue-sharing 
rate 𝛼 = 1. Likewise, under contract 8, 𝑅 sets both 𝑝 and 𝛼, she will optimally do the same 
and take 100% of the monopoly rent. So we have 
𝜋5
𝑀 = 1 ×
1
2
×
1
2
=
1
4
, 
𝜋𝑅5 = (1 − 1) ×
1
2
×
1
2
= 0, 
𝜋8
𝑀 = (1 − 1) ×
1
2
×
1
2
= 0, 
𝜋𝑅8 = 1 ×
1
2
×
1
2
=
1
4
. 
 □   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
C2. Equilibrium outcomes under bilateral duopoly  
Our analysis of the wholesale model (contract 2) and the agency model (contract 7) in the 
framework of bilateral duopoly is analogous to Lu (2016) and Foros et al. (2013), respectively. 
The symmetric equilibrium outcomes under each are presented in Table 4.2. The proofs are 
similar for reversed wholesale (contract 3) and reversed agency (contract 6). We present them 
here for the sake of completeness.  
The direct demand function under bilateral duopoly is  
𝑞𝑖
𝑗 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)−𝑝𝑖
𝑗
+𝛾𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
+𝛽(𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
−𝛾𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
)
(1−𝛽2)(1−𝛾2)
. 
Under reversed wholesale model (contract 3), in stage 2, manufacturer 𝑗 solves 
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max
𝑝1
𝑗
,   𝑝2
𝑗
𝜋𝑗 = max
𝑝1
𝑗
,   𝑝2
𝑗
(𝑝1
𝑗 − 𝑤1
𝑗)𝑞1
𝑗 + (𝑝2
𝑗 −𝑤2
𝑗
)𝑞2
𝑗
. 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗 = 𝑞1
𝑗 + (𝑝1
𝑗 −𝑤1
𝑗
)
𝜕𝑞1
𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗 + (𝑝2
𝑗 −𝑤2
𝑗
)
𝜕𝑞2
𝑗
𝜕𝑝1
𝑗 = 0. 
From the above condition, we get 
𝑝𝑖
𝑗 =
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛾(𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
−𝛽𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
)+2𝛽𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
+𝑤𝑖
𝑗
−𝛽𝑤−𝑖
𝑗
2
. 
Solve for the stage 2 equilibrium retail price  
𝑝𝑖
𝑗 =
(2+𝛾)(1−𝛾)+2𝑤𝑖
𝑗
+𝛾𝑤𝑖
−𝑗
4−𝛾2
. 
Substitute the above into (4.2), we can obtain the stage 2 quantities demand 
𝑞𝑖
𝑗 =
𝛾2𝑤𝑖
𝑗
−2𝑤𝑖
𝑗
+2𝛽𝑤−𝑖
𝑗
−𝛽𝛾2𝑤−𝑖
𝑗
+𝛾𝑤𝑖
−𝑗
−𝛽𝛾𝑤−𝑖
−𝑗
+𝛽𝛾2+𝛽𝛾+2−𝛾2−2𝛽−𝛾
(4−𝛾2)(1−𝛾2)(1−𝛽2)
. 
In stage 1, retailer 𝑖 solves 
max
𝑤𝑖
1, 𝑤𝑖
2
𝜋𝑖 = max
𝑤𝑖
1, 𝑤𝑖
2
𝑤𝑖
1𝑞𝑖
1 +𝑤𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
2. 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
1 = 𝑞𝑖
1 +𝑤𝑖
1 𝜕𝑞𝑖
1
𝜕𝑤𝑖
1 +𝑤𝑖
2 𝜕𝑞𝑖
2
𝜕𝑤𝑖
1 = 0. 
Imposing symmetry, the symmetric equilibrium unit-fee transfers under reversed wholesale 
model (contract 3) in bilateral duopoly, denoted as 𝑤𝑟𝑤, are given by 
𝑤𝑟𝑤 =
1−𝛽
2−𝛽
. 
The equilibrium retail prices, demand and profits are therefore 
𝑝𝑟𝑤 =
(1−𝛽)(2−𝛾)+(1−𝛾)
(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)
, 
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𝑞𝑟𝑤 =
1
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)(2−𝛾)
, 
𝜋𝑟𝑤
𝑗 = 2(𝑝𝑟𝑤 −𝑤𝑟𝑤)𝑞𝑟𝑤 =
2(1−𝛾)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
, 
𝜋𝑖𝑟𝑤 = 2𝑤𝑟𝑤𝑞𝑟𝑤 =
2(1−𝛽)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)
, 
𝜋𝑟𝑤 = 𝜋𝑟𝑤
𝑗 + 𝜋𝑖𝑟𝑤 =
4(1−𝛽)(2−𝛾)+4(1−𝛾)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)2(2−𝛾)2
. 
 
Under reversed agency model (contract 6), in stage 2, retailer 𝑖 solves 
max
𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑖
2
𝜋𝑖 = max
𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑝𝑖
2
 (1 − 𝛼1)𝑝𝑖
1𝑞𝑖
1 + (1 − 𝛼2)𝑝𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
2. 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1 = (1 − 𝛼
1)(𝑞𝑖
1 + 𝑝𝑖
1 𝜕𝑞𝑖
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1) + (1 − 𝛼
2)𝑝𝑖
2 𝜕𝑞𝑖
2
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1 = 0. 
From the above condition, we get 
𝑝𝑖
𝑗 =
(1−𝛼𝑗)[(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)+𝛾𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
+𝛽(𝑝−𝑖
𝑗
−𝛾𝑝−𝑖
−𝑗
)]+(1−𝛼−𝑗)𝛾𝑝𝑖
−𝑗
2(1−𝛿𝑗)
, 
Solve for the stage 2 equilibrium retail prices and quantities demand 
𝑝𝑗 =
𝛾(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(1−𝛼−𝑗)[(1−𝛽)(1−𝛼𝑗)+(1−𝛼−𝑗)]+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(2−𝛽)(1−𝛼𝑗)(1−𝛼−𝑗)
(2−𝛽)2(1−𝛼𝑗)(1−𝛼)−𝛾2[(1−𝛼−𝑗)+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛼𝑗)][(1−𝛼𝑗)+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛼−𝑗)]
, 
𝑞𝑗 =
𝐴−(1−𝛽)[(1−𝛾)+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾2)+𝛾(
1−𝛼−𝑗
1−𝛼𝑗
−𝛾
1−𝛼𝑗
1−𝛼−𝑗
)
𝐴(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)
, 
where  
𝐴 = (2 − 𝛽)2 − 𝛾2 [1 + (1 − 𝛽)2 + (1 − 𝛽)
(1−𝛼𝑗)
2
+(1−𝛼−𝑗)
2
(1−𝛼𝑗)(1−𝛼−𝑗)
]. 
In stage 1, manufacturer 𝑗 solves 
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max
𝛼𝑗
𝜋𝑗 = max
𝛼𝑗
2𝛼𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗. 
The corresponding first-order condition is given by 
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝛼𝑗
= 2𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗 + 2𝛼𝑗[𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑗
𝜕𝛼𝑗
+ 𝑞𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝛼𝑗
] = 0. 
Imposing symmetry, the symmetric equilibrium revenue-sharing rates under reversed agency 
model (contract 6) in bilateral duopoly, denoted as 𝛼𝑟𝑎, is given by 
𝛼𝑟𝑎 =
(2−𝛽)(1−𝛾2)
2−𝛽(1+𝛾)
. 
The equilibrium retail prices, demand and profits are therefore 
𝑝𝑟𝑎 =
1−𝛽
2−𝛽
, 
𝑞𝑟𝑎 =
1
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)
, 
𝜋𝑟𝑎
𝑗 = 2 𝛼𝑟𝑎  𝑝𝑟𝑎  𝑞𝑟𝑎 =
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
(1+𝛽)(2−𝛽)[2−𝛽(1+𝛾)]
, 
𝜋𝑖𝑟𝑎 = 2(1 −  𝛼𝑟𝑎)𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑞𝑟𝑎 =
2𝛾(1−𝛽)[2𝛾−𝛽(1+𝛾)]
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)2[2−𝛽(1+𝛾)]
, 
𝜋𝑟𝑎 = 𝜋𝑟𝑎
𝑗 + 𝜋𝑖𝑟𝑎 =
4(1−𝛽)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝛾)(2−𝛽)2
. 
                                                                                                                                                   □                                                                                                                                              
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Chapter 5 
 
The Effects of Endogenous Enforcement on 
Strategic Uncertainty and Cartel 
Deterrence 
 
  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The fight against cartels fixing prices or allocating customers remains a priority of antitrust 
authorities around the globe. The main tool of antitrust authorities to deter cartels is to punish 
detected cartelists with fines featuring both fixed and variable elements. On the one hand, 
cartels are prosecuted for their wrongdoings per se, i.e. they receive an exogenous, fixed fine 
for the mere attempt to collude irrespective of the actual cartel harm. On the other hand, parts 
of the fines are adjusted to the magnitude of harm induced by the cartel.1 Furthermore, a 
substantial part of costs of detection for cartelists stems from private damage actions, in which 
damages are awarded based on estimated overcharges, and therefore are endogenous. 
                                                          
1 Revenue-based fines is in practice in major jurisdictions including the EU and the US. See Bageri, Katsoulacos 
and Spagnolo (2013).   
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The deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement can be decomposed into two elements: 
frequency and composition deterrence. Frequency deterrence refers to the prevention of cartel 
formation and is often measured as the number of cartels that are not formed in the presence 
of antitrust laws, but would have formed otherwise. Composition deterrence refers to the 
mitigation of harm caused by a cartel through a reduced cartel overcharge (Block, Nold and 
Sidak, 1981; Harrington, 2004, 2005; Bos, Davies and Ormosi, 2016). This effect follows from 
a change in the cartel’s optimisation problem in the presence of endogenous enforcement and 
is usually treated as profitability–driven. Yet, cartel behaviour may not only be influenced by 
profitability concerns, but also by strategic responses of cartelists to uncertainty about the 
actions of the other cartel members – we define this as strategic uncertainty. Although 
strategic uncertainty does not influence the expected profitability in the same way as antitrust 
enforcement does, as the probabilities of the other cartel members’ actions are ex ante 
unknown, it may be affected by endogenous enforcement and indirectly contributes to 
composition deterrence. 
In this paper, we seek to determine whether endogenous enforcement can induce 
composition deterrence through strategic uncertainty in a laboratory experiment on infinitely–
repeated non–cooperative games. In doing so, we abstract from the direct profitability–driven 
effects and focus on the indirect effects induced by antitrust enforcement on strategic 
uncertainty. We contribute to the experimental literature on collusion in the presence of an 
antitrust authority by proposing a framework that allows us to study the impact of endogenous 
enforcement on equilibrium cartel price selection. For this purpose, we allow the expected 
punishment to increase with the cartel price, so that cartels formed on a high price and a low 
price are identical in expected profitability but different in the riskiness of collusion (Blonski, 
Ockenfels and Spagnolo, 2011; Blonski and Spagnolo, 2015) or the level of trust required for 
collusion (Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq and Spagnolo, 2015). As a result, the two collusive 
equilibria are equally payoff–dominant, but the low cartel price is with lower riskiness of 
collusion 
Yet, while we expect endogenous enforcement to induce composition deterrence, it may 
produce adverse effects on frequency deterrence. The enforcement regime featured in our 
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design renders the low cartel price a more desirable collusive equilibrium, and thus may 
encourage more collusive agreements on the low cartel price as well as stabilise such 
agreements. That is, endogenous enforcement may produce frequency and composition 
deterrence that go in opposite directions. This potential trade–off may have important 
consequences for the optimal design of antitrust enforcement, which warrants the study of the 
overall effect of endogenous enforcement. 
Our findings suggest that, consistent with our theoretical predictions, endogenous 
enforcement produces composition deterrence through its effect on strategic uncertainty. As a 
result, more cartels are formed on  the low cartel price that is attached with the lower riskiness 
of collusion. Yet, we find an adverse effect on frequency deterrence due to the increased 
stability of cartels formed on the low price. Due to the trade-off, the overall effect of 
endogenous enforcement on market outcomes is unclear. This might plausibly also be driven 
by the aggravated strategic uncertainty under endogenous enforcement, which ceteris paribus 
worsens the cartel coordination problem and thus mitigate the adverse effect on frequency 
deterrence. Furthermore our results show that subjects’ preferences over cartel prices are not 
driven by their risk attitudes, suggesting that subjects behave strategically. Moreover, cartel 
price choices are insensitive to different combinations of fines and detection probabilities that 
feature the same expected punishment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 5.3 
describes the experimental design, and provides the theoretical background and the hypotheses. 
Section 5.4 presents the results. Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
Until now, most cartel experiments that explore how enforcement regimes affect frequency 
deterrence focus on the impact of exogenous fines and detection probabilities on collusion. 
Examples include the studies on the effects of leniency programmes by Hamaguchi, Kawagoe 
and Shibata (2009), Bigoni et al. (2012, 2015), Clemens and Rau (2014), and Hinloopen and 
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Onderstal (2014), but also on other aspects such as the substitutability of fines and detection 
probabilities (Chowdhury and Wandschneider, 2015), avoidance activities of cartels 
(Chowdhury, Crede and Wandschneider, 2016), and tacit collusion induced by previous 
cartel activities (Chowdhury and Crede, 2015). Exceptions are Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and 
Selten (2007) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) studying the effects of leniency 
programmes, and Fonseca and Normann (2014), who study how firm numbers affect the 
necessity to engage in repeated communication to preserve collusion. In these three papers, 
fines are endogenous and depend on the chosen cartel price and/or the preceding collusive 
history. Yet, they do not study how the endogeneity of fines affects cartel prices or stability, 
hence the issue of composition deterrence remains unaddressed. To the authors’ knowledge, 
endogenous detection probabilities (apart from detection triggered by leniency applications) 
have not yet been experimentally implemented or studied in the context of cartels. However, 
in the field, cartelists decide not only whether to collude, but also which price to collude on. 
Although it is reasonable to assume that the risk of detection faced by a cartel increases with 
the magnitude of its price overcharge (Harrington, 2004, 2005; Harrington and Chen, 2006), 
cartel experiments so far have forgone to analyse composition deterrence due to the exogenous 
design of implemented enforcement regimes.  
While the breakdown of all–inclusive cartels is, in general, either triggered internally by 
coordination failure of cartelists or externally through the detection by antitrust authorities, the 
experimental literature on cartels tends to focus on the latter channel. Recently, Bigoni et al. 
(2015) suggest that deterrence can be achieved not only through imposing severe punishments, 
but also by worsening the incentive and the trust problems of cartelists. As a cartel is a type of 
collective crime, when making decisions, each member cares not only about the expected 
profitability of a collusive agreement, but also its stability and sustainability. As severe 
coordination complexity might itself render collusion infeasible, whether a cartel can be 
profitably formed fundamentally depends on the cartelists’ ability to reach and sustain 
cooperative equilibria. 
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Cooperative games can be loosely divided into two classes: finitely or infinitely–repeated 
non–cooperative games, and coordination games that are classified according to the access of 
information. Both strands of literature point out that the Nash equilibrium concept may fail to 
predict a unique outcome in such games (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross,1990; 
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1993; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). Coordination failure may arise 
from the absence of a payoff–dominant cooperative equilibrium, as well as from Nash 
equilibria that are not self–enforcing (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990). The multiplicity 
of equilibria calls for equilibrium refinement criteria to select equilibria that are most likely to 
arise. While Harsanyi and Selten (1988) suggest payoff dominance should take precedence 
over alternative deductive selection criteria, more recent theoretical and experimental studies 
(e.g. Van Huyck et al., 1990) tend to support the risk dominance criterion. The underlying 
reason for coordination failure, as suggested by Van Huyck et al. (1990) and developed by 
Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009), is strategic uncertainty that arises in a socially 
interactive decision situation. 
Knight (1921) distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. The former is usually referred 
to as Knightian uncertainty or exogenous uncertainty, whereas the latter is referred to as 
strategic uncertainty or endogenous uncertainty. Heinemann et al. (2009) define exogenous 
uncertainty as “a priori given and known probabilities for all possible states of the world”. In 
the context of cartel experiments, the detection probability imposed by the antitrust authority 
belongs to this source of uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty, on the other hand, describes 
situations in which the probabilities with which the states occur are not exogenously given or 
known a priori. Each subject is uncertain about the strategies and actions of the others within 
the same group, and thus has to make decisions according to subjectively assigned 
probabilities based on beliefs. This is where the trustworthiness of the others becomes crucial. 
Based on the behavioural definition of trust and betrayal aversion, Fehr (2009) suggests that 
trust is captured by preferences and beliefs of individuals, as well as those generated from 
social interactions. Intuitively, as the degree of strategic uncertainty faced by decision makers 
increases, it becomes more difficult to trust, hence actions converge to inefficient but secured 
ones.  
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In the evolutionary game theory literature, Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) conclude that the 
games’ fundamentals, which are structural determinants contributing to exogenous uncertainty 
such as the attractiveness of alternative action choices, length of the games, form of 
communication and subjects’ experience, may affect cooperative behaviour. However, 
although repeated play of the game allows for inductive selection and learning, selected long 
run stochastically stable equilibria tend to be those satisfying the concept of risk dominance 
(Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993). Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski and 
Spagnolo (2015) introduce the concept of riskiness of collusion of a cooperative equilibrium 
in infinitely repeated non–cooperative games which is heuristically related to the concept of 
risk dominance.2 In doing so, they consider strategic uncertainty by taking cognitive and 
behavioural determinants into account with a particular emphasis on the sucker’s payoff. They 
take an axiomatic approach and offer a strategic uncertainty based measure of the critical 
discount factor, which allows for a comparison of the riskiness of different cooperative 
equilibria. 
Cooperative games have been applied in the lab to study illegal activities and the optimal 
design of enforcement. For example, Berninghaus et al. (2013) and Tan and Yim (2014) use 
coordination games to model corruption and tax evasion. Both studies highlight the role of 
trust and beliefs, suggesting higher degrees of uncertainty to be an effective device to deter 
illegal activities. As unlike tax evasion, a cartel is a type of collective crime, the incentive and 
trust issues seem to be more relevant. Bigoni et al. (2015) suggest that a crucial part of the 
deterrent effect offered by leniency programmes is driven by the “distrust” created, an idea 
similar to betrayal aversion. They measure the level of trust needed to sustain collusion: the 
minimum level of trust required is higher as the strategic uncertainty of collusion increases, 
thus collusion is less likely to be reached. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The riskiness of cooperation measured by Blonski and Spagnolo (2015) is related to strategic uncertainty that we 
discuss above, rather than exogenous risk, although the term they follow is “strategic risk”. 
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5.3 Experiment  
5.3.1 Experimental procedure  
The experiment was carried out at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science 
(CBESS) at the University of East Anglia, UK, in February and March 2015. Recruitment of 
subjects was carried out with hRoot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) and the experiment 
was programmed and run with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 144 students from a variety of 
backgrounds and nationalities and without prior experience in oligopoly experiments 
participated. 36 subjects were allocated in groups of three, providing 12 independent market 
observations in each of the four treatments. Group composition was fixed throughout the 
session. At the start of each session, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory at 
workstations separated by modular walls. Each subject received a printed copy of the 
instruction, which was also read aloud by an experimenter and displayed on each computer 
screen at the beginning of each session. Subjects’ understanding of the instructions was tested 
with a questionnaire before they had to reach decisions.  
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, the risk preferences of subjects 
were tested with a risk elicitation task similar to that in Eckel and Grossman (2008). Subjects 
indicated the choices of their preferred lotteries on their computers, and then an experimenter 
determined the outcome of the lottery with a coin toss monitored by a volunteering subject. In 
the second part, subjects each represented a firm and played an oligopoly game in markets of 
three firms, as described below in Section 5.3.2 for 20 regular periods. A random stopping rule 
was implemented to avoid end–game effects as described in Dal Bó (2005): after the regular 
periods, there was a 20% chance in each additional period that the experiment ends. At the end 
of each session, subjects filled out an anonymous demographic survey before being called out 
of the laboratory and paid in private. Earnings are denoted as “experimental points" and each 
point was converted into 12 pence for cash payment. Based on subjects’ performance, 
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payments varied from £4.00 to £13.20 with a mean of £8.19. Sessions lasted between 40 to 60 
minutes.3    
 
5.3.2 Experimental design   
In the experiment, subjects, each representing a firm, engage in competition in a market with 
two other subjects. The market is defined as a homogeneous goods Bertrand triopoly with 
(discontinuous) inelastic demand as introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and market 
characteristics similar to those in Gillet et al. (2011). Previous experimental evidence indicates 
that three firms are sufficient to ensure that collusion cannot be sustained effectively without 
communication (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Wellford, 2002), but with communication 
(Fonseca and Normann, 2012). 
In each period all firms simultaneously make price decisions by choosing any price 𝑝 
from the choice set  𝑝 ∈ {40, 41, . . . , 52}. A firm sells one unit of the good and incurs a 
production cost of 40 if its price is lower than that of any other firm, and does not sell anything 
nor incur any production cost otherwise. The firm that sells the good at a price lower than its 
two competitors in a period therefore makes a profit of 𝑝 − 40 whereas the other two firms 
make zero profit. In case that two or three firms choose the same lowest price, the profit is 
evenly divided among them. Before engaging in Bertrand competition as described above, in 
each period firms first have to simultaneously decide whether they wish to enter a non–binding 
price agreement, and if so, which price to agree on. There are two price agreements to choose 
from: one on the high cartel price 𝑝𝐶
ℎ = 52 and one on the low cartel price 𝑝𝐶
𝑙 = 46.4 We 
allow two cartel prices to facilitate the identification of effects in the econometric analysis of 
price agreements and to ensure that fines and detection probabilities are transparent to the 
subjects. Firms wishing to cooperate can choose to suggest their preferred cartel price, or they 
can suggest both prices if they are indifferent between the two. However, such a price 
                                                          
3 Sample instructions, including the risk elicitation task, can be found in Appendix D1. 
4 52 is the highest possible price and 46 is the mean price in the choice set. 
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agreement can be detected by the computer with positive probability resulting in a fine to be 
deducted from the profits. 
Firms need to indicate their decisions to cooperate by answering the question “Do you 
want to agree on prices?”. If all three firms wish to agree on prices and a unique common price 
exists among the three firms’ suggested cartel prices, an agreement is reached on that price. If 
all three firms choose both prices, implying that they wish to agree on either price, then in half 
of the groups in each treatment a price agreement on 46 is reached automatically and in the 
other half a price agreement on 52 is reached automatically. This is done to control for any 
potential effect of this protocol on cartel price choice. It is shown in Section 5.4 that this default 
agreement price rule does not affect subjects’ price choices. The default price remains the 
same within a group throughout the experiment. If there is no common price among the firms’ 
chosen cartel prices, no price agreement is reached, e.g. if two firms choose 46 and one firm 
chooses 52. If firms do not wish to cooperate, they can express so by choosing the option “No”. 
If at least one firm chooses “No”, no price agreement is reached in that period. To avoid any 
potential effect that the order of items appearing on the screen may have on subjects’ choices, 
their order is randomized across periods.5 
With our design, we expect coordination complexity arising from endogenous 
enforcement to render reaching price agreements more difficult. Although a free–form 
communication protocol may help to facilitate price agreements, we restrict communication 
to a limited–form protocol for several reasons. First, our focus is to obtain clear measures on 
subjects’ desired price choices rather than to facilitate collusion. Second, limited–form 
communication prevents the social dimension to influence results (see, e.g. Cooper and Kühn, 
2014) and ensures that communication is limited to pure signalling and cheap talk. 
Furthermore, it allows for a clear identification and econometric analysis of how strategic 
uncertainty increases the complexity of cartel coordination. Given that in our experiment 
bargaining is only possible through signalling over the course of several periods of the game, 
observations on cartel price choices at the subject level may not directly translate into similar 
                                                          
5 A computer screenshot of the communication protocol can be found in the instructions in Appendix D1. 
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patterns at the market level. To study the uncertainty–driven behavioural pattern of subjects, 
we focus primarily on individual subjects’ decisions. 
The sequence of the market experiment is summarised below: 
1. Firms simultaneously indicate their decisions to cooperate by answering the question 
“Do you want to agree on prices?” Firms willing to cooperate choose “Yes” and the 
price(s) they wish to agree on and “No” otherwise. 
2. Firms learn about whether a price agreement is reached, and if so, the agreement price. 
3. Firms simultaneously make price decisions by choosing a price from the choice 
set 𝑝 ∈ {40,41, . . . ,52}. Any price agreements reached at stage 2 are not binding for 
the firms’ price decisions at this stage. 
4. Firms learn about each other’s prices and whether they sell a good in the current period. 
5. Firms learn about whether they are detected by the computer given that they have 
reached a price agreement in the current period and/or their price agreements in 
previous periods have not yet been detected. 
6. Finally, firms learn about their profits in the current period minus any potential fines, 
as well as about their accumulated profits. 
This experiment is based on a 2×2 between–subject design. Baseline is the control 
treatment and serves to capture coordination failure that occurs because certain cooperative 
actions are not supported by an equilibrium. The other treatments assess the explanatory power 
of the concept of riskiness of collusion when two cooperative equilibria are payoff equivalent, 
which is useful to determine the uncertainty–driven channel of composition deterrence. We 
then compare the three treatments with endogenous enforcement to examine, given a constant 
expected profitability, whether there is a limited substitutability between fines and detection 
probabilities that might affect cartel pricing as well as deterrence. The detection probabilities 
(𝐷) and the fines (𝐹) differ in different treatments as shown in Table 5.1. 
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 Exogenous detection prob. Endogenous detection prob. 
 
Exogenous 
fine 
Baseline 
 
46: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = −0.4  
52: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6     
 
EndoD 
 
46: 𝐷 = 3.3%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6 
52: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6  
 
 
Endogenous 
fine 
EndoF 
 
46: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 2, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6       
52: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6     
 
BothEndo 
 
46: 𝐷 = 10%, 𝐹 = 4, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6    
 52: 𝐷 = 20%, 𝐹 = 12, 𝐸(𝜋) = 1.6  
 
Table 5.1 Treatments and key parameters 
In Baseline, the detection probability (20%) and the fine (12 experimental points) are the 
same for price agreements on the high price 52 and the low price 46. It represents a typical 
homogeneous goods Bertrand cartel experiment with exogenous fines and detection 
probabilities independent of the cartel price. In EndoF, the detection probability is held fixed 
but fine is endogenous. The magnitude of the fine is a function of the agreed cartel overcharge: 
collusion on price 52 yields a higher per period profit and hence requires a higher potential 
fine (12), whereas collusion on price 46 face a lower potential fine (2). Similarly, in EndoD 
the fine is held fixed but the detection probability increases in the cartel overcharge: collusion 
on the low price 46 and on the high price 52 feature detection probabilities of 3.3% and 20%, 
respectively. In BothEndo, the fine and detection probability attached to collusion on 52 are 
the same as in Baseline, whereas those attached to collusion on 46 are lower (𝐹 = 4 and 𝐷 = 
10%), i.e., both elements are endogenous in this treatment. The overcharge is about 27% when 
firms collude on price 52, which is close to the mean overcharge of 29% of the cartels studied 
in Connor and Bolotova (2006). Detection probabilities of 10% and 20% are in range of those 
reported in Ormosi (2014) for cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1984 
and 2009. 
Parameters and the experimental design are chosen such that the expected profitability 
and the ICCs are equal across the treatments with endogenous enforcement and the two cartel 
prices. This rules out the profitability–driven effects of endogenous enforcement on cartel 
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behaviour as analysed in Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015), which is crucial for 
allowing us to focus on our research question: the uncertainty–driven effects. 
 
5.3.3 Theoretical background   
Before we provide the theoretical model that underlines our framework and experimental 
design, we briefly discuss the main insights from the theoretical literature on endogenous 
punishment on cartel prices. Consider a homogeneous goods market with 𝑛 ≥ 2 firms that face 
the identical unit costs of production 𝑐 and demand function 𝑄(𝑝), and compete in prices, 
where 𝑝 denotes price and 𝑄  is the quantity supplied to the market. The industry profits 
𝜋(𝑝, 𝑐) is  
𝜋(𝑝, 𝑐) = (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑄(𝑝).                                                                                                         (5.1) 
When price collusion is not possible, price competition gives rise to the unique Bertrand 
equilibrium in which all firms set 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑐 and each firm earns 𝜋𝐵 = 0. When price collusion 
is possible and all firms agree to collude, then in the absence of antitrust enforcement, each 
firm sets 𝑝𝑀 = arg𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝜋(𝑝, 𝑐) and yields a profit of 𝜋
𝑀/𝑛. 
In this context, the existing literature (e.g. Block et al., 1981; Katsoulacos et al., 2015) 
has shown that antitrust enforcement that is increasing in cartel overcharge can mitigate the 
harm caused by the illegal activity by producing composition deterrence. To illustrate this 
result, we include an expected punishment of 𝐷𝐹 where 𝐷 is the detection probability and 𝐹 
is the penalty imposed upon detection. Let 𝐷𝐹  be a function of cartel prices and assume 
𝜕𝐷𝐹/𝜕𝑝 > 0 and 𝜕2𝐷𝐹/𝜕𝑝2 ≥ 0 such that it is weakly convex.6 With this general functional 
form, we allow either the fine, the detection probability, or both elements to increase with the 
cartel overcharge, which is a reasonable assumption given observations from the field. Figure 
                                                          
6 We consider our findings based on this assumption, in particular the counteracting effects of frequency and 
composition deterrence, to hold in most cases. However, special scenarios may exist in which the assumption does 
not hold. See Bos et al. (2015) for an example in which antitrust punishment benefits cartels. 
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5.1 plots the cartel gross profit against the price in the absence of the expected punishment 
(𝜋𝑀) as well as the net profit in the presence of the expected punishment (𝜋𝐷𝐹). As Figure 5.1 
illustrates, such endogenous antitrust enforcement can lead to composition deterrence by 
altering the expected profitability of a cartel. As a result, while cartels may not be deterred 
altogether, they are formed at lower prices, i.e. at 𝑝𝐷𝐹instead of 𝑝𝑀. 
 
             Figure 5.1 Profitability–driven composition deterrence 
Changing the cartel’s optimisation problem, however, is not the only channel through 
which composition deterrence can be achieved in the presence of endogenous enforcement. 
Price collusion is in nature a cooperative problem. Therefore, in this study we wish to assess 
whether pricing below the monopoly level could be an optimal reaction to strategic uncertainty 
in non–cooperative infinitely repeated games. For this purpose, we introduce an antitrust 
regime with endogenous punishment in which two cartel prices generate the same cartel profit 
but carry different levels of riskiness of collusion. As such, we rule out any incentive that 
arises from the relative size of the expected profitability of a cartel, and makes sure that 
cartelists’ collusive price choices are driven by their behaviour when facing strategic 
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uncertainty. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, this constitutes the crucial property of our 
experimental design, which is explained further below. 
In this framework, there are multiple equilibria. Yet, the only symmetric non-cooperative 
equilibrium that tends to dominate in the case of coordination failure is characterized by each 
firm choosing  𝑝𝐵 =  41  and obtaining a competitive profit of  𝜋𝐵 = (41 −  40)/3 =  0.33  
in each period. However, firms reaching price agreements, depending on which price they 
have agreed on, can each earn a high or a low cartel profit, 𝜋𝐶
ℎ = (52 −  40)/3 =  4  or 𝜋𝐶
𝑙 =
 (46 −  40)/3 =  2, both of which are strictly higher than 𝜋𝐵 . In Baseline, the expected 
punishment is exogenous and fixed at  0.2 × 12 = 2.4 , therefore the expected payoffs of 
colluding on the high price and on the low price are respectively  
𝐸(𝜋𝐶
ℎ) = 4 − 2.4 = 1.6 >  𝜋𝐵,                                                                                              (5.2) 
𝐸(𝜋𝐶
𝑙 ) = 2 − 2.4 = −0.4 <  𝜋𝐵.                                                                                               (5.3) 
The expected payoff of colluding on 𝑝𝐶
ℎ is strictly larger than the payoff associated with 
the predominant non-cooperative equilibrium, whereas it is negative of collusion on 𝑝𝐶
𝑙 . Hence 
in Baseline, cartels can only be profitably formed on price 52, and rational cartels would – 
absent other strategic considerations – either collude on price 52 or not collude at all. In 
treatments EndoF, EndoD and BothEndo, the expected punishment of forming a cartel is 
endogenous and increasing in the cartel price. Figure 5.2 offers the experimental version of 
the general cartel optimisation problem as shown in Figure 5.1.  
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                        a) Gross profits and exp. punishment                              b) Expected profits 
Figure 5.2 Profits and expected punishment in the experiment 
Figure 5.2a shows the gross profits and the expected punishment as functions of the cartel 
price. Figure 5.2b displays the net expected profits of collusion on the high (𝜋𝐶
ℎ) and low (𝜋𝐶
𝑙 ) 
cartel prices. As Figure 5.2 shows, the expected punishment 𝐷𝐹 is now different for the two 
cartel prices: it is lower (0.4) for 46 and higher (2.4) for 52. Consequently, the expect payoffs 
of colluding on the high and the low cartel prices are the same,  
𝐸(𝜋𝐶
ℎ) = 4 − 2.4 = 1.6,                                                                                                        (5.4) 
𝐸(𝜋𝐶
𝑙 ) = 2 − 0.4 = 1.6.                                                                                                        (5.5) 
The two cartel prices thus represent two payoff-equivalent Pareto-dominant collusive 
equilibria. In the following, we characterize the equilibrium conditions, which may vary under 
different treatments and with different cartel prices. Since price agreements are not binding, a 
firm that slightly undercuts the agreed price can obtain a one shot deviation profit 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣, while 
the others earn zero profit.  
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Suppose that firms react to cheating with a grim-trigger strategy (see, Tirole, 1988).  The 
corresponding incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of sustaining collusion infinitely is 
given by 
𝜋𝐶
1−𝛿
−
𝐷𝐹
1−𝛿(1−𝐷)
> 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 +
𝛿𝜋𝐵
1−𝛿
−
𝐷𝐹
1−𝛿(1−𝐷)
,                                                                           (5.6) 
where 𝛿 denotes the discount factor. Note that in the experiment, the punishment is linked to 
the agreed cartel price, irrespective of whether deviation occurs afterwards or not.7 As such, 
the term measuring expected punishment, 𝐷𝐹/[1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝐷)], appears on both sides of the 
ICC and cancels out. Thus, the ICC is not affected by the variations in fines and detection 
probabilities and the discount factor derived from the ICC is given by 
𝛿 >
𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣−𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣−𝜋𝐵
,                                                                                                                          (5.7) 
which is almost identical for 𝑝𝐶
ℎ and 𝑝𝐶
𝑙  (0.656 and 0.642), such that cartel formation should 
not be driven by the relative size of the ICCs: when firms are able to cooperate, they should 
be equally likely to collude on either of the two cartel prices.  
However, while the ICCs ensure the existence of a cooperative equilibrium and that firms’ 
incentives are not affected by variations in the exogenous uncertainty 𝐷𝐹, the cooperative 
difficulties and trust issues arising from strategic uncertainty may render collusion infeasible. 
Thus, firms may not stick to a price agreement even if it represents an equilibrium.  
The recent theoretical and experimental literature tends to suggest that risk dominance 
gives rise to more self-enforcing and sustainable equilibria. Thus, assessing the standard ICCs 
is not sufficient to explain equilibrium selection in the lab. To exemplify this, we use Blonski 
and Spagnolo (2015)’s prisoner’s other dilemma to compare the riskiness of collusion when 
                                                          
7 This is in line with fining practices in the field in most jurisdictions, in which the mere attempt to collude is illegal 
and is fined. 
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firms collude on different prices. This measure of strategic risk can be calculated as the 
difference between two squared expressions 
(𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆)
2 − (𝜋𝐶 − 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣)
2.                                                                                                              (5.8) 
This is closely related to the comparison of Nash products in static 2×2 games to 
determine the risk–dominant equilibrium as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Inside 
the first squared expression is the difference between the predominant non-cooperative 
equilibrium profit and the profit obtained in case of being cheated upon (𝜋𝑆), i.e., the incentive 
to stay out of an agreement to avoid the worse scenario.  Inside the second squared expression 
is the difference between the collusive profit and the deviation profit, i.e., the incentive to enter 
an agreement. The riskiness of collusion is measured by comparing the two opposing 
incentives. Ceteris paribus, when the former is larger than the latter, the riskiness of a collusive 
equilibrium is positive. The higher the riskiness of a collusive equilibrium is, the higher the 
discount factor needs to be to sustain collusion. The corresponding net present value of the 
riskiness of collusion when the game is repeated infinitely is given by 
(
𝜋𝐵
1−𝛿∗
− 𝜋𝑆 +
𝐷𝐹
1−𝛿∗(1−𝐷)
−
𝛿∗𝜋𝐵
1−𝛿∗
)2 − (
𝜋𝐶
1−𝛿∗
− 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 −
𝛿∗𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣
1−𝛿∗
)2.                                               (5.9) 
where 𝛿∗denotes the discount factor below which the riskiness of a collusive equilibrium is 
positive and above which it is negative. Equation (5.9) can be used to calculate the riskiness 
of colluding on different collusive prices in different treatments for any given discount factor 
of firms. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the riskiness of collusion on the two cartel prices as a function of the 
discount factor. We obtain the following observations. First, the riskiness of collusion is 
identical for price 52 in all treatments because of the identical fine and detection probability 
attached to it across treatments, whereas the riskiness of collusion on price 46 varies. Note that 
we do not consider collusion on 46 in Baseline, as it is an off–equilibrium option. Second, 
given the identical payoff, the risk constraint is the tightest for collusion on 52, whereas it does 
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not differ much for collusion on 46 across the included treatments. Third and more importantly, 
collusion on 46 is subject to a lower level of riskiness than collusion on 52. The high riskiness 
of collusion on price 52 follows from the fact that collusion on 52 is associated with higher 
cheating incentives than collusion on 46, whereas the sucker’s payoff of 0 remains constant. 
 
Figure 5.3 The riskiness of collusion 
We therefore derive the following predictions with respect to subjects’ cartel price choices 
in the presence of endogenous enforcement. First, when to collude, subjects would choose 
more often the low collusive price 46 attached with lower riskiness of collusion. This indicates 
the uncertainty-driven scope for composition deterrence. Second, collusion is more stable on 
price 46 than on price 52. Although we do not model frequency deterrence explicitly, the 
predicted increase in the stability of cartels on price 46 implies the trade-off between frequency 
and composition deterrence. This is evident from Figure 5.3 that the discount factors to sustain 
collusion are lower for price 46. Third, subjects’ preference over cartel price 46, as well as the 
levels of cartel formation and stability on price 46, do not differ substantially across the 
treatments with endogenous enforcement.   
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5.3.4 Hypotheses  
As we primarily seek to examine how endogenous enforcement may produce deterrence 
effects through affecting strategic uncertainty in infinitely-repeated non-cooperative games, 
the bulk of the hypotheses relate to the behaviour of subjects rather than to markets. This 
follows from the focus of the experimental design on identifying individuals’ preferences, 
which might not translate to the same behaviour at a group level due to coordination difficulties. 
Nevertheless, market outcomes are important for the assessment of the overall effect of 
endogenous enforcement and are briefly addressed. Based on the existing literature and our 
theoretical predictions, we derive the following hypotheses.  
First, given the prediction that collusion on price 46 is not a payoff-dominant collusive 
equilibrium in Baseline, we seek to verify that subjects do not choose to collude on 46 in 
Baseline. Baseline is the only treatment in which the expected profitability of collusion on the 
high and the low cartel prices are different. The potential failure of (stable) collusion on price 
46 provides evidence that payoff dominance is an important equilibrium selection criterion 
and fundamentally affects subjects’ decisions. As the only feasible collusive equilibrium is to 
collude on price 52, subjects who are willing to collude should do so on 52.  
Hypothesis 5.1 In Baseline, the low cartel price is suggested less often than the high cartel 
price. 
This in itself is not a new hypothesis to test, as the existing literature has already shown 
the importance of payoff dominance in equilibrium selection (see, e.g. Dal Bó and Frechette, 
2011). However, providing evidence for Hypothesis 5.1 is necessary for confirming subjects’ 
understanding of the game and for comparisons later on. We therefore explicitly test it before 
turning to the other hypotheses. 
Next, we wish to examine the role of strategic uncertainty in the choice of cartel prices. 
In treatments EndoF, EndoD and BothEndo, endogenous enforcement equalises the expected 
payoff of colluding on both prices, whereas the expected punishment is imposed in a way such 
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that collusion on 46 is the equilibrium with lower riskiness of collusion. If strategic uncertainty 
plays a role in collusive decisions, then as predicted in Section 5.3.3, the low price should be 
suggested more often. Furthermore, incidences of cheating by the others in the same group 
and detection by the antitrust authority should discourage collusion on price 52 in favour of 
46, if subjects are to collude.  
Hypothesis 5.2 In treatments EndoF, EndoD and BothEndo, the low cartel price is suggested 
more often than the high cartel price.  
Limits to the substitutability between fines and detection probabilities have been a topic 
of interest in antitrust economics. These limits are important for the efficient and effective 
allocation of resources of antitrust authorities. The issue has been examined before 
experimentally with respect to frequency deterrence. Bigoni et al. (2015) and Chowdhury and 
Wandschneider (2015) study how variations of the fine and the detection probability given the 
same expected punishment influence cartel stability, without and with leniency programmes. 
Both studies find the two enforcement elements to be substitutes without leniency programmes, 
but fines to be more important with leniency programmes. Given that there is no leniency 
programme in this experiment and that the riskiness of collusion is identical for collusion on 
price 52 and similar for those on price 46 across the treatments with endogenous enforcement, 
subjects’ price choices are not expected to differ significantly across these treatments. 
Hypothesis 5.3 Subjects’ suggested cartel prices do not differ significantly between EndoF, 
EndoD and BothEndo.  
As cartels formed on prices 46 and 52 yield identical expected payoffs, but differ in the 
expected punishment, the choice between the two cartel prices is similar to a choice between 
two lotteries with different exogenous risks. Therefore, ceteris paribus, risk averse subjects 
might be more likely to choose the cartel price 46 or not to join a cartel at all, as opposed to 
choosing price 52 or being indifferent between the two prices. Studies on the relationship 
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between risk aversion and cooperation do not provide conclusive findings. Sabater-Grande 
and Georgantzis (2002) suggest the relationship to be negative. Reuben and Suetens (2012) 
show that the majority of subjects behave strategically in infinitely-repeated non-cooperative 
games. Dreber, Fudenberg and Rand (2014) conclude that the primary determinant of 
subjects’ behaviour in these games is payoff maximisation and find no conclusive pattern 
between cooperation and risk attitude.8 
Recent studies that distinguish between subjects’ risk attitudes towards exogenous 
uncertainty and their beliefs driven by strategic uncertainty measure the two elements 
separately (Heinemann et al., 2009; Berninghaus et al., 2013; Tan and Yim, 2014). Tan and 
Yim (2014) emphasize the role of strategic uncertainty over exogenous uncertainty and 
Berninghaus et al. (2013) find that beliefs rather than risk attitude explain subjects’ choices. 
The importance of beliefs for cooperation in infinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma games is 
also stressed by Dal Bó and Frechette (2011). Similarly, as we highlight the difference between 
exogenous and strategic uncertainty, and expect that subjects’ price choices are not 
significantly different across treatments with endogenous enforcement (i.e., Hypothesis 5.3), 
we conjecture that strategic risk is the main driver of subjects’ choices and that risk attitude 
only plays a minor role. 
Hypothesis 5.4 Risk attitude does not determine subjects’ suggested cartel prices. 
The four hypotheses above focus on individual subject’s desired cartel prices. Yet, the 
overall welfare effects of endogenous enforcement, which we conjecture to be determined by 
a trade–off between frequency and composition deterrence, is important in assessing the 
efficiency of endogenous enforcement and for potential policy implications. We therefore 
                                                          
8 There are two major differences between the experiment in Dreber et al. (2014) and in this paper, which might 
affect the results with respect to risk attitudes. First, the average cooperation period in our experiment (23.3 rounds) 
is significantly longer than that in theirs (10.7-11.5 rounds). Second, one feature in their experiment is that in all 
analysed treatments, an “execution error” occurs with 12.5% probability and alters subjects’ chosen strategies. This 
makes it difficult for subjects to form beliefs about each other. Our experiment does not feature such a design. Thus, 
subjects in our experiment are relatively more likely to be able to form beliefs on their opponents and make 
informed decisions based on the history of cooperation and cheating. 
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analyse welfare effects as well. To do so, we compare market prices and cartel formation in 
Baseline with exogenous enforcement to those in treatments with endogenous enforcement. 
Whether endogenous enforcement is more efficient relative to exogenous enforcement, ceteris 
paribus, depends on which deterrence effect dominates in the trade-off, frequency or 
composition. 
 
5.4 Results 
As a preliminary to the regression analysis, we provide some descriptive statistics.9 All 
reported results are based on the first 20 periods to avoid potential end–game effects and to 
consider all markets based on an even number of observations.  
 
                a) Subjects’ suggested cartel prices                            b) Price agreements reached  
Figure 5.4 Choice of agreements by treatment 
Figure 5.4a shows the proportions of suggested cartel prices across all subjects separated 
by treatment, where 0 denotes subjects’ preference of not to engage in price agreements, and 
Indiff. refers to instances in which subjects suggest both prices for an agreement. Figure 5.4b 
                                                          
9 Figure 5.5 of the distribution of asking prices and market prices, as well as of the asking prices conditional on 
cheating in the previous period can be found in Appendix D2. 
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shows the proportions of actual price agreements reached across all markets, and 0 denotes 
when no agreement is reached. 
At first glance, the observed patterns appear to be in line with our theoretical predictions. 
First, and relevant to Hypothesis 5.1, among all treatments, the collusive price 46 is suggested 
and agreed on the least often in Baseline. It suggests that the expected profitability plays an 
important role in cartel price choice. Second, and relevant to Hypothesis 5.3, the distributions 
of suggested cartel prices and price agreements reached do not seem to vary significantly 
across treatments with endogenous enforcement.  
    Variable Baseline EndoF EndoD BothEndo 
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠  43.801 44.133 43.856 43.543 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠  41.817 42.713 42.208 42.038 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 46 0.075 0.204 0.238 0.129 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 52 0.192 0.167 0.104 0.125 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  0.117 0.167 0.096 0.108 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 46  1.000 0.429 0.750 0.818 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 52  0.818 0.684 0.818 0.533 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 46  0.000 0.190 0.000 0.091 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 52  0.227 0.316 0.273 0.200 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 reports the means or proportions of selected market level outcomes. Asking 
prices represent the selling prices that subjects individually set in each market in each period. 
Market prices represent the prices at which goods are sold, i.e., the lowest asking prices in 
each market in each period. Prop. agreement 46 (52) measures the proportion of the markets 
and periods in which an active price agreement on 46 (52) is in place. An agreement is defined 
as active if it is either reached in the current period or reached in previous periods but has not 
yet been detected or cheated upon. Prop. new agreement denotes the proportion of markets 
with newly reached (instead of active) price agreements. Prop. cheating 46 (52) reports the 
proportion of the observed occurrence of cheating on an active agreement on 46 (52). Finally, 
Prop. detection 46 (52) is the observed proportion of markets in which agreements on 46 (52) 
are detected by the computer. 
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Several observations can be obtained from Table 5.2. First, asking and market prices do 
not differ substantially across treatments, and they both appear to be above the predominant 
non-cooperative equilibrium price of 41. This implies that prices rise with firms’ attempts to 
collude. Second and in line with Figure 5.4, agreements on 46 are relatively rare (7.5%) in 
Baseline, compared to the treatments with endogenous enforcement (20.4%, 23.8%, and 
12.9%, respectively). Strikingly, for the few agreements reached on 46 in Baseline, cheating 
occurred with 100%. This suggests that subjects appear to have a clear understanding of the 
fact that collusion on 46 is not an equilibrium in Baseline.  
Furthermore, in all treatments, the proportions of cartel formation are low and the 
incidences of cheating are high. Overall collusion in our experiment is considerably less 
successful than in other experiments with similar design but a single collusive price.10 In our 
experimental design, instead of facing two choices - to collude or not to collude, firms are 
offered four choices - to collude on the high price, the low price, either of them, or none of 
them. The descriptive statistics appear to suggest that the flexibility in choices does not induce 
collusion, instead, the availability of several collusive price choices turns out having a negative 
effect on collusion. 
One reason for this might be that, in the presence of endogenous enforcement, more 
choices introduce significantly more uncertainty in group decision-making and coordination. 
Heinemann et al. (2009) show that the dispersion of subjective beliefs increases with the 
complexity of the coordination problem. With only limited communication, it becomes more 
difficult for firms to form beliefs about others’ actions. Consequently, firms’ heterogeneous 
response to strategic uncertainty triggers the failure of collusion and induces cheating as 
suggested by (Van Huyck et al., 1991).  
 
                                                          
10 For example, in Chowdhury and Crede (2015) (with a critical discount factor for the ICC of 0.657), the proportion 
of cartel formation is around 20% and the incidence of cheating is around 10%, whereas in our baseline treatment, 
the proportion of cartel formation is 11.7% and the incidence of cheating is 85.7%. The main difference between 
their experimental design and ours is the number of collusive price choices. In their paper, cartels can only be 
formed on a single price whereas in ours cartelists can choose between two collusive prices.  
107 
 
5.4.1 Subjects’ suggested cartel prices 
We now turn to the main analysis based on regression models. First, we examine individual 
subjects’ suggested cartel prices in a multi-level multinomial logit model with random effects 
at the subjects’ level and report results in Table 5.3.11 Columns II to V present the estimated 
average marginal effects (with their cluster–robust standard errors in brackets) of the 
regressors on subjects’ choices of price agreements, with the choices being no agreement (0), 
an agreement on 46, an agreement on 52, and an agreement on either price (indifference 
between 46 and 52).  
Lag asking price denotes the price that a subject set in the previous period. Lag lowest 
seller is an indicator variable showing whether the subject set the lowest price in the previous 
period (such that she made a positive profit). Lag agreement 46 (52) controls for the effects of 
previous periods’ active price agreement on 46 (52) on subjects’ suggested cartel prices in this 
period. Lag choice 46, 52 and 46/52 are indicator variables of a subject’s suggested agreement 
price in the previous period, with no agreement (0) serving as the baseline. Given that a price 
agreement was in place in the previous period, Lag cheating 46 (52) and Lag detection 46 (52) 
indicate whether cheating or detection occurred on the respective agreement. EndoF, EndoD 
and BothEndo are treatment indicator variables that measure the treatment effects, and 
Baseline serves as the baseline. Period measures the period effects. Automatic price 52 is an 
indicator variable for the markets in which a price of 52 is chosen automatically if all three 
subjects in the group are indifferent between the two cartel prices. Finally, Risk attitude 
measures subjects’ risk attitudes elicited in the risk elicitation task in the spirit of Eckel and 
Grossman (2008). This variable contains discrete values between 1 and 6 where value 1 
represents the highest level of risk aversion and serves as the baseline.  
 
 
                                                          
11 Here we use a multi-level model to estimate price choices of individual subjects because subjects are grouped 
and the parameters vary at both the market level and the subject level. In section 5.4.2 where we estimate price 
choices of cartels, a multinomial logit model is used.  
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 0 46 52 46/52 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   0.003 0.001      0.006∗ −0.010∗∗ 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.150) (0.004) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟    −0.046∗       0.010 0.016 0.020 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 46     −0.150  −0.033    0.097 0.085 
 (0.151) (0.059) (0.102) (0.124) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 52   −0.075    −0.086∗∗∗  0.087 0.074 
 (0.087) (0.023) (0.062) (0.074) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46   −0.231∗∗∗        0.143∗∗∗   −0.010          0.098∗∗∗   
 (0.042) (0.033)    (0.031) (0.037) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 52   −0.309∗∗∗       0.058∗∗        0.146∗∗∗       0.105∗∗∗ 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.033) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46/52   −0.427∗∗∗   −0.053∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗       0.549∗∗∗  
 (0.040) (0.018) (0.029) (0.050) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 46     0.169∗∗ −0.028    −0.024       −0.118∗∗∗ 
 (0.068) (0.035) (0.057) (0.033) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 52       0.150∗∗    −0.030   −0.056       −0.064   
 (0.071) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 46   0.186 0.026  −0.115∗∗∗    −0.097  
  (0.160) (0.104) (0.034) (0.075) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 52  0.015      0.127∗  −0.091∗∗∗    −0.051  
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.020) (0.057) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐹  −0.068         0.091∗ −0.070    0.047 
 (0.076) (0.053) (0.044) (0.054) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐷  −0.099         0.154∗∗   −0.016     −0.040  
 (0.072) (0.063) (0.046) (0.055) 
𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜  −0.005         0.098∗   −0.046     −0.047   
 (0.065) (0.058) (0.048) (0.047) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑       0.014∗∗∗ −0.001      −0.008∗∗∗   −0.006∗∗∗ 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 52  −0.042    0.029   −0.035  0.049 
 (0.048) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 2   −0.084      0.011      0.080      −0.007    
 (0.115) (0.056) (0.089) (0.070) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 3 0.007 −0.005    0.047    −0.049  
 (0.104) (0.068) (0.089) (0.072) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 4   −0.202   0.073 0.164    −0.034   
  (0.127) (0.075) (0.126) (0.069) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 5    −0.009     −0.015    0.030    −0.006  
 (0.117) (0.072) (0.097) (0.067) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 6   −0.039   −0.003         0.034   0.008 
 (0.110) (0.061) (0.080) (0.075) 
Pseudo-LL −2135.055  
Observations 2736  
 Table 5.3 Suggested cartel agreement – Multi-level multinomial logit 
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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We first address Hypothesis 5.1. The observations obtained from Table 5.2 suggest that 
relatively fewer price agreements are reached on 46 in Baseline and that all of them involve 
cheating. The regression analysis confirms this result. As shown in Table 5.3, the treatment 
dummies indicate that, ceteris paribus, subjects are between 9.1% to 15.4% more likely to 
suggest the low price 46 as the agreement price in the treatments with endogenous enforcement 
than in Baseline. Taken together, we have strong evidence for Hypothesis 5.1.  
Result 5.1 In Baseline, the low cartel price is rarely chosen and results in unstable price 
agreements.  
Result 5.1 confirms that subjects understand the game. The intuition behind is 
straightforward: colluding on the low cartel price is not a payoff–dominant collusive 
equilibrium in Baseline. It follows that, ceteris paribus, payoff dominance is an important 
condition for collusion to arise. However, being payoff-dominant may not be sufficient. The 
fact that the majority of subjects did not choose the payoff–dominant collusive price 52 
indicates that subjects have other considerations and face additional constraints when agreeing 
on prices. 
Unlike in Baseline, in EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo, endogenous enforcement renders 
collusion on price 46 a payoff-dominant collusive equilibrium as well as the equilibrium with 
lower riskiness of collusion. If subjects care only about the expected payoff, 46 and 52 are 
equally likely to be chosen in these three treatments. However, as discussed above, issues of 
stability and sustainability are fundamental in cartel coordination, in which strategic 
uncertainty may hinder cooperative behaviour. If these considerations are taken into account, 
then given the theoretical predictions, subjects are more likely to choose 46 in these treatments.  
As shown in Figure 5.4b, price agreements on 46 occur more often in the treatments with 
endogenous enforcement than those on 52. Regression results in Table 5.3 further allow us to 
study the dynamics of subjects’ price choices. First, the Lag cheating variables suggest that 
cheating in the previous period strongly discourages subjects from choosing 52 as the 
agreement price in this period. However, cheating on an agreement on 52 in the previous 
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period increases the probability of subjects choosing 46 in this period. Hence, subjects learn 
about the different levels of riskiness and their choices converge to the collusive equilibrium 
with lower level of riskiness.  
Second, the Lag choice variables suggest that, ceteris paribus, subjects show a 5.8% 
probability to switch from price 52 to 46, but no such substitution pattern can be observed for 
the opposite direction. This adds to the above finding that subjects’ choices converge towards 
the equilibrium with the lower riskiness of collusion. Note that this finding is obtained given 
that we have controlled for the effects of events such as cheating, detection and previously 
reached price agreements. Thus, we find evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.2, which 
constitutes composition deterrence in line with the model predictions. 
Result 5.2 Suggested cartel prices converge to the low cartel price in the treatments with 
endogenous enforcement. 
As our analysis is limited to the first 20 periods of the game, the existence of this effect 
shows that it does not take long before subjects adjust choices towards the equilibrium with 
the lower riskiness of collusion.12  
We next move on to the issue of substitutability between fines and detection probabilities 
in the treatments with endogenous enforcement. There are no significant treatment effects with 
respect to the probability of choosing cartel price 52. This is in line with the experimental 
design, in which the fines and detection probabilities for price 52 are identical across 
treatments. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between treatments regarding 
subjects’ choices not to collude or to be indifferent between the two cartel prices. The only 
significant treatment effects remain to be compared are those on price choice 46.  
As shown before, subjects choose cartel price 46 more often in treatments with 
endogenous enforcement than in Baseline. In order to assess whether the probabilities of 
subjects choosing cartel price 46 vary with the different combinations of fines and detection 
                                                          
12 Yet, the effect might be more pronounced in longer games (see, Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). 
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probabilities across the treatments with endogenous enforcement, we compare across the 
associated treatment effects. Whereas the probabilities to choose price 46 in EndoF (9.1%) and 
BothEndo (9.8%) do not seem to differ from each other, the marginal effect is about 1/3 higher 
in EndoD (15.4%). To formally compare the treatment effects, we conduct pairwise Wald tests 
of the treatment indicator coefficients. The test results do not reject the Null hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients with p–values of 0.169 (EndoF/EndoD), 0.765 (EndoF/BothEndo), and 
0.103 (EndoD/BothEndo). As such, different combinations of fines and detection probabilities 
given the same expected punishment offer the same deterrence effect. 
As Baseline serves as the baseline in the regression analysis, concerns may arise from the 
unique collusive equilibrium in Baseline such that the coefficients for this treatment might 
differ from those in the other treatments. To ensure the robustness of the regression results, we 
re–estimate the multi–level multinomial logit model but exclude Baseline and use EndoF as 
the baseline. This potentially provides a more homogeneous sub–sample, increasing data 
precision whilst reducing the standard errors of the estimates.13 We find that almost all 
qualitative findings shown in Table 5.3 are supported by the regression estimates based on the 
sub–sample, and that the quantitative results only change marginally. Hence Hypothesis 5.3 is 
supported by the data. 14   
Result 5.3 Subjects’ suggested cartel prices are not sensitive to variations in the fine and the 
detection probability that feature the same expected punishment. 
We then test Hypothesis 5.4 relating to the impact of risk attitude on subjects’ suggested 
cartel prices. In order to rule out potential biases resulting from the specification of the 
functional form of the risk attitude measure, we include indicator variables for different 
degrees of risk aversion. Recall that we measure 6 different degrees of risk aversion using an 
                                                          
13 The results of this robustness check can be found in Table 5.6 in Appendix D3. 
14 Note that we obtain the above result in a framework that is relevant to the field and features an overproportionate 
increase in punishment compared to an increase in cartel profit resulting from higher overcharge. The result may 
therefore not be generalized to enforcement regimes that have different punishment strategies, i.e. punishment that 
increases linearly or underproportionately to the increase in cartel profit, which have little relevance for the field. 
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Eckel and Grossman (2008) style risk elicitation task, and that the measure is negatively 
correlated with risk aversion (value 1 indicates the highest level of risk aversion). Strikingly, 
despite this very conservative approach of including the different levels as dummies, not a 
single effect is significant. Yet, it has to be tested whether the different coefficients are jointly 
significant. For this, we conduct joint F–tests of the coefficients for the risk attitude indicator 
variables for all outcome regressions. However, in each case the joint F–test reports that the 
variables are jointly insignificant with p–values of 0.252 for outcome regression 46, 0.327 for 
52, and 0.790 for 46/52.15 Therefore, Hypothesis 5.4 can be confirmed. 
Result 5.4 Risk attitude does not determine subjects’ cartel price choices. 
The above result may possibly be due to the length of interaction of 20 periods, which 
enables subjects to repeatedly engage in learning about the strategies of the others in the same 
group. The effects of learning and belief-forming might dominate the effects of risk attitude 
on choices. We therefore re–run the same model but limit it to the first three periods of the 
game when information is limited and learning has not yet taken place, to see if risk attitude 
plays a role. The joint F–tests again indicate that the coefficients are jointly insignificant.16 
 
5.4.2 Cartel prices reached and welfare effects 
In this sub-section, we analyse the welfare effects of endogenous enforcement at both the 
subject level and the market level. First, we conduct a pairwise comparison of market prices 
and the overall proportions of cartel formation using MWU tests.17 Although Table 5.2 reports 
                                                          
15 Similarly, the risk attitude coefficients are jointly insignificant in the specification that excludes Baseline, with 
p–values of 0.144 for 52 and 0.579 for 46/52. Only for the choice of 46, the risk indicator variables are jointly 
significant (p–value 0.038). This result is driven by a single significant coefficient of Risk attitude – 4. However, 
since most coefficients are individually insignificant, we do not consider this as sufficient evidence for the 
significance of risk attitude in affecting price choices. 
16 The results can be found in Table 5.7 in Appendix D4. 
17 Given the instability of agreements observed in Table 5.2, we regard the proportion of markets with newly 
reached price agreements as a more insightful measure of cartel formation for this purpose. Yet, the same results 
arise with the alternative measure of active cartel agreements. 
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that average market prices are slightly higher in the treatments with endogenous enforcement 
(in particular in EndoF), the p–values shown in Table 5.4 suggests no significant difference in 
market prices across all treatments. 
Variable  EndoF EndoD BothEndo 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 
Baseline 0.386 0.312 0.751 
EndoF  0.840 0.214 
EndoD   0.452 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝. 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Baseline 1.000 0.702 0.768 
EndoF  0.836 0.883 
EndoD   0.977 
Table 5.4 MWU test p-value matrices for pairwise treatment differences 
Similarly, the p–values suggest that the proportions of cartel formation do not differ across 
the treatments. Recall that our experimental design imposes exogenous enforcement in 
Baseline and endogenous enforcement in the other treatments, our results seem to suggest that 
there is a lack of difference regarding welfare effects between the two enforcement regimes. 
Yet, this lack of difference might be due to the trade–off between frequency and composition 
deterrence. 
To address the factors that might have contributed to the trade-off and the lack of overall 
welfare difference, we conduct regression analysis on cartel price agreements reached using a 
multinomial logit model with random effects. The estimated average marginal effects and 
cluster–robust standard errors are reported in Table 5.5. Unlike the multi–level multinomial 
logit model used to analyse subjects’ cartel price choices, the regression table of cartels’ price 
choices does not feature a column for indifference between the two prices, as price agreements 
can only be reached on a single price. Most of the regressors in Table 5.5 are introduced before 
in the discussion of Table 5.3. Nevertheless, as the new regression is based on market level 
observations, we use Lag market price to instead of Lag asking price included in Table 5.3. 
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Furthermore, due to the market level observations, it cannot be controlled for individual 
subjects’ suggested cartel prices in the previous period.18  
 0 46 52 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 46    −0.825∗∗∗      0.743∗∗∗ 0.082 
 (0.066) (0.198) (0.150) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 52  −0.828∗∗∗ 0.318 0.511 
 (0.057) (0.318) (0.321) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔       0.138∗∗∗  −0.067∗∗∗  −0.071∗∗∗ 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 46       0.064∗∗∗ −0.007     −0.056∗∗∗ 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 52      0.093∗∗∗  −0.051∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑      0.007∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗  −0.004∗∗∗ 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 52  −0.005      −0.006    0.011 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  0.009 −0.008     −0.001    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐹  −0.030    0.041 −0.011    
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.017) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐷  0.002 0.032 −0.034∗∗ 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.017) 
𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜  0.001 0.026 −0.027∗   
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.016) 
Log pseudolikelihood −290.758 
Observations 912 
Table 5.5 Choice of price agreements - Multinomial logit 
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
We start with the uncertainty–driven composition deterrence, as it is our primary focus. 
The treatment indicator marginal effects in Table 5.5 suggest that, compared to Baseline, fewer 
cartels are formed on the high cartel price 52 in EndoD and BothEndo. As the overall 
proportions of cartel formation do not differ across treatments, this indicates that more cartels 
are formed on the low cartel price 46 in these two treatments. We therefore find evidence that 
endogenous enforcement leads to composition deterrence which, on average, reduces the cartel 
                                                          
18 Unlike in Table 5.3, we do not include separate effects of cheating on prices 46 and 52 in Table 5.5, as covariance 
matrices for the marginal effects cannot be calculated if the effects are determined separately. 
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overcharge. A similar treatment effect is missing in EndoF. Yet, the missing is ceteris paribus, 
i.e., it is possible that the treatment effect of EndoF is merely captured by the other coefficients. 
Given the evidence of composition deterrence in EndoD and BothEndo, ceteris paribus, 
market prices should be lower in these treatments than in Baseline. The fact that market prices 
do not differ significantly, as shown in Table 5.4, implies that there must be an opposing effect 
driving market prices up. Recall Result 5.1 that subjects are significantly more likely to suggest 
cartel price 46 in the treatments with endogenous enforcement than in Baseline, it is possible 
that endogenous enforcement renders collusion on 46 so attractive that additional cartels are 
formed on 46, resulting in an adverse effect on frequency deterrence. 
We now move on to discuss the dynamics of cartels prices reached. As shown in Table 
5.5, the Lag agreement marginal effects indicate that price agreements on price 46 are 
persistent whereas those on price 52 are not. Furthermore, the Lag detection variables suggest 
that detection of an agreement on 46 in the previous period does not reduce the probability of 
reaching an agreement on 46 in this period, but significantly reduces the probability of 
reaching an agreement on 52. Hence, we find a second source of adverse effects on frequency 
deterrence: while endogenous enforcement induces composition deterrence towards the low 
cartel price 46, it increases the stability of collusion on this price.  
Overall, we find evidence in support of the trade–off generated by endogenous 
enforcement on deterrence and welfare. First, it reduces cartel overcharges and leads to 
composition deterrence. Second, it increases the complexity of cartel coordination and renders 
reaching cartel agreements more difficult. Third, it leads to an adverse effect on frequency 
deterrence as it encourages additional collusion on the low cartel price. Finally, it leads to a 
second adverse effect on frequency deterrence as it stabilises collusion on the low cartel price. 
The first two effects are positive for cartel deterrence and welfare, whereas the latter two are 
negative. It is likely that due to these counteracting effects, the overall welfare effect of 
endogenous enforcement is unclear and that market prices and the proportions of cartel 
formation do not differ significantly between treatments with exogenous and endogenous 
enforcement. 
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Besides the trade-off, there are some additional factors that might account for the above 
result. First, this paper focuses on the indirect strategic uncertainty driven deterrence channel 
of endogenous enforcement, thus fines and detection probabilities are chosen to equalise the 
expected profitability of collusion on cartel prices 46 and 52. Yet, if the expected profitability 
differs between different cartel prices, then one might expect the overall effects of endogenous 
enforcement to change as well. For example, the composition deterrence effect would be 
stronger if the expected payoffs become higher for collusion on price 46 than on 52. Second, 
the communication protocol is designed to clearly capture individual subjects’ preferences for 
cartel prices and to measure the effects of strategic uncertainty on decision–making. This 
comes at the cost of rendering coordination more difficult. Alternative communication 
protocols such as free–form chat may be more effective in establishing and sustaining 
collusion, as they allow bargaining to precede cartel price choices. This is in contrast to our 
experimental design, in which bargaining is only possible through signalling over the course 
of several periods of the game. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
As it would be prohibitively costly for antitrust enforcement to deter cartels altogether, 
composition deterrence in the presence of endogenous enforcement may represent an 
important determinant of the overall welfare effects of antitrust laws as it may help to reduce 
the harm caused by cartels. To better understand the properties of endogenous antitrust 
enforcement, this paper seeks to establish its effect on composition deterrence that stems from 
its impact on strategic uncertainty on cartel prices.  
For this purpose, we conduct a laboratory experiment on non–cooperative infinitely–
repeated games in which subjects engage in price competition in homogeneous goods Bertrand 
triopoly markets. Subjects can coordinate on prices but face the risk of being detected and 
fined if they do. The experimental design and chosen parameters allow us to abstract from the 
profitability–driven incentives induced by endogenous enforcement and focus on the indirect 
effects of strategic uncertainty on subjects’ decision–making. The implemented endogenous 
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enforcement regime features an overproportionate increase in punishment compared to an 
increase in collusive payoffs resulting from higher overcharge, giving rise to payoff–
equivalent collusive equilibria that bear different levels of riskiness of collusion. 
Our results confirm that payoff dominance is a necessary but insufficient condition in 
determining cartel price choices in the presence of endogenous punishment. In line with the 
prisoner’s other dilemma framework of Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski and Spagnolo (2015), 
we find that subjects’ choices converge to the collusive equilibrium with lower level of 
riskiness of collusion. This highlights the role of strategic uncertainty in cartel coordination 
problems. Furthermore, subjects’ cartel price selection is insensitive to different combinations 
of fines and detection probabilities featuring the same expected punishment, and is not driven 
by their risk attitudes.  
With regard to market outcomes, the results suggest a trade–off between increased 
composition deterrence and reduced frequency deterrence in the presence of endogenous 
enforcement. On the one hand, we find strong evidence of the strategic uncertainty–driven 
overcharge reducing composition deterrence. On the other hand, the frequency deterrence 
properties of the enforcement are reduced. This follows from the fact that cartels can self–
select themselves into weaker expected punishment by colluding on low prices only. As a 
result of these opposing effects, the overall welfare effect of endogenous enforcement given 
our experimental design is unclear. 
In contrast to the large body of literature exists for the two forms of deterrence, especially 
for frequency deterrence, little is known about how they interact under different enforcement 
regimes. While we highlight the trade-off between frequency and composition deterrence in 
this paper, we expect future research to investigate it further. For example, while we focus 
purely on uncertainty–driven effects, the trade–off may differ when profitability–driven 
effects are present as well. Several studies (e.g. Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1992; Alm, 
Sanchez and Juan, 1995) find that subjects do not react to punishment in accordance to its 
functional form. Therefore, the observed behaviour might differ from the best behaviour 
predicted by theory. 
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5.6 Appendices D 
D1. Instructions of treatment BothEndo with automatic price 52 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you can earn 
money. How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on the decision made 
by other participants in this room. The experiment will proceed in two parts. The currency 
used in the experiment is experimental points. Each experimental point is worth 12 pence. All 
earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be anonymous, that 
is, your identity will not be revealed to other participants at any time during or after the 
experiment. It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any questions, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. 
Instructions for Part 1 
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked to choose from six different gambles (as 
shown below). Each circle represents a different gamble and you must choose the one that 
you prefer. Each circle is divided in half. The two numbers in each circle represent the amount 
of experimental points the gamble will give you. 
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An experimenter will toss a coin to determine which half of the circle is chosen. A volunteer 
will come to the front of the room and confirm the result of the coin toss. If the outcome is 
heads, you will receive the number of points in the light grey area of the circle you have chosen. 
If the outcome is tails, you will receive the number of points shown in the dark grey area of 
the circle you have chosen. Note that no matter which gamble you pick, each outcome will 
occur with a 50% chance. 
Please select the gamble of your choice by entering the number of your gamble (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
or 6) in the field “I choose Gamble” and press OK.  
Once everyone has made their decision, Part 1 will end and we will move on to Part 2 of the 
experiment.  
Instructions for Part 2  
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen 
participants in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the same two 
participants. All groups of three participants act independently of each other. This part of the 
experiment will be repeated for at least 20 rounds. From the 20th round onwards, in each round 
there is a 20 out of 100 (20%) chance that the experiment will end.  
Your job: 
You are in the role of a firm that is in a market with two other firms. In each round, you will 
have to set a price for your product. This price must be one of the following prices: 
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 
You will only sell the product if the other firms do not set a lower price than you in that round. 
If you sell the product, your earnings are equal to the difference between the price and the cost, 
which is 40: 
Earnings = Price – 40. 
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Therefore, you will not make any profit if you set a price of 40. If you do not sell the product, 
you will not get any earnings but you will not incur costs either. If two or more firms set the 
same lowest price, the earnings will be shared equally between them.  
Before you set your price, you may decide to agree with the other firms to set the same price 
and share the earnings. There are two prices you can agree on, 46 and 52. If you agree with 
the other two firms to set the price of 46 and all firms set 46, each firm will get a profit of 2 
experimental points. If you agree with the other two firms to set the price of 52 and all firms 
set 52, each firm will get a profit of 4 experimental points. 
The picture below shows how this will look on the computer. All firms get asked whether they 
want to agree on prices.  
 
If you want to agree on prices, you can indicate so by choosing the price you want to agree on. 
You can choose either 46 or 52, or you can choose both prices. The other two firms will do 
the same. If all three firms wish to agree on prices, and there exists a common price among 
the three firms’ chosen prices, an agreement is reached on that common price. 
If all three firms choose both prices, implying that they are fine agreeing on both prices, then 
a price agreement on 52 will be reached automatically. If there is no common price among 
firms’ choices, no price agreement is reached. For example, no common price is reached if 
two firms suggest price 46 and one firm suggest price 52. 
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If you do not wish to agree on prices with the other two firms, you can indicate so by choosing 
the option No. If at least one firm chooses No, there will be no price agreement.  
The following table summarises how price agreement can be reached: 
 
Price agreement is 
reached, if 
All three firms wish to agree on prices and 
they reach one common price 
Agreed price is the common 
price (46 or 52) 
All three firms wish to agree on prices and 
they reach two common prices (when all 
firms choose both 46 and 52) 
Agreed price is 52 
Price agreement is 
not reached, if 
All three firms wish to agree on prices and they reach no common price 
At least one firm does not wish to agree on prices 
 
After deciding whether you would like to form a price agreement, you have to set a price by 
filling the “Choose a price” box shown below.  If a price agreement is reached, a message will 
appear above the “Choose a price” box showing the price that you agreed on. If no price 
agreement is reached in that round, no message will appear and you have to set a price without 
being able to coordinate with the other firms. 
 
However, the agreement is not binding and you are not required to set the agreed price. After 
your price choice, you will be informed about the prices that you and the other firms set in that 
round. If you successfully reach a price agreement, the agreement may be discovered by the 
computer. The computer can discover the agreement on price 46 with a 10 out of 100 (10%) 
chance, and can discover the agreement on price 52 with a 20 out of 100 (20%) chance. If the 
agreement on price 46 is discovered, a fine of 4 experimental points has to be paid. If the 
agreement on price 52 is discovered, a fine of 12 experimental points has to be paid. If no price 
agreement is reached, you cannot be discovered or receive a fine. 
The chance of being discovered and the fine depend on the price agreement reached, but not 
on the prices you set afterwards. The table below summarizes the chance of being discovered 
by the computer and the associated fines: 
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 Chance of being discovered Fine 
No price agreement is reached 0% 0 
Firms agree on price 46 10% 4 
Firms agree on price 52 20% 12 
 
A price agreement can be discovered as long as it has not been discovered in a previous round. 
Once this has happened, you will not be fined in the future, unless you make a price agreement 
again. If you and the other two firms had several price agreements and none of them has been 
discovered, the chance of being discovered and fine always depend on the latest price 
agreement. 
The picture below summarizes the structure of Part 2 of the experiment. 
 
At the end of each round, you will be told the earnings you have made in this round. If you 
have reached a price agreement, you will also be told whether the agreement has been 
discovered by the computer.  
Final payment:  
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 50 points = 6 GBP. 
The earnings you make in each round will be converted into cash. Each point is worth 12 pence, 
and we will round up the final payment to the next 10 pence. We guarantee a minimum earning 
of 2 GBP.                                                                                                                                    □   
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D2. Figure 5.5 
 
                    a) Asking and market prices                                b) Asking prices and previous cheating  
Figure 5.5 Choice of prices 
Figure 5.5a plots the distribution of both asking and market prices across treatments in the first 
20 periods. As it illustrates, homogeneous goods price competition and incidences of cheating 
lead market prices to be below the asking prices. As previously stated, the predominant price 
set by subjects is 41, which is the only symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium and yields 
positive payoffs. Figure 5.5b plots the distribution of asking prices dependent on whether 
cheating occurred in the previous period on a price agreement reached in that period. 
Remarkably, although a number of agreements are reached on price 52, cheating primarily 
leads subjects to charge prices from range between 41 and 45. This can be observed from 
Figure 5.5a as well. In other words, subjects that deviate from agreements on price 52 tend to 
undercut by charging prices below the low cartel price of 46.                                                  □                                                         
 
 
 
124 
 
D3. Table 5.6 
 0 46 52 46/52 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   0.004 0.002      0.004 −0.010∗∗ 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟     −0.045  0.018 0.000 0.027 
 (0.033) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 46      −0.126   −0.039    0.101 0.064 
 (0.147) (0.074) (0.100) (0.107) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 52       0.039   −0.109∗∗∗ 0.039 0.031 
 (0.076) (0.025) (0.036) (0.074) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46    −0.227∗∗∗            0.172∗∗∗ −0.028          0.082∗∗ 
 (0.046) (0.032)    (0.034) (0.036) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 52    −0.321∗∗∗       0.063∗        0.120∗∗∗       0.138∗∗∗ 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.056) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46/52     −0.443∗∗∗   −0.072∗∗∗ −0.058∗        0.573∗∗∗  
 (0.052) (0.023) (0.035) (0.068) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 46     0.140∗∗ −0.029    −0.013       −0.098∗∗∗ 
 (0.068) (0.044) (0.059) (0.033) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 52        0.106    −0.035   −0.041       −0.066   
 (0.084) (0.035) (0.029) (0.060) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 46   0.181 0.033  −0.109∗∗∗    −0.104  
  (0.166) (0.121) (0.037) (0.069) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 52     −0.095∗       0.197∗∗  −0.066∗∗∗    −0.035  
 (0.055) (0.083) (0.018) (0.056) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐷  −0.029         0.055 0.055 −0.081∗  
 (0.074) (0.041) (0.057) (0.046) 
𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜         0.070    −0.003      0.020    −0.086∗∗ 
 (0.070)  (0.041) (0.056) (0.040) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑        0.015∗∗∗ −0.002      −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 52  −0.010    0.011   −0.041  0.040 
 (0.054) (0.033) (0.042) (0.045) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 2    −0.019      0.022      0.031      −0.034    
 (0.112) (0.052) (0.079) (0.068) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 3 0.037 0.026 0.027    −0.090  
 (0.107) (0.084) (0.085) (0.075) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 4    −0.278∗∗       0.213∗∗ 0.121    −0.056   
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.115) (0.074) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 5    0.007  0.058   −0.009     −0.056    
 (0.152) (0.118) (0.100) (0.070) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 6    −0.004   0.048   −0.056 0.012 
 (0.112) (0.078) (0.052) (0.087) 
Pseudo-LL −1587.218  
Observations 2052  
Table 5.6 Suggested cartel agreement excluding Baseline – Multi-level multinomial logit 
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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D4. Table 5.7 
 0 46 52 46/52 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒         0.017∗    −0.016∗     −0.007  0.006 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟        0.061    −0.053     −0.095∗  0.086 
 (0.062) (0.053) (0.054) (0.060) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 46   0.059  −0.188∗∗∗      0.297∗∗    −0.168∗∗  
 (0.120) (0.018) (0.012) (0.065) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 52    −0.065        −0.222∗∗∗      0.361∗∗∗    −0.073  
 (0.104) (0.020) (0.127) (0.088) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46    −0.227∗∗∗       0.067 0.011       0.149∗∗ 
 (0.049) (0.058)     (0.073) (0.066) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 52    −0.355∗∗∗        0.030      0.279∗∗∗        0.046 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.066) (0.068) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 46/52   −0.387∗∗∗   −0.136∗∗∗   −0.168∗∗∗        0.691∗∗∗  
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.056) (0.060) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 46       0.169∗∗∗ −0.028    −0.024       −0.118∗∗∗ 
 (0.068) (0.035) (0.057) (0.033) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 52        0.406∗∗∗     −0.107∗∗   −0.149∗      −0.150∗∗  
 (0.125) (0.045) (0.082) (0.066) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 46      −0.194∗∗∗        0.709∗∗∗   −0.286∗∗∗    −0.229∗∗∗  
  (0.028) (0.020) (0.031) (0.075) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 52     −0.215∗∗∗        0.658∗∗∗  −0.239∗∗∗    −0.204∗∗∗  
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.036) (0.032) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐹        0.076     −0.020 −0.088    0.032 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.056) 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝐷  0.011       0.161∗∗   −0.075     −0.098∗  
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.054) (0.054) 
𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜  0.001       0.203∗∗∗   −0.117∗     −0.086∗∗   
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.067) (0.044) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑        0.073  −0.082∗∗    −0.015  0.025 
 (0.048) (0.037) (0.057) (0.044) 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 52  0.004    −0.003   −0.047  0.046 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.046) (0.042) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 2       0.009 0.059      0.019      −0.087    
 (0.070) (0.083) (0.081) (0.060) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 3 0.068 −0.056      −0.038        0.026  
 (0.087) (0.072) (0.076) (0.080) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 4    −0.196∗∗∗ 0.146 0.101    −0.052   
 (0.066) (0.102) (0.090) (0.059) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 5    −0.020     0.063 0.008    −0.051  
 (0.076) (0.095) (0.104) (0.061) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 6       0.019   0.086   −0.022    −0.083 
 (0.084) (0.094) (0.077) (0.058) 
Pseudo-LL −296.673  
Observations 288  
Table 5.7 Suggested cartel agreements – Multi-level multinomial logit 
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Includes only the first three periods. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
This thesis consists of four independent essays, each addressing a specific issue regarding 
firms’ strategic incentives and inter-firm agreements. These essays are meant to contribute to 
our understanding of some new issues emerged along the progress of economy and 
information technology that, in general, have not yet received much investigation by the 
economic literature. In the first three essays, we apply IO theory to examine the nature of the 
selected new phenomenon observed in the real world, assessing their underlying motives, as 
well as the effects on competition and welfare. In the final essay, we seek to blend some 
behavioral insights into IO theory in a laboratory experiment. 
To briefly sum up, Chapter 2 evaluates the profitability, entry deterrence and welfare 
effects of quality proliferation in a market of vertical maximal differentiation. Chapter 3 
examines the agency model characterizing a vertical relation through comparing it to the 
wholesale model and linking it to the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints. Based on a 
broader framework, Chapter 4 formally distinguishes between classic RPM and agency RPM, 
with the agency model as an example of the latter, and clarifies the ceteris paribus effects of 
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reversing decision roles and changing forms of the transfer payment in vertical contracts. 
Finally, Chapter 5 establishes the strategic uncertainty driven channel of cartel deterrence in 
the presence of endogenous enforcement, and highlights the trade-off between frequency and 
composition deterrence. 
We discuss future research relating to each essay in turn. While Chapter 2 is inspired by 
the popular high-street and luxury brands collaboration, it aims at examining the effects of 
proliferation when it is adopted by a single high quality firm. Nonetheless, we repeatedly 
observe in the fashion apparel industry that brands collaborations are conducted by two 
vertically differentiated brands, and sometimes high-street brands, rather than designer brands, 
seem to take the initiative.1 Hence we consider it relevant to include the low quality firm in 
the analysis. Joint proliferation has been examined in the marketing literature as a type of 
strategic alliance, joint venture or co-branding (e.g., Chun and Niehm, 2010), with the focus 
being whether such proliferation strategies can benefit both collaborating parties. Meanwhile, 
there is a lack of economic analysis on the respective incentive of vertically differentiated 
firms to engage in joint proliferation.  
Furthermore, although vertical joint proliferation is usually conducted by two vertically 
differentiated branded manufacturers, e.g., Lavin for H&M (2010) and Vivienne Westwood 
for Lee (2010), it can also be between a designer brand and a high-street retailer, e.g., the US 
Target Corporation has teamed up with a number of designer brands. Hence future research 
can examine proliferation strategy from the perspective of vertical relation. Moreover, as 
consumers care increasingly more about the non-physical utility offered by physical goods, 
distinguishing between true quality and perceived quality while having bounded-rational 
consumers in the model would be an alternative approach to enrich the analysis and increase 
policy relevance. 
While Chapter 4 in many ways extends Chapter 3, there are several interesting avenues 
for future research based on itself. First, given the analysis of each pure form two-level vertical 
                                                          
1 H&M collaborations are a typical example of such. It has been actively engaging in collaborations with various 
designers for decades. In May 2016, it announced its next collaboration with French designer brand Kenzo, to be 
launched in November 2016.  
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contract, future research can assess more complex contracts that involve both unit-fee and 
revenue-sharing transfer payments, as well as multi-level vertical markets in which different 
vertical contracts are written between different levels of the market. This kind of analysis 
would allow us to better evaluate RPM used in a particular industry. Second, it is important 
for future research to study the equilibrium contract selection problem, assuming fully 
noncooperative behavior of firms; and to examine the effects of any additional vertical 
restraint used when there is room for joint profit maximisation.  
Regarding the final chapter, future research should continue the study on the strategic 
uncertainty driven channel of deterrence and the trade-off between frequency and composition 
deterrence. In particular, future experimental studies may wish to consider alternative designs 
to examine the effects of endogenous enforcement. The trade-off between the two forms of 
deterrence may differ when the profitability-driven incentives are present as well. 
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